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My dissertation, Ways of Living: An Ethical Realism in the Prose of Gottfried 
Keller, takes as its focus the extensive discourse in mid-nineteenth century German letters 
on what constitutes a properly “realist” work of literature. My study examines three major 
works by Gottfried Keller: Der grüne Heinrich, the Leute von Seldwyla cycle, and the 
political satire Martin Salander. Keller, I argue, is less interested in offering a 
comprehensive social portrait of his native Switzerland than he is in exploring contrasting 
ethics, or modes of disposition towards the world: resentment and affirmation, 
parsimoniousness and wastefulness, sensuality and renunciation. To this end, Keller uses 
the familiar structures of Realist prose, like the construction of characters as types, the 
extensive description of physical objects, or the use of narrative topoi like the marriage 
plot, to dramatize conflicts between various Lebensarten: self-sacrifice in service of an 
unattainable ideal or fleeting happiness in the here and now, for example. For Keller, then, 
the “objectivity” championed by the Realists is above all a way of directing the reader’s 
attention towards the crises of value underpinning the most unremarkable of people and 
the most mundane of occupations. In Keller’s prose, I conclude, Realism is less an aesthetic 
program than a way of comporting oneself, a survival mechanism by means of which the 
hard truths of life, above all the vanity of human endeavor and the painful renunciations 
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1. Keller as Poetic Realist 
 
  
In his 1927 review of the first published edition of Gottfried Keller’s collected works, 
Walter Benjamin observed that Keller occupied a curious place in the canon of German 
letters. The new-old truth that Keller is one of the three or four greatest prose authors is too 
old to interest a modern readership, wrote Benjamin, and too recent to oblige anyone to 
read him.1 Nearly a century later, the difficulty facing a scholar preparing a study of 
Gottfried Keller is very much the same as the one that faced Benjamin. Certainly, Keller’s 
status as a canonical author of German-language literature has been cemented. His Romeo 
und Julia auf dem Dorfe and Kleider machen Leute remain staples of the Gymnasium 
reading list; and the rest of his works have been read consistently since his death—Keller’s 
legacy even managed to survive the National Socialist period without the message of 
tolerance and liberalism in his texts being abridged or distorted. In Zürich, Berlin, and 
Munich, the cities where he lived and worked, his memory is preserved by street signs, 
stamps, and plaques bearing his name. The last decade alone has seen scores of articles, 
conferences, and omnibus collections of criticism on Keller’s work, a sign not only of its 
depth and complexity, but of the abiding loyalty it inspires in its readers. 
 At the same time, the defining features of Keller’s work—its proud provincialism, 
its gentle irony, its skepticism of lofty philosophical speculation—have always prevented 
                                                
1 “Wie dem nun sei—die neu-alte Wahrheit, die Keller unter die drei oder vier größten Prosaiker der 
deutschen Sprache aufnimmt, hat immer noch einen schweren Stand. Sie ist zu alt um die Leute zu 
interessierien, und zu neu um sie zu verpflichten.“  Benjamin, Walter. Erzählen. “Gottfried Keller.” 
Suhrkamp: 2007. p. 40. 
 2 
him from attaining the highest rank in the pantheon of German writers. Theodor Adorno, 
in his remarks on the centennial of Heinrich Heine’s death, mentions the “utterly dismal” 
level of the prose written during what he dismissively refers to as “the epoch between 
Goethe and Nietzsche”—the era, in other words, of Keller and poetic Realism.2 The periods 
that bookend Keller’s time, that of Idealism and Romanticism on the one hand, and “the 
Modern” on the other, have always attracted Germanists and comparatists because of the 
extremely close relationship to speculative philosophy enjoyed by literature during those 
times, as though the latter, lacking in nobility, is only justified as an object of inquiry by 
association with the former. Realism, by contrast, has the ring of the philistine, the blithely 
unreflective. For Erich Auerbach, an admirer of Keller’s, the simple fact that Adalbert 
Stifter and Gustave Flaubert were contemporaries was definitive proof of the mediocrity 
of nineteenth century German letters. Even Keller’s appearance, W.G. Sebald observes, 
suggests a fundamental lack of seriousness in his work. With his pointy goatee and round 
spectacles, he seems more a provincial bureaucrat, the ink-stained holder of an insignificant 
public office, than an artist with penetrating insight into human existence.3 The difficulty, 
then, is why one ought to write about an author whom everyone is familiar, but in whom, 
because of his attachment to a little-loved period, no one expects to find the fertile ground 
for scholarly research afforded by a Hölderlin or a Kafka. 
As a result, recent scholarship has tended, largely though not exclusively, to soft-
pedal Keller’s relationship to the Realist period. In his book Sprachbilder, published in the 
year 2000, Helmut Pfotenhauer observes that the overwhelming tendency of scholarship 
                                                
2 “Das Ärgernis umgeht, wer sich auf den Prosaschriftsteller (Heine) beschränkt, dessen Rang, inmitten des 
durchweg trostlosen Niveaus der Epoche zwischen Goethe und Nietzsche, in die Augen springt.” Adorno, 
Theodor W. Noten zur Literatur. Suhrkamp, 2003. p. 72.  
3 Sebald, W.G. Logis in einem Landhaus. Fischer Verlag: 1998. 
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on Realism in the previous years has been to attack the notion that an objective reality is 
represented in the works of the period. “Das Interesse der Realismus-Forcsung in den 
letzten Jahren richtete sich vonehmlich darauf,” writes Pfotenhauer, “die Gebrochenheit 
der in den einschlägigen Texten konstituierten ‘Wirklichkeit’ zu erweisen,” best 
represented by scholars like Ursula Amrein, Gerhard Neumann, and Christian Begemann. 
That tendency has become still stronger in the decade and a half since Pfotenhauer’s book. 
Many studies choose to side-step the question of representing reality by adopting a tighter 
thematic focus—Sabine Schneider, Ursula Amrain, Caroline von Loewenich, for example, 
on representations of the female figure and the role of the family4; Karl Wagner and Phillip 
Anjouri on Keller’s relationship to the natural sciences and other emerging modes of 
knowledge in the mid-nineteenth century5; Richard Ruppel, and Karl Pestalozzi on the 
themes of happiness and the good life in his work6; Thomas Binder and Alexander Honold 
on the role of affect and socialization.7 The complex Textgestaltung of Keller’s works, 
which were written, re-written, and then revised again by Keller later in life remains a 
perennial subject of inquiry for Keller scholars.8 Those scholars who, like Ernst Osterkamp 
                                                
4Cf. Schneider, Sabine. Der grüne Heinrich neu gelesen. “Ikonen der Liebe. Frauenbilder.” Ed. Wolfram 
Groddeck. Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2009. pp. 201-220; Amrein, Ursula. “Süße Frauenbilder zu erfinden, wie 
die bitter Erdie sie nicht hegt!” Inszenierte Autorschaft bei Gottfried Keller. Rede zum Herbsbott 1996. 
Fünfundsechzigster Jahresbericht. Gottfried Keller-Gesellschaft-Verlag, 1997. pp 3-24. von Loewenich, 
Caroline. Gottfried Keller: Frauenbild und Frauengestalten im erzahlerischen Werk. Würzburg: 
Königshausen u. Neumann, 200. 224. 
5 Cf. Wagner, Karl. “ ‘Das Glück des Wissens’: Formen des Wissens und der Wissenschaft in Kellers 
Roman.” Der grüne Heinrich neu gelesen. Ed Wolfram Groddeck. Chronos, 2009. pp. 91; Ajouri, Phillip. 
Erzählen nach Darwin: Die Krise der Teolologie im literarischen Realismus. De Gruyter, 2007.   
6Cf. Ruppel, Richard. Gottfried Keller: Poet, Pedagogue, and Humanist. Peter Lang, 1988; Karl 
Pestalozzi.“Sprächliche Glücksmomente bei Gottfried Keller.” Gottfried Keller: Elf Essays zu seinem Werk. 
Ed. Hans Wysling. Fink, 1990. pp. 185-202. 
7Cf. Binder, Thomas. “Zwischen Experimentfreude und Pflichtgefühl.” Gottfried Keller: Romane und 
Erzählungen. Ed. Walter Morgenthaler. Stuttgart, 2007. pp. 154-171. Honold, Alexander. “Vermittlung und 
Verwilderung: Gottfried Keller’s Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe.” Deutsche Verteljahrschrift für 
Literaturweissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte. Issue 78. Vol. 3, pp. 459-81. 
8 Cf. Müller, Dominik. “Wiederlesen und weiterschreiben. Gottfried Keller’s Neugestaltung des ‘Grünen 
Heinrich’: Mit einer Synopse von beiden Fassungen. Peter Lang, 1988.  
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and Rainer Nägele, do engage more concretely with Verklärung, the poetic transfiguration 
of reality—the central concept of the Realist program in Germany—tend to do so without 
reference to the other authors and critical writing of the period, preferring instead to link 
Keller’s artistic process to other, more attractive areas of inquiry—the former to the 
tradition of landscape painting and medial differences between literature and the visual 
arts, the latter to the relationship between the affects and literary representation, with 
Kafka’s Surrealism as the primary counterpoint.9 Nonetheless, these studies all share what 
Pfotenhauer identifies as the central insight of contemporary scholarship on Realism: 
“Gebrochen, so zeight sich, sind die Realitäten des ‘Realismus’ durch die Modi ihrer 
Darstellung, die sich in ihrer Eigenart und imaginativen Leistung vor den Referenten im 
Draußen, in der gegebenen Welt schieben, die suggeriert wird. Auf Semiose statt auf eine 
schlichte Vorstellung von Abbildung richtet sich die Aufmerksamkeit.”10 My work shares 
the view that a close examination of Keller’s work yields not a transparent portrait of the 
world in which Keller lived, as even some of Keller’s most perceptive readers have tended 
to assume, but rather a prose of remarkable semiological heterogeneity, in which the act of 
representation is no less foregrounded than that which is represented, in which the act of 
poetic transfiguration is itself dramatized and performed. That poetic images are somehow 
realer, fuller, more alive, and, in some crucial and ultimately mysterious way, independent 
of life itself is one of the main Leitmotive of Keller’s writing. At the same time, however, 
I do not go so far as to say that the concept of “reality” or of “life” can be so readily 
                                                
9 Cf. Osterkamp, Ernst. “Erzählte Landschaften”. Der grüne Heinrich neu gelesen. Chronos, 2007. pp. 141-
158.; Nägele, Rainer. “Keller’s Cellar Vaults: Intrusions of the Real in Gottfried Keller’s Realism.” 
Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern and Contemporary Thought. Ed. 
Rüdiger Cample and Julia Weber. De Gruyter, 2014. pp. 187-201.  
10 Pfotenhauer, Helmut. Sprachbilder. Untersuchungen zur Literatur seit dem achtzehnten Jahrhundert. 
Königshausen & Neumann, 2000.  
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jettisoned when discussing Keller. It is my view that, while the rich weave of metaphor, 
personae, narrative voices, and intertextual allusions expands ever outward, the belief that 
something called customs, manners, institutions, and emotions of human life do exist, that 
they can be represented, and that, though he might not succeed, it is the artist’s duty to 
attempt to capture them, serves as a centripetal force that pushes back against this play. In 
this view, literature is not simply a bearer of meaning, but a creator of meaning, in the very 
real and concrete sense of allowing the reader to orient himself in the jumble of perceptions 
that constitutes his daily life. This sentiment is expressed most succinctly by Julian Schmidt 
in one of his many polemics against Romanticism: “Wir sind in der Edda, im Homer, in 
den Vedas zu Hause, aber nicht bei uns.”11 The scholar Kinder is right to say, then, that 
while all artworks make some claim to truth, it is only Realist literature that submits itself 
to the judgment of richtig/falsch—that whatever else the text undertakes, whatever else it 
offers, it must produce an image of the world that the reader can recognize.  
As a consequence, I found myself returning again and again to the question of 
Realism as I read Keller. I found myself consistently puzzled by what appeared to me to 
two opposite poles in Keller’s unique, remarkable style. On the one hand, I was struck by 
the extent to which Keller’s work, particularly the second volume of Der grüne Heinrich 
and the Seldwyla novellas, demonstrated a penetrating insight into the working of his 
world—and ours. The gradual obsolescence of handicraft and the rise of the debt economy; 
the twin bounds of love and guilt, of need and the desire for independence as constitutive 
of family life; the triumphs and disappointments of artistic life; and, perhaps most forward-
thinking for the nineteenth century novel, the depiction of a sexuality liberated of Christian 
                                                
11 Schmidt, Julian.“Die Reakton in der deutschen Poesie.” Realismus und Gründerzeit: Manifeste und 
Dokumente zur deutschen Literatur 1848-1880. Vol 2. Ed. Max Bucher. Springer Verlag, 1981. p.85. 
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shame without descending into libertinis as indispensable for a happy and fulfilling life—
all these appeared to me to be rendered with unerring fidelity and considerable pathos. On 
the other hand, I was struck, particularly when I contrasted his work against his 
contemporaries in England and France, by the extent to which Keller’s work appears to be 
set not in the present, but in the timeless, fairy-tale like realm of allegory, in which social 
and historical detail that might anchor Keller’s writing more firmly to a world that was 
recognizably his seemed to be deliberately withheld. In what sense, I wondered, did Keller 
consider himself, and can we consider him now, a Realist? And how can we understand 
this process of poetically transfiguring reality, the Verklärung or Verschönung of the world 
to which Keller repeatedly refers in his work, his letters, and his critical essays? These are 
the questions that motivate this dissertation. 
 It is the central argument of my dissertation, then, that Keller’s relationship to the 
movement known as Realism is crucial to any understanding of his work. Before Keller’s 
novels can advance a theory of the family or of alienated labor, it must pluck these themes 
out of the stream of everyday experience and fix them in prose. To do that, the author must 
have some sense, some understanding, as to why he or she is embarking on this enterprise, 
of what he or she hopes to achieve. And while some authors resolve the how and the why 
of their work without explicitly expressing them, Keller returns again and again in his 
work, his letters, and his conversations with friends, to the question of the relationship 
between art and life. The reason he does so, I will argue, has to do with the unique position 
of German Realism as a deeply programmatic movement that saw itself as inaugurating a 
modern German literature.  
 7 
 I believe that these questions are the more pressing in reading Keller because, 
whereas in England and America, Realism emerged more or less organically from the 
pages of the newspaper, combining reportage with genres like travel-writing, humor, and 
satire; and while in France the authors of the Realist period drew openly on the social 
observation of aristocratic memoirs and letters; the authors of German Realism believed 
themselves to be inventing a new kind of literature from whole cloth in the wake of the 
defeated revolutions of 1848.12 They distinguished their own pessimistic, ostensibly non-
political outlook from the overtly political, revolutionary writing of the Vormärz; as well 
as from Romanticism, whose fantastical style belied, as the Realists saw it, a thinly veiled 
nostalgia for a feudal agrarianism, dynastic aristocracy, and the unchallenged power and 
security of the Catholic Church. The authors of the period—Gustav Freytag, Theodor 
Storm, Berthold Auerbach, Jeremias Gotthelf, Wilhelm Raabe, Adalbert Stifter, and later, 
Theodor Fontane, together with critics like Julian Schmidt, Theodor Vischer, and Emil von 
Horowicz—saw it is as their task to draw “ordinary life” onto stage of artistic 
representation. Ordinary life, of course, is skewed to the middle class perspective of these 
authors. Common themes included the transformation of labor from agriculture to industry; 
the conflict, often a romantic one, between the aristocracy and the rising middle classes; 
the struggle for freedom in times past, from medieval times up to Napoleon; city life as it 
was newly emerging; and the serenity of nature. 
 And so while every work of literature makes a claim to truth, it is, as Hermann 
Kinder observes, Realism alone that asks to be valued for its its verisimilitude. Only 
                                                
12 Cf. Bucher, Max. “Voraussetzungen der realistischen Literaturkritik.” Realismus und Gründerzeit: 
Manifeste und Dokumente zur deutschen Literatur 1848-1880. Vol. 1. J.B. Metzler, 1976. pp. 32-47. 
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Realism asks that the category richtig/falsch be applied to its representations.13 One of the 
main affective responses that Realist prose seeks to produce, then, is not only a pleasing 
sensation of beauty but also a sense of familiarity and recognition. In a frequently quoted 
letter to Auerbach from June of 1860, for example, Keller writes: “Ich halte es für Pflicht 
eines Poeten, nicht nur das Vergangene zu verklären, sondern das Gegenwärtige, die Keime 
der Zukunft so weit zu verstärken und zu verschönern, daß die Leute nun glauben können, 
ja, so seien sie, und so gehe es zu!”14 Or, in his Prolog zur Schillerfeier in Bern, he praises 
Schiller’s work for the mirror it holds up to reality: “daß Dichtung sich und kräft’ge 
Wirklichkeit / in reger Gegenspieglung so durchdringen / Wie sich, wo eine wärmre Sonne 
scheint, / am selben Baume Frucht und Blüten mengen.“15 However beautiful or glorious 
art might by, its beauty and its glory must stand firm-footed on the ground of recognizable 
reality, which remains the rubric within the inventive power of the poet functions. For 
Keller, that meant adopting the techniques now broadly recognized as “realistic”: the 
abolition of chance and unlikely occurrence in the construction of plot and character; the 
frequent use of descriptive detail, particularly of physical environments; and setting the 
action against the background of recent historical events, that allowed the 
contemporaneous reader to judge not only the work’s beauty, but the likelihood of the 
narrated events having actually transpired. 
 The questions that the critically inclined reader of 2017 might ask of this program—
whose perspective is left out when “ordinary” life is represented?; what substantive relation 
                                                
13 “Vorausgesetzt wird dabei eine Bestimmung des Realismus, die mir in ihrer, fast leeren, Allgemeineiheit 
unproblematisch zu sein scheint: der Anspruch auf Realismus beinhaltete eine Aussage über Wirklichkeit, 
Werk und das Verhältnis beider mit dem Werturteil falsch/richtig.” Kinder, Hermann. Poesie als Synthese. 
Athenäum Verlag, 1973. 
14 Keller, Gottfried. Seine Briefe und Tagebücher. Wilhelm Herz Verlag: 1894. p. 465. 
15 Keller, Gottfried. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. 1. Ed. Kai Kauffmann. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag: 1995. p. 548. 
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can language have with empirical reality, given that the former is riven with contradiction 
and opacity?—did not plague the Realists. That is not to say, however, that their view of 
literary production was a naïve one. The potentially crippling question facing the authors 
of Keller’s time was the selection of subject matter. In his lectures on aesthetics Hegel had 
observed that the modern world was drained of the reservoirs of mythic imagination that 
were the source of the poetic. And because of the highly collectivized nature of the 
contemporary world, which can be best understood as a network in which human beings 
subjugate one another for their respective ends, poetic deeds—Achilles’ return to the 
Trojan War after mourning the death of Patroclus, for example—are simply no longer 
possible.1617 One need not accept Hegel’s view of art in the modern world to recognize 
that, for aestheticians of Realism like Theodor Vischer and Julian Schmidt, who venerated 
Hegel not only for his theories of art but for having demonstrated the historical inevitability 
of the bourgeois liberal state, Hegel’s dim view of what he referred to as the prosaische 
Weltordnung was, if not the final world on the matter, then at least a credible explanation 
of why Germany had produced no great authors since Goethe and Schiller. Their challenge 
was to postulate a contemporary aesthetics of the German novel. In Vischer’s study of 
poetics, begun in 1847 and completed 1858, he suggested three possible ways that the 
poetic might be recovered in the time of the prosaic. First, contemporary author might 
change the setting of his work to the past to those times when poetic deeds was still 
possible; second, he might focus on those aspects of contemporary society—“grüne 
Stellen”, as Vischer calls them—where the poetic still dwells: among gypsies, criminals, 
                                                
16 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Ästhetik III. Suhkramp, 1986. p. 471-8. 
17 I have also drawn on Paul Fleming’s gloss of Hegel’s argument in Exemplarity and Mediocrity: The Art of 
the Average from Bourgeois Tragedy to Realism. Stanford University Press, 2009. p. 121. 
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and traveling artists, or during revolutions and other times of political upheaval; and finally, 
in the depths of the human mind, where madness dwells, as Goethe had when he created 
the character of Mignon, in Wilhelm Meister. There were, in other words, still veins of 
poetry to be mined in the contemporary world, they had only to be unearthed from beneath 
the rock of the prosaic.18 
The first version of Der grüne Heinrich, Keller’s first major work, opts to take the 
latter course. In a letter to his publisher Vieweg in advance of the 1854-5 edition, Keller 
presents his protagonist as a a portrait of the deleterious effects of poverty and familial on 
the psyche—a sorrowful, case study worth recounting because it is true.19 The grim ending, 
in which Heinrich dies of shame at having failed his mother, is rather at odds with the 
playful irony of the rest of the book; that Keller felt compelled to add it suggests the extent 
to which that, following Vischer, he felt that to warrant literary treatment Heinrich had be 
presented as extreme, an aberration. Keller discarded this belief with the publication of the 
first cycle of his Seldwyla novellas in the 1855-6, where he embraced the notion that reality 
in all its forms, the town and the country, the drawing room and the garden, the farm and 
the factory, is worthy of poetic representation. It is not a sense of his own specialness that 
causes Heinrich to become an artist, but a powerful sense of fidelity to the ordinary. Art, 
as he tells his uncle, “besteht nicht darin, daß man merwürdige und berühmte Orte aufsucht 
und nachmacht, sondern darin, daß man die stille Herrlichkeit und Schönheit der Natur 
betrachtet und abzubilden sucht... Wenn man nur ein einfältiges Sträuchlein abzeichnet, so 
                                                
18 Vischer, Theodor. Cit. Theorie und Technik des Romans im 19. Jahrhundert. Ed. Hartmut Steiecke. 
Niemezer Verlag, 1970. p. 70. 
19 “Eine der vielen Seiten des Zweckes ist die Verherrlichung der mütterlichen Pflicthterfüllung und 
Aufopferung und diese Verherrlichung kann im größeren Style nur geschehen durch ein trauriges Ende, durch 
das Martyrthum der Trägerin.” SW. Vol. 2, 1119. 
 11 
empfindet man eine Ehrfurcht für jeden Zweige, weil derselbe so gewachsen ist und nicht 
anders nach den Gesetzen des Schöpfers.”20 The divine, as Heinrich sees it, lies not in the 
miraculous, but in the consonance of each individual detail with the law set down by its 
creator. 
 With the problem of subject matter for the Realist novel arose the problem of style. 
The question of style—of how to write, of what techniques to adapt and which to discard—
is a question faced by every writer; but for the Realist, the problem is a particularly thorny 
one. If, as the Realists claimed, the purpose of art is to offer as loyal a representation of 
reality as possible, then why should art exist at all? Would not the best and most moving 
art simply be reality itself? To that end, the critics and authors of Realism found it expedient 
to distinguish literature against other modes of representation that, as the Realist program 
saw it, depicted only the surface of reality, while remaining silent about its depths, where 
reality’s true substance lies—in the visual arts, photography, which offered only a cold, 
indifferent, inhuman repetition of reality’s surface; and in literature what Otto Ludwig 
called a “prosaic Realism,” an unconsidered representation of reality’s surface, untouched 
by a moral or aesthetic intellect. The Realist movement saw “prosaic Realism” in certain 
works of Junges Deutschland, but by and large the worst perpetrators of “naturalism,” as 
it was sometimes called, were the French. A typical perspective is the one offered on 
Flaubert by Emil Homberger in a series of articles on the Realist novel for the Augsburger 
Allgemeine Zeitung in 1870: “Wie der Idealismus, welcher den Boden der realen Welt 
verläßt, zu luftiger Phantasterei wird,” wrote Homberger, “so sinkt der Realismus, welcher 
die Wirklichkeit […] nicht durch das Ideal vergeistigt, zum plumpen Materialismus herab. 
                                                
20 SW, Vol. 3, p. 145. 
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Der Verfasser der Madame Bovary scheint uns interresant als vollendetes Muster eines 
materialistischen Dichters.”21 To bring the ordinary into view is only half the task of the 
Realist; the other half, as Keller put it in his letter to Auerbach, is to subject reality to a 
process of transfiguration, of Verklärung—to make it more beautiful, to sharpen events, 
objects, individuals, and actions that, to the naked eye, seem immaterial and insignificant 
so that their pure essence shines through. A properly Realist work of literature would be a 
perfect imitation of reality, only truer, clearer, and more beautiful—the same, yet somehow 
changed. It is the challenge of overcoming these contradictions and synthesizing them into 
an artistic whole that is the singular mission of the Realist project in Germany 
Such, at any rate, was the theoretical understanding of Realism, and it must be noted 
that Keller makes repeated reference to these problems and concepts in his critical writing, 
his prose, and his poetry. In an essay on Jeremias Gotthelf, Keller writes: “Es wäre die 
Aufgabe des Dichters gewesen, allfällige eingeschlichene Roheiten und Mißbräuche im 
poetischen Spiegelbild abzuschaffen und dem Volke eine gereinigte und veredelte Freude 
wiederzugeben, da es sich einmal darum handelt, in der gemeinenen Wirklichkeit eine 
schönere Welt wiederherzustellen durch die Schrift.”22 This theme is echoed in Heinrich’s 
encounter with his benefactor the Count, who offers the following advice to the young man 
at the nadir of his personal and creative fortunes about art’s proper subject and process: 
“Der Graf räth Heinrich sich der produktiven Behandlung [understood here in the sense of 
treatment or representation] des öffentlichen Lebens zu widmen, als der einzigen noch 
möglichen und würdigen Form, die Gestaltungskraft und dichterische Phantasie zu 
                                                
21 Homberger, Emil.“Gustave Flaubert.”Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung. March 18, 19, 20, 1870. Cit. 
Plumpe, Theorie des burgerlichen Realismus. Ed. Gerhard Plumpe. Reclam, 1997. pp. 198-204. 
22 Keller, SW, Vol. 1, 75. 
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benutzen, welche, wenn sie eine gesunde sein wolle, auch das wirkliche Leben die besten 
und schönsten Erfindungen leisten müsse.”23 As Keller’s career progressed, the poetic 
tendency would be made more and more distinct from the artistic process. The 
transfiguration of the world would be portrayed more and more as an anthropological 
fact—an inclination and a mode of perception of which all human beings are capable. 
Indeed, for the hapless protagonists of Keller’s novellas—for Pankraz, the incurable 
moper; for John Kabys, the stymied businessman and social climber; Wenzel Strapinski, 
the penniless tailor; the austere comb-makers Jobst, Fridolin, and Dietl—their very 
existence is a push and pull between the circumstances of their lives and the pleasure of 
their dreams, which bubble up and gently ease them back down to the reality from which 
the dreamers started. This returns us once again to the question of the role of Verklärung, 
and the self-designation of Realism in Keller’s work. 
It is not my position that Keller’s writing is “Realist” in the sense that he consulted 
the numerous literary-theoretical texts published in the fifties before setting about his own 
work. Such an assertion, besides oversimplifying—if not entirely misunderstanding—the 
writing of literature would simply be in chronological error, as many of the major critical 
and theoretical texts of the period, from Julian Schmidt’s Geschichte der deutschen 
Literatur seit Lessings Tod to the latter volumes of Vischer’s Kritische Gänge appeared 
only after Keller’s first major works were already written. But a program is not simply a 
set of written instructions: Keller, like Schmidt, Vischer, and the other Realist authors, 
worked under the impression that they were righting decades of benightedness, sloppiness, 
and general mediocrity in German literature, and so they felt compelled to reflect, in their 
                                                
23 SW, Vol. 3, p. 576. 
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correspondence, in literary reviews, in face to face conversation, and in the literature 
itself—on the task of transforming the material of empirical reality into poetic truth. 
Keller’s work, to be clear, does not “instantiate” this program; rather, this discussion gives 
Keller’s work its impetus. He dramatizes and gives it narrative form, he mines it for 
comedy and for pathos, he satirizes and criticizes it. The discourse of Realism furnishes 
Keller with a vocabulary for his reflections on the relationship between art and life, on the 
faculty of poetic imagination, and on the ultimate purpose of art. Without reference to 
Realist movement, Keller’s repeated, and frequently idiosyncratic, use of terms like 
objektiv, kritisch, Wirklichkeit, Verklärung and Verschönung make little sense. 
In beginning with the question of Keller’s relationship to the articulated program 
of literary Realism, and the problems posed by setting the “representation” of “reality” as 
one’s task, I see my work as reaching back to the German scholarship on Keller from the 
late seventies and early eighties. The central works of this time are Adolf Muschg’s 
biographical study, Gottfried Keller (1977) and Gerhard Kaiser’s Das gedichtete Leben 
(1982). These works offer substantial insight into Keller’s project as the process of 
poeticizing life—for Keller’s protagonists, as for Keller himself. In this, Muschg and 
Kaiser build on and deepen the early, highly biographical studies of Keller, like those of 
Jakob Baechtold and Emil Ermatinger. Muschg and Kaiser closely explore the act of 
turning the jumble of life into a personal symbolic language, whose elements are 
ceaselessly combined and recombined, revalued and rearranged, placed into an endless 
variety of constellations. I also draw considerable influence from Hermann Kinder’s Poesie 
als Synthese (1973) and Peter Uwe Hohendaal’s Kultur im Zeitalter des Liberalismus 
(1985), both of which offer considerable insight into the relationship between the largely 
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abstract language of the Realist program and the very concrete political situation in which 
it arose. Both Kinder and Hohendaal present Realist aesthetics as deeply rooted in the 
political realities of the middle class during the Gründerzeit—hoping, still, for a German 
nation in middle class hands, with a leadership morally beholden to other nations as well 
as to its own citizenry, but leery of the revolutionary measures that had amounted to nothing 
in 1848. Both scholars characterize aesthetics as a politics by other means for the authors 
and critics of Realism, a notion to which I will return repeatedly in this dissertation. These 
authors build in their turn, on the seminal essays on Keller written by Walter Benjamin and 
Georg Lukács during the late twenties and thirties, from which Keller emerges as a pointed 
critic of the chauvinistic militarism and unrestrained capitalism of the Gründerzeit; as a 
sensitive defender of a true democracy in which even the lowest members of society would 
find the power to determine their own destinies; as an ethicist engaging, through the stories 
of his characters, with the question of how one can retain one’s humanity in a world that 
demands that happiness be sacrificed today so that one can survive tomorrow. In attempting 
to untangle what role the poetic transfiguration of reality plays in Keller’s work, it is my 
hope to combine the thematic focus of recent Keller scholarship with the broader scope of 
this older work. 
 
2. Versittlichung: The Ethical Turn in Realism 
 
 In summary, the initial question of my dissertation is how Keller represents reality, 
what role the Realist program plays in his work, and to what end reality is represented. 
This latter is a question no less difficult than the first two. Reading Keller, one is struck by 
the extent to which the right life, the good life, happiness and pleasure recur as themes, not 
only in the essayistic reflections that recur in Keller’s work, but in the actual metaphoric 
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and symbolic language of the prose. Seldwyla, Keller reminds us in the introduction to his 
novella cycle, means “happy place,” though the Seldwylers that we encounter are certainly 
anything but happy. Throughout Keller’s work, characters seek happiness in food, in love, 
in travel, in dress—and cross-dressing—in the familial home, and in nature. They find 
happiness and lose it, learning from their various hardships and forgetting the lessons once 
more. In my reading of Keller, I found myself asking to what extent Keller believes that 
literature has the ability or the right to counsel the reader as to what the right life is, and 
how to attain it? Is this, in fact, what Keller is attempting to do? Here, too, the recent 
scholarship is hesitant. Certain authors, like Richard Ruppel, Karl Pestalozzi, and Martin 
Swales have argued in individual essays that Keller’s poetics revolve around the idea of 
happiness. Ruppel argues that Keller’s work models an individual ethics rather than a 
normative one, fostering a self-reflection and an introspection that might serve as the 
ground for a personalized ethos—in this, he builds on older studies of Keller like those 
Ermatinger and Thomas Roffler that linked Keller to a Feuerbachian project, in wich the 
self is liberated from harmful illusions. Swales and Pestalozzi go further in arguing that 
evoking the experience of happiness and contentment is the primary goal of Keller’s 
poetics. Keller’s correspondence offers little insight here. His answer to this question was 
limited by the modesty of his character: literatures is meant to give pleasure, it is a respite, 
a pleasure garden, a Blumengarten und Erholungsplatz.24 
 It is here that the recourse to the Realist program offers its greatest yield. For the 
critics and authors of the period, the question of art’s purpose was an explicit one, set at 
the very heart of their poetics. On the one hand, Realism claimed a decided coolness 
                                                
24 SW, Vol. 7, p. 653. 
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towards demanding that this or that condition in the world change, that its readers cultivate 
one behavior over another. This position went hand in hand with their rejection of the 
explicitly revolutionary program of the authors of Junges Deutschland. Such openly 
political writing was rejected as artful pamphleteering; it was, as Hermann Kinder 
expresses it, “allein dem Leben verpflichtete,” that is, too firmly grounded in the real. 
Openly moral or political literature voided the autonomy of art, and with it, the legitimacy 
of art’s poetic dimension. Keller participated ardently in the political strife of Switzerland 
in the early 1840s, in the anti-Catholic struggles of the Sonderbundskriege; his first literary 
productions were ardently nationalistic, patriotic poetry.25 In his mature literary work, 
however, the themes of patriotism and citizenry are only represented, not directly enjoined. 
Instead, Keller pleads for what he calls, in an 1884 letter to Paul Heyse, the 
“Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Poesie”—the unlimited privilege of the poetic over the 
worldy.26 By contrast, the Realists frequently pointed to what they considered the poetic 
insufficiencies of the nascent naturalist novel of Zola, the Goncourts and Eugene Sue, in 
which society’s worst ills, like poverty, alcoholism, sexual incontinence, the working poor, 
prostitution, avarice, and the selfish desire for social advancement in hopes of rousing the 
reader’s sympathies against them. “Was liegt denn der Welt an den ewigen Lebensläufen 
dieser Pariser Huren und an ihrem täglichen, ja stündlichen Lakenreißen!” Keller continued 
in the same letter. “Nichts! Aber… die unseligen Auotren sind eben die gleichen Glücks- 
                                                
25 For more detail on Keller’s role in the anti-Catholic struggues, cf. Andermatt, Michael. “Hussah! Hussah! 
Die Hatz geht los!” Antikatholizismus bei Gottfried Keller. Germanistik in der Schweiz. Ed. Michael Stolz. 
Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Akademischen Gesellschaft für Germanistik, 2013. Vol. 10. pp. 305-317.  
For an overview of Keller’s early political poetry, cf. Hartmann, Regina. “Die Macht des Wortes: Gottfried 
Kellers frühe Lyrik im politischen Kampf.” Macht in der Deutschschweizer Literatur. Ed. Goncalo Vilas-
Boas and Teresa Martins de Oliveira. Frank und Timme, 2012. pp. 73-85. 
26 SW, Vol. 6, p. 1095. 
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und Geldsüchtler wie die Tröpfe, die sie beschreiben.”27 In Keller’s estimation, to use the 
ugly and the moral repulsive as a morally instructive tool was to disfigure the poetic, to 
destroy the artistic value of the work of literature. Vischer, for his part, dismissed the 
mindset animating such literature as a “rein pädagogisches, paränetisches Bewußtsein.”28 
 Why write, then? Why read? If the poetic impulse amounts to quietism, why not 
simply devote one’s attentions and energies to the world, rather than waste them on 
representations of it? To that, Realism had a qualified answer. While art could not directly 
compel, wrote Vischer, it could nonetheless influence and cultivate by reconciling 
poetically the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of empirical reality, by showing “daß sich 
eine Aussicht auf die Hebung aller jener entsetzlichen Übel der Gesellschaft in ihrer 
Wurzel, auf eine Umänderung im Organismus der Gesellschaft eröffnete.”29 By 
synthesizing the particular with the universal, the ideal with the real, poetry demonstrated 
the triumph of “Harmonie und Versöhnung.” The very unity and balance of the poetic work 
demonstrated for its reader that these virtues were possible in a world he might otherwise 
have given up as hopeless. The artwork thereby planted the seed for harmonious and 
humane action in reality itself. By means of this anti-political politics, this anti-moral 
morality, the Realist work was able to preserve its poetic autonomy by uniting aesthetics, 
politics, and metaphysics all under a single principle—that of harmony. And while the 
other programmatic pronouncements on the subject are not so rigorously systematic as 
Vischer’s, the notion that an artwork’s aesthetic qualities must model the tendencies it 
wishes to bring about in its readers without directly commanding its readers to behave one 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Vischer, Theodor. Kritische Gänge. Ed. R Vischer. Olms Verlag, 1922. p. 128.  
29 Ibid., 152.  
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way or another is present even in the more explicitly political writing of Robert Prutz, 
Julian Schmidt, and Keller himself.30 In Schmidt’s view, simply choosing the middle 
classes as subject matter was bound to strengthen the diligence and clarity that that class 
learned in the parliament, the military, the factory, and the public school. If the novel could 
not change society without voiding its aesthetic content, then it could at least be a tool in 
the slow, organic cultivation of the individual. 
 The second argument of my dissertation, then, is that what distinguishes Keller 
from the other authors and critics of the Realist period, in Germany as well as in the rest of 
Europe, is that the question of to what end reality is to be represented is placed front and 
center in his writing. How reality is to be represented is always paired with the question of 
why it is to be represented. These questions are not only the implicit programmatic 
assumptions of his writing; they give shape to its every technical aspect, from the 
description of characters to the development of plot and perspective. They serve as the red 
thread uniting his entire literary project, transforming the social landscape of the Realist 
novel into an ethical one. Where for Balzac social station is all, Keller’s work is peopled 
with customs, values, dispositions—what Keller refers to as Lebensarten, or ways of living. 
Where the former depicts courtesans, peers, artists, priests and bureaucrats, Keller 
describes quasi-allegorical figures like Wurmlinger, the purveyor of a corrosive, all-
pervasive skepticism, or Züß Bünzlin, the virginal daughter of a washerwoman who spends 
her days washing white linens and playing with soap figurines. These characters are not 
only disposed in a certain way towards the world—they embody that disposition, 
                                                
30 I will discuss Schmidt’s political views in the third chapter of this dissertation. Robert Prutz was the editor 
of Das deutsche Museum, a literary newspaper, and argued that literature’s task was to give expression to 
historical consciousness as it progressed. Cf. Prutz, Robert. Vorlesungen über die deutsche Literatur der 
Gegenwart. Mayer Verlag, 1847. pp. 329-331. 
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everything that they do bears the mark of the way of living that they have chosen, or that 
has chosen them. In the central romantic conflict of Der grüne Heinrich the protagonist 
must choose not between a woman of his class and a woman of the aristocracy; but between 
his cousin Anna, who embodies an ethic of idealism and renunciation, and the sensuous 
widow Judith, who stands for happiness in the there and now. That is why, though the 
themes of Keller’s work are undoubtedly those of the Realist novel—the transformation of 
European life from an agrarian society to an industrial one; the eclipse of the production of 
goods by debt and speculation; the place of moral and ethical certitudes in a society no 
longer oriented around God; the conflict between familial obligation and personal 
liberation—the world depicted appears to be so firmly rooted in the fairy-tale-like world 
of the allegorical.  
 This ethical focus in Keller’s work distinguishes him not only from the canon of 
European Realism but from his countrymen as well. Despite German Realism’s aversion 
to reine Pädagogik and its supposed fidelity to the non-binding power of the allgemein 
Menschliche, Vischer’s Versittlichung often functions as a prescriptive morality, praising 
certain behaviors and warning the reader away from others. One might think here of 
Theodor Fontane’s treatment of louche aristocratic decadence in Schach von Wutenow, 
which ends with the suicide of its dissipated protagonist; in the off-hand observation by the 
grandfather narrator of Adalbert Stifter’s “Granit” that a local village was wiped out by the 
plague when they abandoned their old customs. One might consider the German novel’s 
persistent avoidance of the typically Realist themes of social aspiration and the sensuality 
of the city; and its yearning, nostalgic depictions of the unchanging customs and wise 
morality of village life. Keller himself noted with displeasure the highly moralizing 
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tendencies in the work of Jeremias Gotthelf, otherwise an aesthetic lodestar for the young 
author. “Es steht einstweilen nicht mehr in der Macht der Kirche, ihre Gegner körperlich 
zu verbrennen;” wrote Keller, “daß man hingegen mit Vergnügen ein moralisches 
Scheiterhäufchen unter den Füßen Andersdenkender anzündet, davon ist Jeremias Gotthelf 
ein neues Beispiel, und dieß moralische Verbrennen ist kaum menschlicher.”31 Keller’s 
work is highly skeptical of those perspectives on life that cheat man of his happiness, that 
offer a position of certitude from which one judges and punishes others. Here, one might 
draw a distinction between the moral, understood as the realm of those binding, universal 
judgments as to what is right; and the ethical, understood as a personal, and therefore 
necessarily pluralistic inquiry into what is good. Keller’s work is an investigation into the 
latter question. It is an exploration of the full range of human ways of living, or 
Lebensarten.   
  The term Lebensarten—a typical Kellerian usage in its substitution of a 
conversational term for a complex philosophical concept—is first introduced by Keller as 
the title of a chapter in the final volume of Der grüne Heinrich, as Heinrich weighs his own 
profligacy against the joyless austerity of his mother. What might, in another work, be 
treated as a moral question, as a question of continence or filial duty, is treated by Keller 
as a matter of happiness. Who is happier, Heinrich wonders, he or his mother? Neither, it 
turns out. His mother’s financial stability allows her no pleasure, whereas the joys Heinrich 
purchases for himself are quickly soured by the humiliations of poverty. But the full scope 
of Keller’s understanding of a Lebensart emerges in the consideration of the relationship 
between labor and value that follows. Here, Heinrich’s glum reflections cause him to 
                                                
31 SW, Vol. 7, p. 100. 
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contrast the sale of relevanta Arabica, a cheap, worthless lentil product whose brief 
popularity generates enormous value for its owners and their employees before the factory 
is shuttered and the fortune it produced evaporates; and the life of Friedrich Schiller, a 
human being who was rewarded for his constant struggle for authenticity and self-
fulfillment with a life of endless hardship. To Heinrich—and to Keller—whether one ought 
to save one’s money or spend it freely is a superficial matter, when compared against the 
deeper inquiry into the true nature of work and the real basis of durable value. Neither the 
bitterness that the young Pankraz feels at never receiving his allotted portion, nor Martin 
Salander’s ardent, if foolish taste for patriotic pageantry, nor John Kabys’s desire to 
achieve status and control his existence are mere moral behaviors. Keller makes use of the 
process of poetic idealization described by Vischer not only to reproduce reality but to 
depict a full range of dispositions towards reality, ways of being in reality; the drama of 
his work lies in the contrast and the conversation between these. Consequently, Keller 
never finally decides for one way of living or another, never enjoins the reader to behave 
like this or like that. The utopian strain of Realist thought—that the techniques of aesthetics 
directly model and make sensible the better world they might one day bring about—is 
balanced in Keller with many rueful reflections on the limit of art’s ability to instruct in a 
life whose most handy pedagogical tools are pain and loss. It may be recalled that Heinrich 
only truly grasps the meaning of “objectivity,” that beloved Realist concept, as he watches 
his cousin’s coffin lower into her grave. For Heinrich, as for many of Keller’s protagonists, 
enlightenment only comes once, only comes because, the chance for happiness has 
decisively passed.  
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 The second aspect of my argument, then, is that in Keller’s prose the moral and 
instructive element that remained present in the Realist novel is expanded into a broader 
consideration of numerous Lebensarten or Lebensweisen. In moving away from moral 
behaviors Keller also brings to the forefront the ethical tension that follows from the 
representational tensions of the Realist program: if a Realist art is at pains to justify its 
existence without becoming either pure repetition of empirical reality or pure abstraction, 
then how can art bring about a better world, a better individual, without voiding its artistic 
and poetic value by becoming a didactic work of moral or political instruction? It is not in 
the synthesis, but rather precisely in the unresolved tension of these questions that what I 
will call Keller’s “ethical Realism” is located. 
   
 
3. Keller as Ethical Realist 
 
 I offer the above not as a condensation of the following dissertation, but rather as 
an account of the assumptions from which I will approach the more concrete, technical 
questions of Keller’s writing. My specific point of investigation will be the intersection in 
Keller between the representation and transfiguration of reality, and the question of the 
good life. Each chapter of my dissertation will approach the above questions in greater 
nuance and detail by following them in the grain of a single work of Keller’s I see as 
typifying both a particular aspect of Realist prose, and Keller’s own “ethical Realism”—a 
literature constituted by the push and pull between the question of how life is best lived 
and the technical demands of capturing and “poeticizing” empirical reality. To this end, I 
have chosen the three works of Keller’s that best exemplify, and cut most boldly against, 
the Realist program: Der grüne Heinrich, Die Leute von Seldwyla, and his final novel, the 
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political satire Martin Salander. These three novels are distinguished from the remainder 
of Keller’s work in that they are set in the Switzerland in which Keller came of age and 
that he observed around him as a Staatsschreiber to the canton of Zurich. It will be my task 
to observe how throughout his career Keller’s sense of the Verklärung of reality develops 
and how his sense of the “the good life” changes during his career, how in each project he 
works the two together and plays them against one another, how each takes its own distinct 
aesthetic form and makes it own distinct ethical judgments. 
 The first chapter will focus on the second edition of Der grüne Heinrich, from 
1878-9. I have chosen the second edition, roughly concurrent with the second cycle of 
Seldwla novellas over the first for two reasons. The first is Keller’s own stated preference 
for the second, apparent in comments throughout his letters, about the lamentable 
formlessness and cypress-dark ending of his first attempt. The second reason, more to the 
point of my argument, is the decisive step towards Realism taken by Keller in the 1870s. 
The second version adds two chapters to the beginning, in which the Switzerland of 
Heinrich’s early childhood, then in the full bloom of liberalism and nationalism, is sketched 
in vivid and humorous detail against the background of the Napoleonic Wars and the Greek 
of War of Independence; and two chapters to the end, in which Heinrich takes on a career 
in public life and surveys, with tired resignation, the “democratic” and “republican” 
Switzerland of his adulthood. With this explicit grounding of the events of Der grüne 
Heinrich in the real world as it might be recognized by Keller’s Swiss readership there 
comes an accompanying shift from the pathological character of Heinrich’s life to the 
universal nature of his experience. It is specifically this anthropological aspect of the book 
that will be my focus, above all, the Realist technique of construction of characters as types. 
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 The literature connecting typology to Realism is an extensive one; here, I have 
focused my attention to the programmatic texts of the Realist period. The theorists of 
Realism agreed that it was a given fact of modern literature that the surface of reality was 
far too diverse and complex, packed with far too much information, to be easily reproduced 
by any writer. It followed that the modern author was compelled to abstract and to condense 
singular facts and individuals into general ones, which would stand in for the multiplicity 
of reality. Given the highly changeable and jumbled character of empirical reality, Vischer 
argued that the author’s task was to purify the forms of things, to depict the coherence 
between their inner, invisible depths and the characteristic features of their surface, so as 
to reveal their fixed essence. This practice is precisely the one engaged in by Keller when 
he transforms individuals and scenes around him into idealized types, ennobled by the 
sublime poetic treatment with which Keller represents them. But where the Realist novel, 
in Germany and abroad, saw this essence as a distinctly social one—where, for example, 
Balzac, in his “Avant-Propos” to the Comédie Humaine fashions himself as a zoologist or 
botanist of social milieus, Keller’s novel considers a range of modes of comportment 
towards reality. Every character in Der grüne Heinrich is, as Keller claimed, directly 
traceable to someone he knew in life, and the same time, an allegorical representation of a 
way of living, whether joy, skepticism, melancholy, austerity, profligacy, philosophical 
inquiry or religious bigotry. 
 Typology also serves as a central link between the Realist novel and another form 
that Keller employs to his own ends—the Bildungsroman, or novel of education and self-
development. I draw here on Phillip Ajouri’s reading of typology in the Bildungsroman as 
an Ordnungsmuster, a tool by means of which Heinrich, the novel’s protagonist, is able to 
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arrange and categorize the experiences he undergoes and the individuals he encounters in 
his adult life, by means of which he is able to make sense of his present moment and project 
his desires for the future. This teleological use of typology and poetic imagination is, 
however, just one side of Der grüne Heinrich. The same polarities of the Realist project—
its ambivalence about representing the world; its ambivalence about offering instruction to 
its reader—are at work in the relationship between imagination and typology in the 
Bildungsroman. Longing for the future, the power of artistic abstraction is in Keller rooted 
in a Lebensart of privation and renunciation, practiced by Heinrich’s mother and his cousin 
Anna. In the company of the widow Judith, however, Heinrich learns to suspend his desires 
by giving himself to them completely and totally, by surrendering to the moment and 
foregoing both the regrets of the past and longing for the future. This latter way of living, 
which serves throughout the novel as contrast and a complement to the first, suggests as a 
different way of considering the typifications that he encounters—not as a sequence 
approaching a final endpoint, but rather as an anthropological compendium, a collection of 
human manners, with no one way of living privileged over the others. Here Vischer’s 
allgemein Menschliche is transformed into the tolerance of difference and imperfection, a 
simultaneous despair and celebration of the vanity of all attempts to curing oneself of 
ignorance and folly.  
 The same tensions between reality and ideal, instruction and tolerance are at work 
in the lengthy descriptions to be found in the novellas of Die Leute von Seldwla. Telling of 
a town in Switzerland whose defining characteristic is its lack of industry and the tendency 
of its inhabitants to lend and borrow irresponsibly, these tightly plotted novellas are filled 
with detailed description
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of Seldwya. These scenes, like the enumeration of the baubles jealously collected by a 
washerwoman’s daughter or the extensive golden accoutrements donned by an up-and-
coming businessman about to ask for a woman’s hand in marriage are, in one sense, typical 
of the detail-rich prose championed by the Realists, for whom details were the magnet 
filings by means of which expansive social reality made itself perceivable. In Otto 
Ludwig’s 1858 essay reflecting on the emergent Realist novel, he sets it as the task of the 
poet to represent “the multitude of things”—Dinge, understood here as not only the entirety 
of human affairs, but the sheer variety of the sensible world—through which the law 
governing them would become perceivable. Ludwig’s own Zwischen Himmel und Erde 
begins not with an action or an event with a description of a physical location, a garden 
house; a technique imitated by Keller in Der grüne Heinrich and by Fontane in his Stine 
and Irrungen, Wirrungen. For the author depicting the travails of a class whose primary 
form of self-expression was ownership, the detail serves as a crucial mediating point, where 
the inchoate realm of private self-conception, yearning and aspiration, encounters the 
abstraction of social reality in the fixity of the physical world.  
 In the Seldwyla novellas, Keller takes up the theme of “the good life” in a different 
manner than he does in Der grüne Heinrich. Here, the attention lavished onto his 
characters’ material circumstances goes hand in hand with the belief that man’s true being, 
and therefore, his only chance for happiness, is to be found in his physical existence. The 
play of repetition and difference that marks these passages, which draws on the listing 
tradition of the Bible and Renaissance humanism, evokes plenty and freedom from the 
material want that is the basis of all servitude. These meditations on man’s fate as an 
essentially material condition dovetails with the novellas’ treatment of the themes of 
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poverty, privation, financial exploitation and uncertainty, and the search for a labor that 
satisfies man’s need to commune with the physical world. In this sense, the idealized, 
utopian tenor of these descriptions serves to create an imaginary, poetic space in which the 
cleft between the appearance and the being of things opened by the exchange economy is 
finally healed. In this space the natural world is no longer something to be mastered; the 
worth of objects is no longer limited to their monetary value. Instead, a freer, more open, 
more reconciled relationship toward the material world becomes possible. And in telling 
the stories of characters with no artistic aspirations, Die Leute von Seldwyla uncouples 
poetic imagination—exclusively the provenance of the author in Realism—from art and 
places it in the realm of the anthropological. The ability to poeticize reality belongs to every 
human being. For Keller’s dejected, forlorn protagonists, imagination is a recompense for 
the privations and renunciations that their lives demand of them.  
 The final chapter of my dissertations considers the relationship between the ethical 
and the political in the social realism of Keller’s final novel, Martin Salander. Martin 
Salander holds a particular significance in Keller’s oeuvre for being the only one of his 
works not begun during his stay in Berlin from 1850-1856. For this reason, Martin 
Salander can be considered a final reflection not only on the political aspirations of his 
generations and a meditation on the future of liberalism, but above all as a reflection on the 
legacy of poetic Realism itself. In this respect, Martin Salander represents Keller’s most 
earnest embrace not only of the stylistic features of the French Realist novel—the social 
plots of Balzac, the terse naturalism of Emile Zola and Henrik Ibsen, then at the peak of 
their European popularity—but of the liberal strain of German Realism that considered the 
Zeitroman, or the social panorama, the de facto form of the modern novel. Like Gustav 
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Freytag’s Soll und Haben or Wilhelm Raabe’s Hungerpastor, Martin Salander seeks to 
represent a unifying social reality from the perspective of an individual. That individual is 
the eponymous character, a schoolteacher-cum-businessman-cum-politician who 
experiences with bewilderment the banking crises, environmental catastrophe, rapid 
industrialization, and political apathy of Switzerland during the Gründerzeit. 
 Here Keller also seizes on the implicitly pedagogical and instructive aspects of the 
liberal Realist novel. Industry, parliamentary democracy, the imminent formation of a 
meritocratic German nation in which the privileges of the aristocracy had been abolished 
and replaced with bourgeois diligence—those aspects of reality that a middle class author 
like Freytag considered most real, were very little in evidence in the Germany in which 
Soll und Haben was written. These realities, according to Freytag and the more rigorous 
critical justification afforded his work by Julian Schmidt, already existed in the present, 
albeit as a germ; the Realist novel’s poetic project was wholly within its rights to depict 
what that germ might look like when it sprouted. Indeed, the novel ensured that outcome 
by modeling and strengthening the very tendencies in the present that would help bring it 
about. Keller’s eponymous hero serves as a mouthpiece for the understanding of poetic 
Realism as a kind of civic education; he is constantly at work imagining ways that an 
artwork, or a walk through nature, romantic love, or a wedding toast, can be turned into a 
work of political pageantry that teaches social harmony and good citizenry to the factional 
Swiss. It is telling of Keller’s final position on the political powers of Realism that these 
projects fail—without the cultivation of the self and the development of character, the 
phantasm that poetic Realism pawns off as reality merely further serve to distort an already 
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distorted present, stoking the longing of the reader and the populace for the insubstantial 
and the unreal.  
 How, then, should the self be cultivated, and how should character be developed, 
to create not only the most active, but also the happiest citizenry, and what role might art 
play in this cultivation? Here, too, Martin Salander distinguishes itself from Keller’s 
previous work in tackling this question directly, and offering a seemingly direct answer in 
the form of Salander’s son, Arnold. Unlike his father, Arnold practices a remarkable 
continence as far as poetic abstraction, or abstraction of any sort, is concerned. He firmly 
refuses to participate in politics or to listen to political speeches, preferring to limit himself 
to accounts of the facts as they are; he refuses to turn the family businessman, a dry goods 
store, into a money-making enterprise against which he can borrow; and he refuses to fall 
for the charms of the classically beautiful, though dim-witted sister-in-law of the novel’s 
antagonist, the grifter Louis Wohlwend. In the character of Arnold, Keller offers as a way 
forward a critical realism that is Stoic in its refusal of idealizations, all abstractions or poetic 
imaginings; this realism is above all an inward disposition, a kind of askesis, that consists 
of curbing one’s desire, teaching oneself to see things as they are to be content with them. 
But even in the idealized Arnold, I argue, the novel evinces a great ambivalence. Arnold 
never errs and never imperils his family with his short-sighted decisions, as does his father, 
but nor does he produce anything, do anything, or hope for anything. Keller places himself 
clearly with the Salander father. With the end of desire must come the end of imagination, 
both political and poetic, and with it, the end of Keller’s project. 
 In these chapters I will draw as needed on the wide range of Keller scholarship from 
the last decades. Of particular importance to me will be those studies that offer perspective 
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on the question of labor, especially affective labor; the role played by gender and sexuality 
in Keller’s work; and the relationship between politics and poetics. It is my hope that the 
analyses that follow will be able to bridge the gap between the more specialized Keller 
scholarship and the poetological-political studies to which I am more directly indebted. It 
is the uniquely attractive aspect of Keller that his work supports such a wide spectrum of 
interpretation, and that the programmatic questions that drove it are far from resolved—






























Of the many regrets regarding his artistic career that plagued Gottfried Keller in the 
last years of his life, chief among them was the voyeuristic pleasure that his readers took 
in Der grüne Heinrich. The publication of the second, revised version in 1878 had brought 
him considerable success, but with it had come the sense that his readers had fundamentally 
misunderstood what he was hoping to achieve by writing a novel whose protagonist’s life 
tracked so closely with his own. “Es gibt noch Esel, die es für bare biographische Münze 
nehmen,” Keller wrote tartly to Maria Melos on the 29th of December in 1880.32 The 
Germanist Jakob Baechtold would reach out to Keller shortly afterward about producing a 
biographical overview of his works, something akin to Goethe’s Dichtung und Wahrheit, 
a prospect that held little interest for Keller. In a letter to Paul Heyse four years later, Keller 
wrote: “Ich sagte Baechtold geradezu, ich möchte nach meinem Tode jedenfalls nicht in 
seine Hände fallen.” The grim language—and the grim sentiment that they express—
portray biographical inquiry as a clinical and icy medical procedure, something akin to the 
vivisection of a corpse lying helpless on the coroner’s slab.  
 And yet, in many of his letters Keller repeatedly claimed precisely the opposite—
that Der grüne Heinrich was, in fact, connected to his life quite intimately. In a book 
proposal that he sent to his publisher, Friedrich Vieweg, as he was drafting the novel’s first 
version in 1850, he wrote that he had “noch nie etwas produziert, was nicht den Anstoß 
                                                
32 I have cited this quote, and the following three, from Sabine Schneider’s essay “Poesie der Unreife,” to 
which I am indebted for this overview of Keller’s expression as to the autobiographical content Der grüne 
Heinrich. Schneider, Sabine. “Poesie der Unreife.” Der grüne Heinrich: neu gelesen. Ed. Wolfram Groddeck. 
Chronos Verlag: 2009. pp. 55-77 
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dazu aus meinem inneren oder äußeren Leben empfangen hat”; and, in more emphatic 
terms, in the same letter: “Es ist wohl keine Seite darin, welche nicht gelebt und empfunden 
worden ist.” In this, Keller was, in a way, only stating the obvious. His novel told the story 
of a distinctly Keller-like protagonist, born in Switzerland, whose father, active in public 
life, dies at a young age, leaving the family destitute. Like Keller, Heinrich is kicked out 
of school over a misunderstanding over his role in a rowdy incident with his schoolmates, 
he struggles with his disenchantment with religious orthodoxy and gradually embraces 
atheism. Heinrich and Keller both attempt careers as painters, wracked with guilt at not 
undertaking a career more useful to his mother and his country; and, most significantly, 
both give up. The novel, he claimed was an “Autobiographie [...] mit Anlehnung an 
Selbsterfahrenes und Empfundenes.”  For Keller, the entire value of his first major literary 
attempt lay in the access it gave him, and others, to the substance of his own life. In a letter 
to Hermann Hettner wrote that the single purpose guiding him as he wrote was “mich selbst 
mir objektiv zu machen, und ein Exempel zu statuieren.”33 
 The literature commenting on the ostensibly autobiographical character of Der 
Grüne Heinrich is considerable, beginning in his lifetime and running to the present day. 
The first major studies of Keller’s work immediately after his death by Baechtold, into 
whose hands Keller did indeed fall, and by Emil Ermatinger are biographical studies, 
whose purpose is to demonstrate the continuity between his poetic project and his life.34 
More recent studies, like Sabine Schneider’s “Poesie der Unreife,” as well as Martina 
                                                
33 Schneider, Sabine. “Poesie der Unreife.” Der grüne Heinrich: neu gelesen. Ed. Wolfram Groddeck. 
Chronos Verlag: 2009. p. 57. 
 
34 Cf. Baechtold, Jakob. Gottfried Kellers Leben: Seine Briefe und Tagebücher. Besser Verlag, 1894-97; Emil 
Ermatinger, Gottfried Kellers Leben, Briefe und Tagebücher. J.G. Cotta, 1915-18. 
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Wagner-Egelhaaf, portray the process as one that frequently subverts the conventional 
expectations of autobiography.35 A definitive answer as to the autobiographical status of 
Der grüne Heinrich would fall beyond the realm of this dissertation; rather, what I wish to 
investigate in this chapter is the artistic process described by Keller to Hettner in this last 
letter, the process of making an example, whether of oneself or of others. What Keller 
describes here is, in fact, a double process. By “example,” Keller means as an individual 
or a particular case that stands in for a general principle or class of person. To be exemplary 
is, in this sense, to be typical of something. At the same time, the word “statuieren,” with 
its emphasis on the practical, instructive aspect of this example—“to make an example of 
someone,” as one might say in English, although Keller’s preceding remark about making 
himself “objective” seems to dispel the pejorative emphasis carried by the phrase. How, 
and to what end, does Keller accomplish this process of taking his life, as well as the lives 
of others, and transforming it into an instructive example?  
 To the critics and authors launching the Realist movement just as Keller was 
completing Der grüne Heinrich, this remark of Keller’s would have read simply as a 
recognition of the difficulties facing the modern novelist. The primary hurdle that the novel 
as it stood in the 1850s had to clear was the obvious impossibility of representing a world 
whose surface had become so variegated, whose visible ways of living had become so 
numerous and so diverse. An author could scarcely hope to achieve a perfect one-to-one 
reproduction of empirical experience, a “photograph,” as Julian Schmidt put it in his 
Geschichte der deutschen Literatur seit Lessings Tod, not without disdain for a technology 
                                                
35 Cf. Wagner-Egelfhaaf, Martina. Autobiographie. De Gruyter, 2000. 
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he considered inhuman and mechanical. As the novel was necessarily limited in scope, the 
modern novelist was compelled to condense and to generalize:  
Was der moderne Roman als Convenienz vorfand, war die rationalistische Art und Weise, 
aus der bunte Mannigfaltigkeit des Lebens in die Darstellung nur dasjenige auszuwählen, 
was was zu den herrschenden Ansichten über Freiheit und Sittlichkeit stimmte. […] Die 
Charaktere wurden nach der geraden Linien entworfen, man hatte ein bestimmtes Urtheil 
über ihren Werth und Unwerth, ihr innerer Zusammenhang und ihr Unterscheid gegen 
Andere zeichnet sich ab, in der Handlung zeichnet sich ein festes Gewebe von Grund und 
Folge.36 
 
Schmidt saw this “Convenienz” as precisely that—a convenience, a kind of short-hand that 
left the modern novel at a considerable disadvantage when it came to producing characters 
with natural motivations or psychological depth. The sheer clamor of the world forced the 
author to begin with this limiting “Idealism,” as Schmidt calls. It fell to the individual talent 
to paint these condensed characters and types with poetic energy and vigor, to make them 
jump off the page and truly come to life once more. (In Schmidt’s view, Keller was one of 
the few modern authors who possessed this gift.) 
 What happens, then, to the crude material of life in this process of simplification, 
condensation and delineation? In his Ästhetik des Schönen, Vischer suggests that the 
process is one of beautification, or Verschönerung. By this Vischer does not mean that the 
author simply scrubs those aspects of life that he considers unpleasant or disturbing—the 
reader need only recall the many scenes of brutal violence in Homer’s Iliad. Rather, the 
process is one of “reine Formentwicklung,” the purification of a person, object, or event of 
anything contrary, dissonant, or accidental, anything secondary to their fundamental 
meaning. Writing in 1843, Vischer did not believe that this technique had ever been 
properly used in German literature. Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Schiller’s plays had 
                                                
36 Schmidt, Julian. Geschichte der deutschen Literatur seit Lessings Tod. Vol. 3. Grünow Verlag: 1867. p. 
589. 
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attempted it, but they were hampered by their aristocratic bias. A modern novel, such as 
was not yet written, would find a way to democratize this technique and apply it not to just 
the rarified heights of society, but to society in its entirety, turning what appeared to be a 
garbled mish-mash into a harmonious whole of general expressions, of forms—of 
examples, to use Keller’s phrase. Following Vischer, the expansive cast of Der grüne 
Heinrich can be seen as a compendium of precisely such types and examples, reflected in 
a darkly comic manner in the scene early in the book in which, still reeling from his father’s 
death, the young Heinrich assembles a menagerie from insects and spiders in the yard of 
his childhood home. By plucking these animals out of the jumbled grass and dirt of his 
yard, by taking one from many, it is transformed from an unremarkable creature into a 
specimen, bearing the weight not only of its species, but of all animal life.  
 Scholars in recent years who have probed into the typological character of Keller’s 
work have stressed the zoological, that is to say, scientific aspect of Keller’s realism.37; 
Both Phillip Anjouri and Dietmar Schmidt (citing Anjouri and building on his argument) 
have stressed the central role of typology as an Ordnungsmuster for the world, a way of 
ordering, categorizing, and differentiating the bodily and the material. Both authors 
connect the poetic techniques of Realism to the rise of the natural sciences in the mid-
nineteenth century, with Anjouri exploring the links between Keller and Darwin’s 
categorizations and philogenetic typologies, with Schmidt stressing the novel’s 
                                                
37 The menagerie scene is dissected by Gerhard Kaiser his essay, “Ein Blick in Gottfried Kellers Bestiarium,” 
Gerhard Kaiser stresses, as he stresses elsewhere, the significance of animal life in Keller’s stories of 
maturation and socialization, as that element that must be bound and overcome so that the individual can 
enter harmoniously into society. Karl Wagner, for his part, has traced the links between Keller’s style and 
popular science writing of the 19th century. Cf. Kaiser, Gerhard. “Ein Blick in Kellers Bestiarium.” Dichtung 
als Sozializationsspiel. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978. pp. 125-134; Wagner, Karl. “ ‘Das Glück des 
Wissens’: Formen des Wissens und der Wissenschaft in Kellers Roman.” Der grüne Heinrich neu gelesen. 
Ed. Wolfram Groddeck. Chronos, 2007. pp. 91-110. 
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concurrence with that other typological science, physiognomy. These studies are borne out 
by the heavily—if ironically—scientific language of one of the key programmatic texts of 
European Realism, the “Avant-Propos” to Honoré de Balzac’s Comédie Humaine, which I 
will explore later in this chapter, in which Balzac refers to himself as a botanist and 
zoologist of humanity. But my investigation will go in a different direction. I readily accept 
that typology is a constitute technique of the modern novel, as both scholars definitively 
prove and as the programmatic literature of Realism definitively states. The question that 
I will attempt to answer in this chapter is: according to what criteria, what values does 
Keller differentiate one type from another? How does Keller classify individuals? What 
kinds of types does Keller distinguish from one another? And what does this tell us about 
Keller’s relationship with Realism—both as a movement and as an artistic program?  
 Keller’s contemporaries in England, in France, and in Germany had a ready answer 
to these questions: the task of the modern author is to distinguish social types above all. 
The rubric according to which the hundreds of characters in Balzac’s Comédie Humaine 
are classified is simply one of social station: peer, prostitute, solicitor’s clerk, soldier, 
cleric. Their fates, as Balzac conceived them, were journeys up society’s ladders and down 
its chutes. For Keller—and this will be my answer to the above question—characters typify 
not classes or social milieux but rather inner dispositions, inclinations of character, 
determinations of value, what Keller calls, in a word, Lebensarten, or ways of living. 
Where the broad tendency of Realism was to represent visible aspects of the social world, 
Keller sought to represents ways of existing in it and attitudes towards it. Rather than depict 
the full range of professions, Keller offers a wide spectrum of understandings of labor. 
Rather than show how characters make or lose their fortune, Keller presents the reader with 
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different understandings of monetary value. These considerations will, in their turn, return 
us to our initial question of what Keller means by ein Exempel statuiren. What does Keller 
want us to do as we read through his compendium of Lebensarten? Is one privileged over 
the others? And if so, does art, or should art, have the power to enjoin the reader to embrace 
it? 
 These questions recur throughout all of Keller’s work, but they are particularly 
salient for Der grüne Heinrich, the second version of which I will examine in this chapter. 
I have stated in the introduction that I favor the second version as the more properly realistic 
of the two versions. As a novel of development, rather than a case study of a pathological 
individual, it foregrounds precisely the formation and growth of an individual 
consciousness as it learns to make sense of the world, and as it begins to ask the very 
questions of value and significance that it uses to distinguish human beings, events, and 
actions from one another. 
In the following chapter, I will argue while Keller’s autobiographical novel Der 
grüne Heinrich conformed to the program of Realism delineated by critics like Julian 
Schmidt and writers like Otto Ludwig and Theodor Fontane, Keller not only dramatically 
expanded the scope of that program, but often ran sharply counter to it as well. The Realists 
demanded that the author not simply describe the world, but also make use of an active 
narrative voice to poeticize and idealize it. Verklärung, as the Realists called this technique, 
was literature’s true task over and above the “mere” reproduction of reality, a charge they 
leveled against the impassivité of French “naturalists” like Zola and Flaubert. In the first 
section, I will argue that, with its extensive depictions of the manners, customs and 
characters of the Switzerland in which he was raised, Keller’s autobiographical novel did 
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indeed answer the Realists’ call for a return to das Reale—to the world “as it is.” I go on 
to assert that what Keller referred to as the Reichsunmittelbarkeit der Poesie is most 
immediately apparent in the construction of the supporting cast of Der grüne Heinrich. The 
joiners, tailors, craftsmen, builders, farmers, schoolteachers and public functionaries 
encountered by Heinrich as he attempts to establish himself as an artist, are, on the one 
hand, drawn directly from the artisanal class and the petit bourgeoisie. On the other hand, 
Keller’s novel raises these ordinary individuals into archetypal figures embodying 
inclinations of character, temperament, philosophical inclination—Lebensarten, to use 
Keller’s term, or “ways of living.” In Keller, the sociological landscape of the Realist novel 
is transformed into an ethical one.  
In the second section, I will argue that the delineation of these “ways of living” in 
Der Grüne Heinrich comprises not only the novel’s substance but also its guiding structural 
principle, completely determining Keller’s approach to the novel’s main themes—money, 
art, work, love, shame, familial obligation and self-fulfillment. Several of the chapters of 
the novel are devoted to the outright expression and comparison of different worldviews, 
life courses, and personalities, often in the form of characters who varied, contradictory 
advice to Heinrich and his mother. The same principle also inheres in the planning of many 
of the book’s chapters, in which a discursive division, as between essay and narrative, also 
occasions an ethical division, as between two Lebensarten—hardening oneself in the face 
of death, or celebrating; living for one’s work, or working for profit—in which neither 
quite gains the upper hand. I will argue that this narrative principle is most fully and most 
subtly at work in Heinrich’s torn affections between Anna and Judith, the conflict that 
dominates the second and third volumes of the novel. Keller uses both female figures to 
 40 
draw an explicit connection between ethical disposition and the programmatic questions of 
Realism: what are people like, how should they be, and how should the two be reconciled 
and represented? Anna, who first seems to be struck in the mold of Goethe’s Gretchen, 
occasions a wider consideration of the relationship between renunciation and its 
relationship to the aesthetic act of idealization. Judith inversely embodies an ethic of 
emphatic joy that goes hand in hand with a refusal to abstract away the hard truths of life 
and the failings of those who have to live it—a Lebensart that sees a harsh, but ultimately 
forgiving light as far more favorable to the world than the veil of Verklärung for which the 
Realists, Keller among them, proselytized so forcefully. 
In the chapter’s final section, I will argue that what makes Der grüne Heinrich so 
distinctive among the great novels of the nineteenth century is that it avails itself of didactic 
forms while taking a highly skeptical stance vis á vis the possibility of self-directed ethical 
improvement. I will frame my argument as a question of genre: I hold that Keller’s novel 
is and is not a Bildungsroman. Drawing on David Wellbery and Phillip Ajouri, I argue that 
the Bildungsroman, though a notoriously difficult genre to distinguish, contains two 
distinctive features. The first is a teleological structure—not necessarily one in which the 
protagonist reaches a final goal, but nonetheless one in which the protagonist categorizes 
his past experiences and uses these typified experiences in order to project new, longed-for 
experiences which he then attempts to realize. This process is carried out by a desire that 
is fundamentally one that wishes, one that longs for something—the second identifying 
aspect of the Bildungsroman. In his longing to become a painter and a great citizen, in his 
chaste encounters with Anna, Der grüne Heinrich gives just such an account of desire, and 
consequently, of development and growth. But in Judith it also offers a countermodel. In 
 41 
his encounters with Judith, Heinrich learns to suspend his desires, his reflections on the 
past and his longing for the future, by giving himself to them completely and utterly in the 
moment. At such moments, Heinrich sees the diversity of experience and character around 
him and accepts it; and instead of a Bildungsroman, the novel becomes a kind of menagerie, 
a compendium of Lebensarten, a colloquy, in which the despair that Heinrich feels at ever 
achieving happiness is compensated for by the humanity he achieves in the tolerance of 
difference. 
 
2. “Zwei erklärte Atheisten”: A Typology of Ethics 
 
 I would like to begin the chapter by examining a passage that appears in both 
versions of Der grüne Heinrich, Heinrich’s recollection of the two atheists in the coterie 
of traders, merchants, and superstitious townspeople that passed through the junk shop 
across the street from the house in which he grew up. As Heinrich recalls the two men, “Es 
waren dies zwei erklärte Atheisten. 
Der eine, ein schlichter, einsilbiger Schreinersmann, welcher schon manches hundert Särge 
gefertigt und zugenagelt hatte, war ein braver Mann und versicherte dann und wann einmal 
mit dürren Worten, er glaube ebenso wenig an ein ewiges Leben, als man von Gott etwas 
wissen könne. Im übgrien hörte man nie eine freche Rede oder ein Spottwort von ihm; er 
rauchte gemütlich sein Pfeifchen und ließ es über sich ergehen, wenn die Weiber mit 
fließenden Bekehrungsreden über ihn herfuhren. Der ander war ein bejahrter 
Schneidersmann mit grauen Haaren und mutwilligem, unnützem Herzen, der schon mehr 
als einen schlimmen Streich verübt haben mochte. Währed jener sich still und leidend 
verhielt und nur selten mit seinem dürren Glaubensbekenntnisse hervortrat, verfuhr dieser 
angriffsweise und machte sich ein Vergnügen daraus, die gläubigen Seelen durch derbe 
Zweifel und Verleugnungen, rohe Späße und Profanationen zu verletzen und zu 
erschrecken, als ein rechter Eulenspiegel das einfältige Wort zu verdrehen und mit dick 
aufgetragenem Humor in den armen Leuten eine sündhafte Lachlust zu reizen. Er besaß 
weder großen Verstand, noch Pietät für irgend etwas, selbst für die Natur nicht, und schien 
einzig ein persönliches Bedürfnis zu haben, das Dasein Gottes zu leugnen oder 
wegzuwünschen, indessen der Schreiner sich bloß nicht viel daraus machte, hingegen auf 
seinein Wanderjahren die Welt aufmerksam betrachtet hatte, sich fortwährend noch 
unterrichtete und von allerlei merkwürdigen Dingen mit Liebe zu sprechen wußte, wenn er 
auftauchte. Der Schneider fand nur Gefallen an Ränken und Schwänken und lärmenden 
Zänkereien mit den gegeisterten Weibern: auch sein Verhalten zu den Juden, gegenüber 
demjenigen des Sargmachers, war bezeichnend [...] Als er späterhin starb, that er dies so 
verzagt und zerknirscht, heulend und zähneklappened und nach Gebet verlangend, daß die 
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guten Leute einen glänzenden Triumph feierten, indessen der Schreiner eben so ruhig und 
unangefochten seinen letzen Sarg hobelte, welchen er sich selbst bestimmte, wie einst 
seinen ersten.38 
 
Here, Heinrich leaves the two men to pick up his recollection of the religious debates that 
went on with the shop’s owner, Frau Margarete, who held the existence of ghosts as 
scientific fact. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the ruin of the marriage of Frau 
Margarete and her husband Jakob, when, egged on by his friends, among them the tailor, 
Jakob demands that Margarete turn over half of the gold she has put away to him by 
marriage right. 
 This aside immediately strikes the scholar concerned with the question of Keller’s 
relationship to the program of Realism. To start with, except for clearly singular characters 
like Frau Margarete, Meretlein, or Heinrich’s immediate family, the tailor and the joiner 
are the first personages in Heinrich’s world whose personality, profession, and moral 
character are described in depth by Keller. After the general sketches in the novel’s 
introductory chapters, they are the first concrete instances of what sort of people inhabit 
the world in which Der grüne Heinrich is set, the Switzerland of the 1830s and 40s. Though 
hopelessly provincial compared to the metropolitan centers of Europe, where the old order 
has been seriously destabilized by rapid technological development, urbanization and the 
parceling of the old estates, the region has nonetheless also felt the aftershocks of the 
recently-settled Napoleonic Wars. The dynamic spirit of the new times is embodied for 
Heinrich, the book’s narrator, in the person of his father, a stonemason who returns to 
Switzerland from an apprenticeship in Germany armed with the “the French ideas”—an 
indefatigable work ethic, a powerful civic commitment, and a sense of common purpose 
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with the artisanal class. The mere fact that Heinrich, a child of the petite bourgeoisie, 
encounters the joiner and the tailor as full human beings in their own right firmly roots Der 
grüne Heinrich in the perspective of Metternich’s Europe as experienced by a liberal 
member of the lower middle class. As Heinrich grows older, he will also share his class’s 
disappointment that, though the so-called enlightened classes have been swept into political 
prominence and economic power over the aristocracy, the promised freedom and 
immediacy of human relations they were to have brought with them have not yet come.  
 That much may be said for Keller as a Realist in the popular sense of the term. Just 
the same, Keller withholds far too much information from the reader for the anecdote to 
serve a purely sociological function. There is no mention of how the two men figure into 
the life of the town, no description of their places of business—crucially absent is an 
account of how they interact with those above or below them on the social ladder. Their 
respective trades are mentioned by Keller also as an entrée into their moral characters. The 
steady, upright work of the joiner, whose trade forces him to consider the mortality of all 
things, turns him into a steady, upright man, while the bow-backed needlework of the tailor, 
whose work stokes his customers’ vanities, is a mean-spirited man for whom the mantle of 
enlightenment is merely a pretext for attacking the happiness of those he resents. The 
joiner’s work forces him to contemplate the inevitability of death and so, in his life, he is 
able to keep cordial relations with the people around him, even those who are differently 
minded. The tailor, meanwhile, only pretends to have achieved this peace in order to harass 
those who have actually found it. To heighten the parable-like effect of the story, Keller 
removes the rich physical description with which the book abounds. After the first chapters, 
apart from a passing mention of Louis Phillipe, the novel offers no places or dates until its 
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conclusion. The result of Keller’s severing, or at least downplaying, their specific social 
circumstances is that the two otherwise unremarkable men are raised to the status of 
archaic, universal figures, existing no longer in the Switzerland of the 1830s, but in the 
timeless, ahistorical realm of story-telling. The joiner has all of the rectitude of a Seneca, 
while the tailor is transformed from a provincial artisan into a villain on the scale of a 
Richard III or Iago, taking pleasure in doing evil for evil’s sake.  
Seen now from a more technical perspective, this passages offers a highly 
instructive example of how Theodor Vischer’s aesthetics, couched as they are in the 
abstract and the metaphysical, might be put into actual practice by an author attempting 
literary realism without a literary antecedent to imitate. The first and most crucial hurdle 
that the passage clears is that of “Zeitmäßigkeit”—timeliness not only in the sense of being 
of the present, but of being an urgent, compelling subject of poetic representation for the 
present. Of the three “grüne Stellen” that Vischer identifies as repositories of the poetic in 
the prosaic world, the tailor and the joiner are taken from the second, that of uncommon 
people, people on the margins of society, like criminals, gypsies, and traveling musicians, 
and who, as being outside of the ordinary, might therefore be valid subjects of sublime 
poetic treatment. As denizens of Frau Margarete’s junk shop, a place out of time where the 
ghosts of the dead still haunt the living, and where magic can still be used to curse one’s 
enemies or to gain luck in one’s endeavors, where the proprietress does accounts in dust 
using only three roman numerals, the tailor and the joiner are, despite the modesty of their 
professions, clearly not individuals encountered by the narrator every day. Their status as 
men apart is further underscored by the fact that they are atheists, a self-identification that 
puts them on the outside even of the motley community at the shop.  
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Secondly, by sharpening each character so that he complements and contrasts the 
others, Keller is able to achieve the “reine Formentwicklung” and “Verschönerung” that 
Vischer praises so highly in the epic poets. Every aspect of the character perfectly 
harmonizes with the sentence-long description that Keller provides for each man, from the 
pipe that the joiner peaceably smokes in the company of others, enacting, in a tiny everyday 
gesture, his rejection of transcendence for the happiness of the here and now; while the 
gadfly disposition of his counterpart, the tailor, is on ready display in his cruelty for the 
Jewish visitors to Frau Margarete’s shop, who are otherwise tolerated by the diverse crowd 
there. All extraneous details and interactions, all aspects of the men’s characters that do 
not accord with those initial descriptions is cast-off—we never learn, for example, how 
each man dresses, or whether he is married, and so on. Each portrait moves cleanly, without 
a single false step, from each character’s first presentation to their death, the ultimate proof 
of their character. But rather than resulting in the loss of each individual detail in this 
generality, the clear contours of each man’s character makes each individual detail that 
much more vivid—the third aspect of Vischer’s Idealisierung. In Vischer’s anti-
transcendent, immanent aesthetics, harmony is not something over and above the 
individual parts that produce it, but rather given, or, perhaps more aptly, embodied in 
them—or, “daß der Geist, der die Dinge im Lichte der inneren Unendlichkeit auffaßt, 
gerade eine schärfere Zeichnung der Einzelzüge begründet…, weil im Lichte des 
eröffneten Zusammenhangs mit der unermeßlichten vertieften inneren Welt selbst das 
Kleine, Enge, höchst Eigentümliche berechtigt, bedeutend wird.”39 Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the lively, if grim comedy of each man’s death that rounds off each story—
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the joiner finishing his last coffin and then climbing into it, the tailor piteously recanting 
all of his beliefs in what is celebrated by the community as a victory for religion. In each 
detail, the episode’s theme—the rejection of transcendence, the wisdom of happiness in 
the present, tolerance as an expression of happiness—is driven home once more.  
 It is at the final point, that of Versittlichung, that the matter becomes more complex. 
Vischer argued that the very process of Verschönerung was itself instructive, without being 
didactic. In harmonizing the seeming contradictions of the visible world, and in simplifying 
its mass of impressions into clear, comprehensible forms, the poetic transfiguration of 
reality made sensible and graspable a reconciled and humane attitude towards the world: a 
“wahrhaft bejahende und positive Weltanschauung… muß der Kunst so willkommen sein, 
wie die helle Sonne welche… frei und klar die Erde und jedes ihren Wesen beleuchtet.”40 
It demonstrated, without being openly didactic, that things simply were as they were, gave 
the reader this knowledge and this vision and let him find his own way. Certainly, Keller 
seems to favor the joiner over the tailor, and the humorous, detached, darkly comic voice 
seems more of a piece with former man than the latter. And yet, the story is a story of two 
men, not one. Keller gives equal care and attention to the tailer and the joiner alike; each 
man’s character receives the same dignified, elevated poetic treatment, each man’s life is 
rooted in his trade and his trade in his character. It is the contrast and complement between 
the two, and not the obvious enlightenment of the joiner, that gives the episode its dramatic 
thrust and satisfying conclusion. And while the anecdote’s strong formal connection to the 
Christian parable—in the didactic contrast of the two men, the moral weight thrown on 
their professions, the subtle touches of Christian anthropology, namely, the assumption that 
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life is suffering and the only wisdom in the preparation for death—makes the episode feel 
as though it is intended to be instructive, the characters in the episode, comic though they 
are, are meant to be familiar, too. They stand for existing moral, psychological, and even 
physical dispositions in the world shared by Heinrich, Keller, and his readers. 
For Keller, then, the Verklärung of the world consists not simply in using poetic 
language to glorify the experience of the bourgeoisie but rather of transforming the people 
he observed into the moral and psychological types with whom he carried on a kind of 
ethical Puppenspiel. The joiner, who joyfully embraces the disappointments of life and the 
finality of death, recurs in the person of the journeyman joiner called in to build the coffin 
for Heinrich’s cousin; he is also to be found in Hulda, the shopgirl who urges Heinrich to 
work a simple job six days a week and love on the seventh, as well as the hungover 
workmen cheerfully building a dam the day after the town’s Tellfest. The tailor, meanwhile, 
is cousin to the many resentful misanthropes in Keller’s oeuvre, from Heinrich’s 
schoolmate Meierlein to Wurmlinger, “welcher sich ein Vergnügen daraus machte, den 
Leuten, welche sich mit ihm abgaben, allerlei Erfindungen und Aufschneidereien 
vorzutragen, um sie nachher ihrer Leichtgläubigkeit wegen zu verhöhnen,”41 and Pankraz 
the moper, who flies into a rage whenever his sister cheats him of his share of the mashed 
potatoes on which the poor family subsists. Hardly a character appears in Der grüne 
Heinrich without being set in the service of some general anthropological insight, either 
through a dramatization that makes the point explicitly, or via a casual linguistic usage, 
especially some variant of jene—a favorite formulation of Keller’s: “Denn er gehörte zu 
jenen Menschen, die nicht gesonnen sind, sich in ihren Begierden im mindesten zu 
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beschränken, und in der Gemeinheit ihrer Gesinnung dem Nächsten mit List oder Gewalt 
das entreißen, was er gutwillig nicht lassen will”42;“[Frau Margaretes] Mann war einer von 
denjenigen, welche nichts Eigenes gelernt haben noch thun können und daher darauf 
angewiesen sind, mehr die Handlanger einer thatkräftigen Frau zu machen und auf eine 
müßige Weise unter dem Schilde ihres Regimentes ein ruhmloses Dasein zu führen;”43 to 
list just several. Such a level of detail, characterization and clarity of judgment is nowhere 
to be found in Keller’s German language contemporaries, none of whom had the 
observational power to paint in any but the broadest colors: aristocrat, banker, merchant, 
farmer and the like. 
It is precisely this technique, the typification and dramatization of psychological 
traits and philosophical dispositions, that sets Keller distinctly apart from his fellow 
German realists and sets him into conversation with the “cynical” Balzacian Realism that 
the “Herren Grenzboten” held in such contempt. Keller, typically for the period, took, or 
claimed to take, little interest in the French novel and preferred to define himself against 
his immediate German language predecessors—Gotthelf, Auerbach, and Goethe, virtually 
the only German prose author respected by the Realists, and then only for his Wilhelm 
Meister. Nonetheless, it was Balzac who, in his “Avant-Propos” for the sprawling Comédie 
Humaine in 1846, first detached explicitly the Realist novel from the production of plots 
and set as his task the investigation and representation of human character in all its variety: 
“The creator used but one and the same pattern for all organized creatures. The animal is a 
principle which takes its external form, or to put it more precisely, the differences of its 
form, from the milieu in which it is called upon to evolve… Does not Society make of man, 
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according to the milieu in which his activity takes place, as man different men as there are 
variety in zoology?”44 Though the arch casting of the author as a pith-helmeted researcher 
following in the footsteps of Buffon, Saint-Hilaire, and Humboldt is utterly foreign to the 
drier, and as we have seen in the passage under consideration, much darker sensibility of 
Der grüne Heinrich, the deemphasis on plot and the absence of the protagonist for entire 
stretches of the book in favor of characters with little or no relation to the plot would have 
been unthinkable before Balzac. On repeat readings of the novel, one is struck by just how 
little of its space is occupied by Heinrich, and just how much space is given over to 
everybody—anybody—besides him: to Heinrich’s teacher at school, who is incapable of 
commanding the respect of the students and inadvertently sparks a student revolt; his 
religious instructor, who confuses Heinrich’s childish enthusiasm with demonic 
possession; Heinrich’s playful female cousins, who never tire of mocking his vanity; a 
homeless man he meets on the road home from Munich, all of whom represent some 
difference of “form” in the human animal, as Balzac puts it, and who, together, swallow 
the much weaker story of Heinrich’s development. 
But here, too, the comparison to French Realism reveals as many differences as it 
does similarities. It is clear that Keller is no mordant chronicler and cataloguer of mores—
in comparison to Balzac even the Munich chapters of Der grüne Heinrich read as though 
they are set in the Middle Ages. Much scholastic ink has been spilled to demonstrate that 
the discrepancy between the German-speaking world and the rest of Europe is above all a 
social and historical one; that Switzerland, divided as it was between cantons and dialects 
simply did not allow for a portrait as comprehensive as Balzac’s—that Keller had to walk 
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the so-called deutscher Sonderweg to modernity.45 And yet the difference of worldview, 
which grew wider, not narrower, as Keller’s Switzerland became more and more like the 
rest of Europe, is not simply developmental. The two writers experience life at 
fundamentally different levels. To Balzac, social station is everything: whether his 
characters were soldiers or greengrocers or merchants or prostitutes or peers of France, 
their station said everything there was to say about them. Their “fate,” as far as he was 
concerned, was identical to their position on the social ladder. For Keller, status is an 
entirely superficial consideration. Without the first two chapters of the novel—added 
almost twenty-five years after its initial publication—the reader would be entirely unable 
to discern in what century, let alone in what milieu, the story of the joiner and the tailor 
takes place. Work, money, family, prosperity—all these are considered not as emblems of 
social identification but in terms of the effect that they produce on the inner character of 
the human being who possesses them. The story of the tailor and the joiner is less rich in 
social detail than any told by Balzac, but for that it cuts much deeper. It is a story of two 
natures, two characters, two dispositions: two ethics. 
The word ethics has long plagued Keller scholarship, and its misleading moral 
tones—in the German Ethik as well as in its English counterpart—have often led scholars 
to confuse the ethical focus in Keller’s work with what Schmidt approvingly referred to as 
sittliches Benehmen, correct conduct. Though the moral affects, particularly shame, play a 
central role in Der grüne Heinrich, the resonance we hear in terms like “medical ethics,” 
or “ethical business practice,” that is, of right and wrong action, rarely sounds in the novel. 
Moral crises did not interest Keller; he understood ethics in the far broader Greek sense of 
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ethos—of custom, habit, values, disposition, and fundamental character. Virtually every 
figure in Der grüne Heinrich stands in for some sort of character, some value, some 
disposition. Anna’s father, the schoolmaster, is a picture of quiet, unjudging piety, an 
argument for all that is good in the Christian character, while the philosopher who teaches 
under him, praising the all as he reads Spinoza, terrified that his coffeepot will shatter into 
a thousand monads as he reads Leibniz, represents the philosophical mindset itself. In 
Habersaat, the novel offers a consideration of what might be called artistic Fordism, totally 
mechanized cultural industrial production, while Römer personifies the instability, poverty, 
and occasional genius of the “independent” artist. Seen beside these characters, Keller’s 
seemingly didactic juxtaposition of the joiner with the tailor no longer appears so didactic. 
Both characters’ behavior is inborn, molded by habit, hardened by experience; it 
completely lacks the situational dimension of morality—if, for example, while crossing a 
bridge, I see someone drowning in the water below, ought I risk my life to try and save 
them? Ethics concerns itself with the constant, the regular, and therefore more fundamental 
aspects of life. How do I treat the people I see every day? Those who are different from 
me? What do I believe, and why do I believe it? Am I afraid to die?    
It is typical of Keller’s work that such lofty conceptual formulations are usually 
replaced with more informal coinages, and the ethical dimension of his work is no 
exception. Neither in his work nor in his correspondence does Keller mention ethics or an 
ethic. Instead, Keller offers the simpler, more direct, and yet more elusive notion of a 
Lebensart—simply, a way of living. The term appears only as the title of a chapter right at 
the mid-point of the fourth and final volume of Der grüne Heinrich, when Heinrich has 
nearly run out of money and is on the verge of admitting his failure as an artist. Suddenly 
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struck by the contrast between his mother’s asceticism and his own wastefulness, Heinrich 
reflects how strange it is that while his mother eats nothing but “eine Art schwarzer Suppe, 
welche sie jahraus, jahrein, einen Tag wie den andern um die Mittagszeit kochte, auf einem 
Feuerchen, welches gleichermaßen fast von nichts brannte und eine Ladung Holz eine 
Ewigkeit dauern ließ,”46  the university student “beansprucht, selber in jugendlichem 
Vertrauen schwärmend, ein außerordentliches Vertrauen, Unfleiß und Geldmangel 
gereichen ihm nicht zum Nachteil, vielmehr warden beide durch besondere Lieder gefeiert, 
sogar das Verthun der letzten Habe, das Hänseln der Gläubiger in alten und neuen rituellen 
Gesängen gepriesen”47 Here, the Lebensarten under consideration are ostensibly the 
joyless ascesis of Heinrich’s mother and the wastefulness of her own son—or, more subtly, 
maternal self-sacrifice and filial ingratitude. When Heinrich tries and fails to sell a crowd-
pleasing painting, however, he returns home and continues his reflections, which now turn 
to questions of labor, profit, and alienation reminiscent of the work of the young Marx. 
Heinrich notes that the work of the artist is the one corner of the world where the labor 
theory of value does not hold: a brilliant idea, lacking any authenticity, is quickly is hailed 
as work if it is realized quickly; years and years of toil with no result are rejected as 
foolishness. Now on something of a roll, Heinrich seizes on the difference between a brand 
of cheap canned lentils, whose production strikes him as an example of “die rätselhaften 
Vermischung von Arbeit und Täuschung, innerer Hohlheit und äußerem Erfolg, Unsinn 
und weiser Betriebe” that lasts “bis der Herbstwind der Zeit alles hingwegfegt und auf dem 
Blachfelde nichts übrig läßt,”48 and the work of Friedrich Schiller, who “aus dem Kreise 
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hinausfliehend, zu welchem Familie und Landherr ihn bestimmt, alles im Stiche lassend, 
was ihn nach ihrem Willen beglücken sollte, [...] veredelte sich unablässig von innen heraus 
und sein Leben wurde nichts anderes als die Erfüllung sein innersten Wesens,” and whose 
works, though appreciated in his lifetime, only became proper “classics” once they brought 
in millions after his death.49 
Heinrich’s recourse to Schiller’s life and literary after-life give the reader a sense 
of the scope of Keller’s conception of a “way of living.” Wastefulness and thrtiftiness are, 
by comparison, behaviors; a Lebensart encompasses not only Schiller’s work habits, but 
his understanding of the nature of work and of profit—the unseen determination of 
character and disposition that serves as the soil for uncounted moral behaviors. For 
Heinrich, work must be a path to self-actualization, as it was for Schiller; since none of the 
work he has done has ever “actualized” him, he has never “earned” money, and as a result 
has no sense of it, he is wasteful. For Frau Lee, on the other hand, a widow, money is saved 
against inevitable catastrophe. To eat meat twice a week, to heat a bowl of soup on more 
than the barely necessary wood would be hubris—the pleasure that is denied is then 
displaced onto the act of renunciation itself. By the same token, the contrast between the 
joiner and the tailor that we considered at the outset of this chapter is not simply between 
an upright man and a resentful one. The excurse is an anthropological sketch of two 
dispositions towards belief: in the one, belief is the natural expression of genuine 
acceptance of the pains of this life, as well as of its joys; the other a violent expression of 
a refusal to grasp those limitations. The politeness shown by the joiner to those who do not 
share his atheism is an example of the sittliches Benehmen that Julian Schmidt hoped the 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
 54 
Realist novel would uphold; the considerations of happiness, death and God that underpin 
from which that politeness grows, meanwhile, are the provenance of Der grüne Heinrich.   
As a provisional summary, we might say then that Der grüne Heinrich both 
employs and subverts a key technique of the German Realist program and that of European 
Realism—that of the Idealisierung, or the type. By making use of the “Convenienz” of 
synthesizing the full range of reality into broad, recognizable, generalized instances, Keller 
is able to achieve a coherence of narrative, character, and action in the anecdotes that fill 
Der grüne Heinrich. However, rather than standing in for classes or social milieux, Keller’s 
types represent Lebensarten, ways of living, dispositions towards the world. Where these 
social types might have served as scenery, or as points arranged on what Pierre Bourdieu, 
in his study of Sentimental Education, refers to as “the field of power”—zones of influence 
that act on one another and the narrator—here Keller is far more interested in exploring 
different modes of comportment, different directions in which one might choose to direct 
his life and his personality, for the narrator as well as for the reader.50 It is this difference 
of value, and not any presumed aesthetic inferiority, that is responsible for the unique feel 
of Keller’s work, which transposes closely observed psychological realism into a realm 
with few recognizable social or historical markers. Rather than seeking to represent the 
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3. Ethical Typology as Structural Principle  
 
 In addition to the glimpse it offers into Keller’s ethics and anthropology, the 
“Lebensarten” chapter of Der grüne Heinrich is particularly instructive as a case in point 
for the mechanics of Keller’s unique Realism. Particularly significant in this respect is 
Keller’s subordination of central plot details to lengthy philosophical excurses and 
character sketches, instead of pruning these down to advance the plot. The full direness of 
Heinrich’s financial situation, for example, is not revealed until the passage considering 
his wastefulness as a behavior typical of the university student; and though this 
consideration is ostensibly from Heinrich’s perspective, and as such is meant to illuminate 
something of his inner life, the particularity of his situation serves the broader contrast 
between the wasteful and the thrifty characters in general, not the other way around, as, for 
example, Balzac’s reflection on the gloomy aspect of certain bourgeois homes serves as an 
entrée into a sketch of the home of Eugenie Grandet.51 What is more, Heinrich’s attempts 
to sell his paintings, his being swindled by a more experienced artist, an undiscerning 
crowd of art patrons dismissing him as a dilettante—the central action of the chapter, what 
might have served as a chapter-length skewering of art world’s pretensions and double-
dealings—function above all to motivate the reflection on Relevanta arabica and Friedrich 
Schiller that is the primary content of the chapter. 
Much, if not all, of the novel is structured precisely according to this principle. “Die 
Künstler,” for example, broadly sketches in the contours of Heinrich’s life in Munich; we 
learn that he is unsure of his artistic abilities and that his paintings cost him an enormous 
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amount of labor. As in “Lebensarten,” Keller offer these details as a cursory introduction 
on the way to the chapter’s real focus, the two types of working artist represented by 
Erikson and Lyrs. (Erikson, a North German of simple and direct character, possesses 
minor but focused artistic talents that allow him to make salable if uninspiring paintings, 
while Lys’s melancholic disposition and inherited wealth keep him from pushing himself 
to develop his considerable inborn ability into a career.) The same structure is at work in 
the “Ratgeber” chapter, in which the widowed Frau Lee consults three friends of her 
deceased husband’s regarding Heinrich’s artistic career. Here, the plot point on which not 
only the chapter but the entire novel hinges—that Heinrich has decided to become an 
artist—is buried into the friends’ contradictory advice: the one suggests that Heinrich 
would be best suited designing women’s handkerchiefs; the other that Heinrich become a 
map-maker; while the final friend advises Frau Lee to dissuade Heinrich from his artistic 
ambitions entirely. We might also consider the “Tischgespräch” at the end of the novel’s 
second volume between Heinrich, his uncle and the town’s mayor regarding the nature of 
sacrifice for the civic good. These chapters—and they are far from the only such chapters 
in the book—have no action at all; instead, they derive their dramatic tension from the 
increasing intensity of the prose as it describes each point of view. Keller’s sentences 
become longer and longer as each point of view reaches its climax, the hypotaxis more and 
more extreme; the contrasting point of view recedes into the distance; and for a moment 
the reader is led to believe that the author’s sympathy with the expressed point of view. 
Then Keller takes up the contrary viewpoint with the same sincerity and conviction, and 
the process begins anew. 
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To favor essayistic reflection over plot is hardly a technique exclusive to Keller or 
to Realism. What distinguishes Keller’s use of it is that even the plot of Der grüne Heinrich 
unfolds so as to expound contrasting ethical determinations—that is, even those chapters 
that foreground plot are structured like the “Lebensarten” chapter. In no scene is this so 
clear as in the “Totentanz” chapter of the second book. This brief chapter serves primarily 
to describe Heinrich’s deepening relationship with Anna, his frail, almost otherworldly 
cousin. The plot is, as usual, relatively spare. During an idyllic stay in the country with 
Anna and her family, Heinrich’s grandmother falls ill and dies; Henrich witnesses his 
internment and attends her funeral feast—here Keller seems to offer a simple, linear 
episode that advances the action of the plot. But here, too, the action is as neatly divided 
as the reflections of relevanta Arabica and Schiller or the comparison between Heinrich 
and his mother. The first half of the chapter recounts his grandmother’s illness, her 
confinement, her funeral and her burial, leading Heinrich ride up to the edge of her grave, 
as it were, to death itself: “Als ich aber die Schaufeln klingen hörte vor der Kirchen Thür 
drängte ich mich hinaus, um in das Grab zu schauen. Der einfache Sarg lag schon darin, 
viele Menschen standen umher und weinten, die Schollen fielen hart auf den Deckel und 
verbargen ihn allmählich; ich sah erstaunt hinein und kam mir fremd und verwundert vor, 
und die Tote in der Erde erschien mir auch fremd und ich fand keine Thräenen.”52 His 
grandmother’s death is Heinrich’s first inkling of death’s utter finality, a significant 
moment in his later rejection of any afterlife. But once the service has ended, a huge meal 
is set and, upstairs, a joyful dance begins: “Auf einmal fing es über unseren Köpfen an zu 
brummen und zu pfeifen. Geige, Baß und Klarinette wurde angestimmt und ein Waldhorn 
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erging in schwülen Tönen... Man spielte einen elendiglichen Trauermarsch... Die Musik 
aber ging plötzlich in einen lustigen Hopser über, die Älteren zogen sich zurück und die 
Jugend brauste jauchzend und stampfend über den dröhnenden Boden hin.”53 Heinrich and 
Anna dance, and at the end of the chapter, they share their first and only kiss, in seeming 
illustration of the first chapter of Ecclesiastes: “one generation passeth away, and another 
cometh, but the earth abideth for ever.” 
Ending the chapter on the kiss sounds a didactic note very similar to the story of 
the joiner and tailor. Because life is short, Keller seems to say, we ought to take our pleasure 
where we can—a mix of Epicureanism and Stoicism, as it were. But, at the same, time, the 
scene is carefully constructed to qualify, if not completely cancel the emphasis the reader 
naturally places on its ending. Neither the finality of death nor the necessity of emphatic 
joy tip the scales against one another. Rather, the two Lebensarten are tangled even as they 
are expounded. The description of the death of Heinrich’s grandmother that opens the 
chapter also contains, significantly, Heinrich’s first realizations of Anna’s beauty, now the 
more striking for the sorrow around her: “Anna [trug] ihr schwarzes Kirchengewand und 
eine ihrer eigentümlichen Krausen, worin sie aussah wie eine Art Stiftsfräulein... Dazu 
durchdrang sie heute eine tiefe Frömmigkeit und Andacht, sie war still und ihre 
Bewegungen voll Sitte, und dieses alles ließ sie in meine Augen in neuem, unendlichem 
Reize erscheinen.”54And even the joy that Heinrich takes in the dance is carefully tempered 
by the schoolmaster’s distaste for it, as well as by Heinrich’s notice of an inconsolable 
young man in the crowd, who descends the staircase from the dance floor “als ob es in den 
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Tartarus ginge.”55 These wrinkles in the text’s allegorical moments work to freeze the two 
dispositions into a permanent Gleichgewicht, like the two Christs in Raphael’s Verklärung. 
Keller refuses to decide finally in favor of one or the other; he preserves instead their 
necessary interdependence. 
The character of Anna is particularly significant for the novel because it is in 
Heinrich’s inability to choose between her and Judith that Keller brings ethical disposition 
to bear on the Realist program itself. It is striking that Keller establishes the central 
romantic plot of his novel as an ethical conflict, and not a social one, no less central a trope 
in the German Realist novel than it was “abroad.” The conflict of lovers from different 
classes in Wilhelm Raabe’s Hungerpastor, Gustav Freytag’s Soll und Haben and the novels 
of the late Fontane—to say nothing of the work of Dickens, James, Stendhal, et al.—used 
the so-called “marriage plot”, in which true love is trampled by social expedience, to paint 
a society in which the bourgeoisie’s political and economic prominence had failed to bring 
about the immediacy of human relations that had been promised by the upheavals of the 
eighteenth century onwards. In Der grüne Heinrich, questions of marriage, inheritance and 
social advancement, are quite conspicuously absent; Heinrich’s relationship with Anna and 
Judith is dramatized as entirely as a conflict between two Lebensarten—most immediately, 
between renunciation and emphatic joy. The romantic moments shared by Heinrich and 
Anna are characterized above all by the refusal—the inability—of the two cousins to 
express their attraction for one another. They do not touch, they kiss only once, and though 
they are related, they do not at first address one another as “Du.” (Heinrich compares the 
familiar second person to a gold coin the more cherished for being laid away.) His first 
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encounter with Judith, by contrast, is one of total physical freedom. Even clothed, the dark-
haired widow appears in a state of near-nudity, her body barely covered by a white linen 
garment, making no pretensions to chastity. With Anna, Heinrich is a child, deeply aware 
of the expectation that he must make something of himself. His encounters with Judith, 
meanwhile, take place under the cover of fog and darkness, where Heinrich can accept 
himself as flawed, possessing murky depths of character he can never bring to light. 
Simply: Anna stands for the distant, the ideal, the untouchable; Judith the sexual, inflamed 
by the here and now.  
What makes this contrast particularly worthy of consideration is that it is via Judith 
and Anna, and not in the passages on painting, that Keller explicitly confronts the program 
of Realism. In Heinrich’s relationship to Anna, argues Sabine Schneider in her recent essay 
“Ikonen der Liebe”,56 Keller draws an explicit connection between Heinrich’s self-
aggrandizement and his tendency to see women as images—like Stendhal’s Julian Sorel, 
who, when he has a love affair, congratulates himself for conducting it á la Rousseau.57 
The renunciation between Heinrich and Anna is, at bottom, an utter disinterest in the real 
Anna. She is soon supplanted by a flurry of images: her portrait, the painting of the 
Heidenstube, her corpse. Indeed, the scene in which Anna dies and is buried is 
simultaneously one of the book’s most moving scenes and one of the sharpest examples of 
its critical irony:  
                                                
56Schneider, Sabine. Der grüne Heinrich neu gelesen. “Ikone der Liebe.” Ed. Wolfram Groddeck. Zürich: 
Chronos Verlag, 2009.  
57 As in the scene, for example, when Julien Sorel arrives in Besancon and proceeds to woo a girl at a café 
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reciting the Nouvelle Heloise to Miss Amanda, who was in ecstasies; he was delighted with his own 
courage,, when suddenly the fair Franc-Comtoise assumed a glacial air. One of her admierers stood in the 
doorway.” Stendhal. The Red and the Black. Trans. Burton Raffel and Diane Johnson. Modern Library, 
2004. p. 154. 
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Der letzte Sonnenstrahl leuchtete nun durch die Glassscheibe in das 
bleiche Gesicht, das darunter lag; das Gefühl, das ich jetzt empfand, war 
so seltsam, das ich es nicht anders als mit dem fremden hocchtrabenden 
und kalten Worte “objecktiv” bennen kann, welches die deutsche 
Aesthetik erfunden hat. Ich glaube, die Glassscheibe that es mir an, daß 
ich das Gut, was sie verschloß, gleich einem in Glas und Rahmen 
gefaßten Theil meiner Erfahrung, meines Lebens, in gehobener und 
feierlicher Stimmung, aber in vollkommener Ruhe begraben sah; noch 
heute weiß ich nicht, war es Stärke oder Schwäche daß ich dies tragische 
und feierliche Ereigniß viel eher genoß, als erduldete und mich beinahe 
des nun ernst werdenden Wechsels des Lebens freute.”58 
 
The reference to the “objectivity” of the Realist aesthetic unmasks Verklärung as a 
symptom of Heinrich’s moody narcissism. Transfiguration is, to use Schneider’s 
description, “ein ästhetisches Verfahren, in dessen Fortgang die lebendige Frau erst 
idealisierend entrückt wird, um dann durch das imaginierte Bild ihrer selbst ersetzt zu 
werden.”59 To Keller, pace Schneider, the calls to objectivity and the subjection of the outer 
world to the laws of the mind (as in Otto Ludwig’s “Poetischer Realismus”) are nothing 
more than childish navel-gazing legitimized as an aesthetic program.  
 Schneider’s reading is not the only one that reads Heinrich’s artistic aspirations, as 
well as his relationship with Anna, as fundamentally immature.60 I do not share this view. 
Just as Keller’s didactic moments are never wholly didactic, so too are his critical moments 
never wholly critical. Though the burial scene cuts down the aesthetic pleasure Heinrich 
takes in the scene itself, the course of Heinrich and Anna’s relationship takes a far more 
ambivalent view of the relationship between idealization and a renunciative ethic. To be 
sure, Der grüne Heinrich is deeply skeptical of the refusals of pleasure demanded both by 
Christian morality—as in the chapter detailing the torments of Meretlein, a child suspected 
by the local pastor of being a witch—and by capitalism. And yet the scenes with Anna, 
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60 Cf. Wick, Nadja. Apotheosen narzisstischer Individualität. Dilettantismus bei Karl Phillip Moritz, 
Gottfried Keller und Robert Gernhardt. Aisthesis Verlag, 2008.  
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based on Keller’s relationship with his cousin Henriette Keller, are quite reverential in their 
treatment of the “purity” of their relationship. One of most moving and evocative 
descriptions in Der grüne Heinrich is that of the room in which Anna is laid out before her 
burial. Her father has brought in some of her belongings, and as the night turns to day, the 
room and the landscape around it spring to life in the presence of the dead girl: “Das tote 
weiße Mädchen lag unbeweglich fort und fort, die farbigen Blumen des Teppichs aber 
schienen zu wachsen in dem schwachen Lichte. Nun ging der Morgenstern auf und 
spiegelte sich im See; ich löschte die Lampe ihm zu Ehren, damit er allein Annas Totenlicht 
sei, saß nun im Dunkeln in meiner Ecke und sah nach und nach die Kammer sich 
erhellen.”61 Later, when Heinrich and a journeyman joiner go off to build Anna’s coffin, 
Heinrich rejoices at the sight of a flock of geese on the lake, startled by the banging of the 
carpenter’s hammer. In these scenes, unfulfilled desire charges the objects in its proximity, 
suffusing them with beauty and nobility. The experience of the physical world offers the 
fulfillment not possible between the lover and his beloved. 
 I stress this point not to quibble with Schneider’s otherwise highly instructive study. 
I only wish to argue that the emphasis placed by Keller on character, disposition, value, 
comportment, what I have called the ethical, in his treatment of Anna and of Verklärung is 
fundamentally ambivalent. Each Lebensart is presented alongside a completely 
contradictory and equally valid way of living. That ambivalence is a central tenet of 
Keller’s ethics and his anthropology. Were Heinrich’s affair with Anna pure pathology, 
Anna would present no counterweight to Judith, in whom Keller considers another 
approach to happiness and another approach to the Realismusproblem, an ethic of radical 
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acceptance that rejects all idealization. Where Anna might have been Heinrich’s Gretchen, 
Judith is his Mephistopheles, bursting his romantic bubbles one by one. When Heinrich 
declares her that he would stab himself in the heart and bleed out for her, Judith scornfully 
asks what he expects her to do with his blood. And when, after Anna’s death, Heinrich 
insists that he must stop seeing Judith in order to remain pure for her, Judith is horrified: 
“‘Halt inne!’ rief Judith ängstlich und legte mir die Hand auf den Mund, ‘du würdest es 
sicher noch einmal bereuen, dir selbst eine so grausame Schlinge gelegt zu haben! … Fühlst 
du denn gar nicht, daß ein Herz seine wahre Ehre nur darin finden kann, zu lieben, wo es 
geliebt wird, wenn es dies kann? Es würde mich wahrhaft unglücklich machen, allein um 
unserer Dummheit willen nicht einmal ein oder zwei Jahre noch glücklich sein zu 
dürfen.’”62 Judith’s resemblance to a statue from antiquity, to say nothing of her name and 
dark curly hair, suggest that she is an emissary of a world not yet stifled by Christian shame, 
a world in which all of the difficulties and pleasures of life, may be faced frankly, without 
search for a higher purpose or fear of divine retribution in the hereafter. For an author so 
frequently presumed to be “naïve,”63 Keller is one of first authors in German literature to 
depict sexuality as something more than a terrifying loss of self or as “mere” pleasure—a 
süße Betäubung, as Fontane refers to it in Schach von Wutenow.64 The scene in which 
Heinrich returns to Judith’s home after the village’s performance of Wilhelm Tell is 
virtually the only one of its kind in nineteenth century literature for the emphasis it places 
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63 Nietzsche’s remark, for example, contrasting Stendhal against his German contemporaries: “Wer die 
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Friedrich. Gesammelte Werke. Vol. 15. Ed. Friedrich Würzbach. Musarion Verlag, 1920. p. 214 
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ihr Herz gebangt hatte, während es sich in Trotz zu waffnen suchte. Und nun hörte sie sie willenlos und 
schwieg in einer süßen Betäubung.”  
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on sexual satisfaction as an integral part of a fulfilled life: “Judith wußte nicht, oder 
wenigstens nicht recht, daß es jetzt an ihrer eigenen Brust still und klug, traurig und doch 
glückselig zu sein war. Ich fühlte mich ganz außer der Zeit; wir waren gleich alt oder gleich 
jung in diesem Augenblicke, und mir ging es durch das Herz, als ob ich jetzt die Ruhe 
vorausnähme für alles Leid und alle Mühe, die noch kommen sollten.”65 Heinrich’s 
prediction proves true: the pleasure that he enjoys with Judith will indeed be a tiny island 
of joy in the sea of struggle and toil that comprises the rest of his life.  
 In keeping with her capacity for joy in the here and now, Judith attempts to cure 
Heinrich of his compulsive idealizations. The closest Keller comes to a statement of 
purpose for Judith’s character comes during the moment that Heinrich asks Judith to ease 
his guilt over his refusal to lend money to his unstable painting teacher, Römer, a 
forgiveness that Judith vehemently denies him: “ ‘Weißt du wohl, Heinrich, daß du 
allbereits ein Menschenleben auf deiner grünen Seele hast?’” she tells him. Heinrich 
protests that what is done can’t be undone, but Judith refuses to excuse Heinrich’s conducts 
or sugarcoat its consequences. Just the same, she refuses to reject him: ‘“Die Vorwürfe 
deines Gewissens sind ein ganz gesundes Brot für dich, und daran sollst du dein Lebenlang 
kauen, ohne daß ich dir die Butter der Verzeihung darauf streiche! Dies könnte ich nicht 
einmal; denn was nicht zu ändern ist, ist eben deswegen auch nicht zu vergessen, dünkt 
mich, ich habe dies genugsam erfahren! Übrigens fühle ich leider nicht, daß du mir irgend 
widerwärtig geworden wärest; wozu wäre man da, wenn man nicht die Menschen, wie sie 
sind, liebhaben müßte?”66 Judith is clear-eyed illusionlessness personified—a sharpness 
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tempered by forgiveness. Without the former, the “the wisdom of Silenus,”67 our image of 
the world is only so much illusion and falsification; without forgiveness, as Ludwig Tieck 
observed in his novella Des Lebens Überfluss, the knowledge of people quickly curdles 
into hatred of them.68 For Keller, Ludwig’s das Wahre is always understood as emerging 
from an ethical disposition and realizing itself in ethical action: what sort of person is doing 
the representing, and to satisfy what emotional need? A wise man? A fool? A virtuous 
man? A depraved one? To forgive? To condemn? To remember?  
 
 
4. Typology and the Bildungsroman 
 
I have argued until now that the Realism of Gottfried Keller’s Der grüne Heinrich 
is ethical. By this I mean that the central concern of Keller’s novel is not only to offer a 
social portrait of a particular moment and milieu of Swiss society, but to explore the values 
and dispositions that underpin that moment—to depict joy, sorry, resentment, affirmation, 
wastefulness, parsimoniousness, chastity, sensuality and other such Lebensarten as they 
concatenate in individual lives. These inquiries frequently take the form of direct essayistic 
reflection, as in the “Lebensarten” or “Glaubensmühen” chapters; in contrasts drawn—
sometimes implicitly, sometimes via a device like a debate—between two and sometimes 
three characters; and also in the primary action itself, which unspools in such a way as to 
favor one way of living, than another, deliberately ending on an ambiguous note. Finally, 
I have attempted to argue that in the characters of Anna and Judith, Keller draws an explicit 
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connection between two different approaches to happiness—in Anna’s case, to seek it in 
the beyond; in Judith’s case, in the here and now—and two different approaches to Realism 
itself, the one a process of poetic idealization akin to that prescribed by Keller’s fellow 
Realists in Germany, the other an emphatic rejection of all ideals and an acceptance of 
human life as it is, incapable of improvement.  
It has been my supposition through that Keller’s Realism—that which makes his 
project a representation of reality, and not simply a vessel for a pre-constructed 
philosophy—is the ambivalence with which he approaches ethical questions. Certain 
characters, particularly Judith, appear to espouse a Lebensphilosophie that hews quite to 
the particular mix of Stoicism and Epicureanism that appears in his letters and that has been 
attributed to him by acquaintances like C.F. Meyer.69 And yet, as I have attempted to 
establish, the novel’s dramatic tension emerges precisely from the constant qualification 
and counterbalancing of one way of living with another. As we saw in the “Totentanz” 
chapter, joy never wholly supersedes grief, but grief never wholly subsumes joy. That there 
are two poles of human behavior, two ways of facing death, two kinds of alienated labor 
take precedence over the content of either pole. I would like now to bring this supposition 
to the foreground and ask: to what end does Keller draw his Lebensarten? Is Keller’s 
anthropology akin to the Brueghel’s paintings showing the four seasons or the Dutch 
proverbs? Or does the ambivalence become, in the end, a Lebensanweisung itself? 
I have chosen, in this chapter, to address this question from the perspective of 
genre—not the genre of autobiography, with which I began this chapter, but rather that of 
the Bildungsroman, the novel of self-cultivation, of education and development. For the 
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first studies of Keller, taken up by scholars who did not know Keller personally but were 
encountering the novel as a potential German classic, the Bildungsroman designation had 
above all to do with prestige—that rose above a simple portrait of the decades of Keller’s 
childhood into a work with a consistent philosophical perspective no less developed than 
that of Wilhelm Meister, with an artfulness of style to match. The point of debate among 
these authors was what exactly that philosophical perspective was. Hans Dünnebier, in his 
1913 study of Keller, Gottfried Keller und Ludwig Feuerbach, argued for the Feuerbachian 
philosophy as the roter Faden of Heinrich’s development into an atheistic, self-aware 
maturity, a recognition that he and he alone is responsible for his happiness here on earth, 
and not in the beyond70; Thomas Roffler, for his part, saw the novel as a political 
awakening71: highlighting the author’s hopes for the preservation of constitutional 
democracy in Switzerland; while Emil Ermatinger read Heinrich’s journey as a struggle 
for personal authenticity in a world inimical to it, in which appearances [Schein] are utterly 
disconnected from inner being [Sein].72 Since then, the perception of Keller’s work as not 
only depicting a Bildung, but charging the reader with his own self-cultivation, has 
persisted well into the eighties and nineties, in both the Anglo-American context, as in the 
studies of Richard Ruppel, and in Germany in the work of Kaspar Locher. 
Like many genre designations, the Bildungsroman is a slippery one, in that many 
of the novels held up as emblematic of the form do not themselves conform to its definition. 
(There is considerable scholarship debating, for example, whether any Bildung takes place 
in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, widely considered the inaugural Bildungsroman.) 
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Nonetheless, in his essay “Die Enden des Menschen,” David Wellbery emphasizes two 
central, identifying aspects of the Bildungsroman. The first of these is the typification that 
Keller alludes to in his letter to Hettner. According to Wellbery, the Bildungsroman is a 
“ein bestimmtes narratives Genre… in dem nicht dieses oder jedes Individuum, sondern 
der Typus ‘Mensch überhaupt’ zum Gegenstand fiktiver Darstellung wird.”73 The process 
of poeticizing human characteristics, whether in the protagonist or in the characters that 
the protagonist encounters, is not simply a tool of the Bildungsroman, but constitutive of 
the genre itself. This typifying process originates in the faculty of Einbildungskraft, or 
imagination, whose roots lie, Wellbery argues, in Begehren, in want, in longing, in desire:  
Treibt die Einbildungskraft antizipatorisch über die Gegenwart hinaus so um Vergangenes 
zu wiederholen. Schwillt und erfüllt sie sich in der Ausmalung der Wunschszenerie, dann 
deswegen, weil sie sich aus unbewußten Erinnerungsspuren, die das Begehren steuern, 
speist. Die Einbildungskraft... richtet sich die Gegenwart als Neuauflage vergangener 
Interaktionskonstellationen ein, agiert im Imaginären eine einst ersehnt Erfüllung aus.74 
 
Not only the narrative substance, but also the narrative direction of the Bildungsroman are 
produced by the longing, wishing, and desiring of its protagonist, who submits his 
experiences in the present to a Vischer-like process of “reine Formentwicklung” in which 
he transforms them into images, ideals, types that become the past from which he attempts 
to imagine a future. Whether he reaches this future, whether the novel ends with the 
character having achieved the happiness he has sought for himself is a secondary matter, it 
is continuous shuttling between the understanding of the past and the expectation of the 
future that forms the narrative warp and weave of the Bildungsroman, whatever conclusion 
it might reach. In a similar vein, in his book Erzählen nach Darwin, Phillip Ajouri writes, 
in a concise formulation: “So ist der Typologie also zunächst ein teleologisches 
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74 Ibid, 602. 
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Ordnungsmuster, nach dem Heinrich die Ereignisse seiner Jugendgeschichte auswählt und 
anordnet und die geschilderten Erigeness bei der Lektüre als Orientierungspunkt für die 
Zukunft verwendet.”75 
 Both Heinrich’s legitimate ambitions for himself—to be a good son, to be a good 
friend, to be a good citizen, to become not only a painter of great renown, but one with real 
insight into nature and beauty—as well as his foolish, ill-conceived plans do evince just 
such a longing. Heinrich spends much time imagining futures and alternate realities for 
himself: his first aesthetic act is to tell a completely fictitious story about where he learned 
a swear word that results in swift and painful punishments for the poor students he 
happened to incorporate into it. Before he returns to Switzerland, he dreams of a warm 
reception from his family; before decided to take part in politics, he has a vision of the 
Swiss people. In a moment of utter desperation, when he is at his most destitute and his 
future is bleakest, Heinrich reaches back to the past by writing the very autobiography we 
are meant to be reading, in order to get a sense of what mistakes he has made and what he 
must do. Is there in fact then a teleological development for Heinrich? A Bildung? In his 
1985 study, Gottfried Keller: Welterfahrung, Wertstruktur, Stil, Kaspar Locher argues yes. 
Locher’s book argues that all of Keller’s work—the novels, the novellas, even the poems—
espouses a rigorously formulated philosophical system, conceptually consistent from one 
work to the next, in which self-development plays a central role. This self-development, 
Locher argues, consists of three stages. The first is the total lack of self-consciousness, a 
complete peace with the world, an as ursprüngliche Unbefangenheit such as Heinrich 
experiences at the novel’s very start. Here, the world is present as a sensory mass from 
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which the child must learn to differentiate himself—we might think of Heinrich’s 
pantheistic recognition of God in a weathervane or the word “pumpernickel.” As that 
sensory mass becomes more and more bewildering, this state crumbles and the child must 
produce a self to make sense of the no-longer unified world. This new, immature self grasps 
at the false norms of society to recover its lost stability. The child, now an adolescent, 
emerges into the antinomy of the previous state, a constricting Befangenheit: “… das 
Resultat der Flucht aus der Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit in irgend eine trügerische 
Gelegenheit, die Sicherheit zu gewähren scheint.”76 Locher the main action of the plot 
under this heading. Heinrich’s artistic aspirations and romantic entanglements are only so 
much Geniesucht, “eine weitere, hartnäckig, festgehaltene falsche Rolle,”77 the symptoms 
of which are a melancholic disposition, narcissistic self-idealization and the use of 
imagination as an escape from reality and personal responsibility. 
After the hard knocks of experience reveal the folly of society’s empty norms 
attained by the subject, after much self-reflection, emerges into the third and final phase, 
Weltöffentlichkeit.78 Here, the naiveté of the child is recovered—one might say 
aufgehoben, given the dialectical flavor of Locher’s argument—through a mature 
understanding of the workings of the world into an unbefangene Bewußtsein. “Es handelt 
sich,“ as Locher puts it, “um das gleichgültige Vorhandsein von Kindlichkeit und Reife; 
man kann und soll naiv sein können, ‘ohne deswegen Esel zu sein.’ Keller nennnt diese 
Aufgabe ‘die Erhaltung der Freiheit und Unbeschlossenheit unserere Augene,’ eine 
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Forderung, der angesicht des mächtigen Drangs nach vorschneller Deutung das Erringen 
und das Aufrechterhalten der reifen Unbefangenheit ist die Voraussetzung für ein gutes 
Leben, das heißt, die Grundlage aller ethischer Werte in Kellers Welt.”79 Here Locher 
draws an explicit connection between the construction of Keller’s characters as ethical 
types and the project of self-cultivation. All of Keller’s characters represent some point on 
Heinrich’s trajectory; their archetypical character is then a sort of inner anthropology of 
Heinrich’s development. The less respectable characters, like Würmlinger, or Meierlein, 
or the tailor, or the renters in the Frau Lee’s apartment, or Pankraz, are representations of 
Bewußtsein, while a select few, like the joiner from Frau Margarte’s shop; Hulda, the 
shopgirl who urges Heinrich to give up his artistic pretensions; the Count and Dorothea 
Schönfund; and above all Judith serve as didactic models of the unselfconscious, active 
acceptance of to the world attained by Heinrich at the novel’s end.  These characters live a 
life of measure and moderation, free of self-deception. They have completed the arduous 
task of disentangling themselves from the vanities of the world and managed to achieve a 
lasting happiness in it. 
To this, one might respond that the wisdom that Heinrich achieves at the novel’s 
end is rather difficult to distinguish from resignation. Though ostensibly a “happy 
ending”—happier, at any rate, than the ending in which Heinrich dies of shame—
Heinrich’s desire to serve his nation by pursuing a career in the public services takes a 
serious blow from the discovery that his mother has been killed, effectively, by the very 
forces corroding democracy itself: bureaucratic incompetence, greedy speculation, and 
industrialization. Heinrich’s tenure as secretary to the canton does little to bolster his 
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patriotism. He learns that “jeder suchte die Wässerlein auf seine Mühle zu leiten” and that 
for many, “die Begriffe Republik, Freiheit und Vaterland als drei Ziegen, die sie unablässig 
melten, um aus der Milch allerhand kleine Ziegenkäslein zu machen, während sie 
scheinheilig die Worte gebrauchten, genau wie die Pharisäer und Tartüffe,”80 a realization 
that, together with the pain of his losses, throws him into a wordless melancholy. The small 
measure of happiness and wisdom that Heinrich attains at the end of the novel is not 
“earned” by Heinrich—rather it is conferred onto him by Judith, in whose voice Heinrich 
recognizes the voice of maturity and experience. Until then, Heinrich’s life has been less a 
linear development than a series of raps across the knuckles delivered by “the School of 
Life,” just as his neighbor, the tinsmith, predicted it would be.  
Nor can the direction in which Heinrich develops be precisely characterized as 
“forward,” since the meaning of each choice that Heinrich makes is always ambiguous and 
multiple. In Keller, the multiplicity of the spheres of human life, and the equal legitimacy 
of competing claims as to how one ought to live is a source of confusion, not reconciliation, 
particularly in those scenes in which different characters offer Heinrich contradictory 
advice. The most dramatic of these is without question the scene in “Der Schädel” in which 
Heinrich takes leave of the renters in his childhood home before setting off to Munich, and 
each gives him a different piece of worthless counsel. The tinsmith on the first floor, despite 
his famous crabbiness, offers Heinrich a Brabant Taler and tells him to enjoy himself; only 
later does Heinrich realize that the generosity was given in the conviction that his 
journeyman years will be miserable, and “the School of Life” will teach him everything he 
needs to know. The second renter, who makes weights and measures for a living, urges 
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Heinrich to be measured in all things, but is himself an intemperate drunk, perpetually 
behind on his rent. The third renter, an incompetent man who has managed to secure 
himself a well-remunerated public position from which he cannot be fired, is not there at 
all. Instead, there is only the sound of a clock ticking away, never measuring the same 
moment twice. The joy and the temperance respectively counseled—if not lived—by the 
first two men are contrasted by Keller against time, which overturns and exposes all 
philosophies. In actual fact, Heinrich follows neither man’s advice. The voice of experience 
is inaudible to the inexperienced; and then, the direness of those moments in life makes a 
consideration of a choice only so much spintisieren, as Heinrich reflects after the 
impassioned consideration on the importance of work in Lebensarten: “Dergestalt 
spintisierte ich über etwas, worin ich zunächst gar keine Wahl hatte, denn die Not und der 
Ernst des Lebens standen zum erstenmal wirklich vor der Thüre.”81 
Indeed, the self-directed reflection that is the motive mechanism of Locher’s system 
rarely amounts to very much in Der grüne Heinrich. Those moments in which Heinrich 
grasps something significant about his own character are never sublime or elevated, but 
comic. When Heinrich vows never to forget the wrong that he has done to Römer, Judith 
bursts out laughing at his grandiloquence: “Der drollige Ausdruck, den sie gebrauchte, 
stellte mir die Sache noch in ein neues und lächerlich deutliches Licht, daß ich einen großen 
Ärger empfand und mich einen ausgesuchten Narren, Laffen und aufgeblähten 
Popanzschalt, der sich so blindlings habe übertölpeln lassen. Judith lachte und rief: “Denke 
daran, wenn man am gescheitesten zu sein glaubt, so kommt man am ehesten als ein Esel 
zum Vorschein!”82 The loss of Heinrich’s “moralische Jungfernschaft,” as Judith playfully 
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calls it, is undoubtedly a step on the path towards autonomy and authenticity. But the 
assumption of moral responsibility that it is the mark of manhood brings with it a desire 
for forgiveness and acceptance such as a mother bestows on her child. (Not accidentally, 
this scene recalls an earlier scene in which Frau Lee consoles Heinrich after his 
misadventures with Meierlein and his first experience of debt.) Self-reflection succeeds 
rather as an acknowledgment that one cannot go on on one’s own, that one needs the help 
of another person. Heinrich’s vows to be a better person do not make him better. The best 
that they do is to offer him consolation in a moment of painful crisis.  
Still more telling of Keller’s highly ambivalent view of teleology is the scene in 
which Heinrich composes his autobiography, ostensibly the text before the reader. Trying 
to account for his failure as an artist, Heinrich sets about a critical examination of his life 
from its beginning right up to that moment. The moment he begins writing, however, the 
auto-critical purpose of the exercise disappears from view: “Kaum war ich aber recht an 
der Arbeit, so vergaß ich vollkommen meinen kritischen Zweck und überließ mich der bloß 
beschaulichen Erinnerung an alles, was mir ehedem Lust oder Unlust erweckt hatte; jede 
Sorge der Gegenwart entschlief, während ich schrieb vom Morgen bis zum Abend und 
einen Tag wie den andern.” Heinrich goes to get the book bound and, because of a 
misunderstanding, it is gloriously bound in green silk, costing Heinrich the rest of his 
money. Hunger occasions a series of fresh reflections, but these, though clearer, 
accomplish little more than did the first. Heinrich’s conclusion is a perfect Kellerian twist 
on Goethe’s love of natural harmony: ““Die nächste Empfindung war ein Gefühl der 
Achtung vor der ordentlichen Folgerichtigkeit der Dinge, wie alles so schön eintreffe; und 
in der Tat ist nichts so geeignet, den notwendigen Weltlauf gründlich einzuprägen, als 
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wenn der Mensch hungert, weil er nichts gegessen hat, und nichts zu essen hat, weil er 
nichts besitzt, und dies, weil er nichts erworben hat.” The very necessity that occasions 
self-criticism also blunts it, and Keller leaves it deliberately vague as to whether it is 
Heinrich’s narcissism or the humanity and forgiveness he learned from Judith that softens 
the blow: “Überdachte ich von neuem mein Leben, trotz des grünseidenen Buches, das auf 
dem Tische lag, und gedachte meiner Sünden, welche jedoch, da der Hunger mich 
unmittelbar zum Mitleid mit mir selber stimmte, sich ziemlich glimpflich darstellten.”83 
Whatever the case, Heinrich’s self-reflections fall into the same category of useless 
aesthetic activity the endless cross-hatching to which he despairs of success as an artist. 
The one example of moral reform in Grüner Heinrich is the example of Heinrich’s father. 
Herr Lee, Heinrich tells the reader, left his home village a simple stonemason and returned 
a citizen who unceasingly did good for his fellow Swiss. Tellingly, he lives on for Heinrich 
not as an example to follow but as an unattainable ideal compared to which Heinrich 
himself is perpetually unreif—perpetually green.  
Keller’s deep skepticism of happiness and self-understanding would suggest, then, 
a strong affinity between Der grüne Heinrich and what is usually referred to in literary 
histories as “the novel of disillusionment”—a later variant of the Realist novel in which 
society is no longer observed with the dispassionate eye of the zoologist, but now plays an 
active role as the proximate antagonist of the individual’s happiness and authentic being. 
(Flaubert’s Sentimental Education, Dickens’ Great Expectations, and Fontane’s Effi Briest, 
all dated from 1860 onward, are typically placed under this heading.) Maturity here is not 
the gaining of happiness, but its loss, not the establishment of personal authenticity, but a 
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stoic acceptance of its impossibility. The strongest argument for such a reading is simply 
the plot of the novel itself: Heinrich fails at every single one the goals he sets for himself 
at the beginning of the novel because he grasps only too late the two hard truths of life, 
according to Keller: that one must work to eat, and that all human endeavor is cut short by 
death. The novel’s end, though not as tragic as in the first version, is hardly a “happy” 
ending. But then, here too, the fundamental ambivalence of Keller’s ethics prevents the 
reader from making such a judgment. If Heinrich does not achieve a lasting happiness or 
wisdom at the novel’s end, as does Wilhelm Meister, he is certainly granted many moments 
of happiness throughout. He experiences patriotic pride and a powerful sense of belonging 
during his town’s performance of Wilhelm Tell; under Römer he learns the satisfaction of 
true artistic labor; in the extensive landscape descriptions, as when Heinrich and Anna ride 
back to her house after the Tell performance, or when Heinrich finally leaves his village to 
go to Munich, Nature itself seems to come alive and embrace him. Such moments of the 
“right life” are hardly lost when reality inevitably brings Heinrich back down to earth, 
when the actor who plays Tell squabbles in costume with an innkeeper over the placement 
of a road, or Römer proves to be mad. Here, Keller’s ambivalence cuts the other way; a 
timidity as far as claiming a lasting happiness goes hand in hand with a stubborn refusal to 
sacrifice the Ideal—personal authenticity, immediacy of human relations, a reconciliation 
between man and the material world—to the determining power of reality. The very 
multiplicity of Keller’s characters, the way that one is always balanced against another, is 
a way of preserving, at least along “the green paths of remembrance,” life’s openness, its 
sense of possibility.  
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In these moments of happiness, Der grüne Heinrich demonstrates a rather different 
understanding of human desire than the unsatisfied longing that, in David Wellbery’s view, 
serves as the animating drive of the Bildungsroman. Desire as hoping for what might come, 
as longing for what one cannot have—that desire is characteristic primarily of Heinrich’s 
relationship with Anna. Because the cousins do not touch, except for a single kiss, and 
because Anna’s illness soon ends the relationship, except for the day of the Tellfest, when 
Heinrich rides after her and kisses her, Heinrich’s feelings for her are continuously marked 
by the sense that the delight of the present consists entirely of imagining what the future 
will bring—apparent in their continuous use of the formal address, which makes the unused 
du seem like a coin, saved away for later. In Judith’s arms, however, Heinrich learns to 
forego the future and the past; he falls, as in the quote I cited above, out of time, tacitly 
accepting joy and sorrow, wisdom and stupidity all at once. He learns to forget the 
ambitions and the conceits that drive him from place to place in search of happiness, and 
he learns to forget the pain of the humiliations of his youth; he is able to see life not as a 
perpetual driving forward; he learns, at least momentarily, to survey it as a balance sheet 
on which every moment of sadness is paid with one of happiness, and every moment of 
insight is matched with the peaceful realization of the futility of all thought, all self-
reflection, all judgment. When desire is fulfilled it is suspended, so is the process of 
judgment by means of which certain experiences and modes of behavior are privileged 
over others, selected out of the present and projected as desirable into the future, 
telescoping into the present the future-oriented process of Bildung and the narrative 
momentum of the text. It would be most accurate to say, then, that Der grüne Heinrich 
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does not exclusively tell a story of self-realization and self-development; it is not itself a 
Bildungsroman so much as it contains one.  
Critics of the first version of Der grüne Heinrich noted the Enthaltsamkeit with 
which Keller treated all ways of living, and held it as one of the as one of the numerous 
failures of a promising first novel. In his remarks on Keller in his Geschichte der deutschen 
Literatur, Schmidt observes, in a remark he explicitly connects to Keller, that  
Der moderne Novellist vermeidet mit einer gewissen Aengstlichkeit jedes moralische 
Urtheil: man soll nicht richten, sondern anschauen; aber durch diese scheinbare 
Objektivität wird nicht selten gerade das Urtheil verwirrt. Indem in jeder Handlung das 
Naturgesetz von der Bewegung und Verknüpfung  der Vorstellung sich zeigt, wird man 
leicht zu den Mißverständis verführt, es bestehe zwischen dem Werth der Individuen kein 
erheblicher Unterschied, und je nach der eignen Stimmung des Poeten klingt durch sein 
Werk entweder der Refrain durch: alles auf Erden ist gleich göttlich, oder alles ist gleich 
erbärmlich.84 
 
Schmidt observes that a morally instructive work does consist simply of portraying 
characters who are exclusively good triumphing over characters who are exclusively bad, 
but rather showing how, through the exercise of the will, a single character containing both 
good and bad qualities can turn itself towards the good. In his utter lack of will, Schmidt 
continues, Heinrich simply strains credibility, and in seeing him bumble from one mistake 
to another without ever successfully learning from any of them, the novel, though 
brilliantly written, become repetitive and dispiriting. It not only abdicates its instructive 
duty as a work of art—it fails as a work of Realism. Evidently this criticism weighed 
heavily enough on Keller that he felt compelled to change the ending of his novel, which 
allows Heinrich to choose freely, and not from financial pressure, to give up art and enter 
the public service. At the same time, Keller took no steps to make the second version of 
Der grüne Heinrich a morally instructive work, intended to produce the sittliches 
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Benehmen that Schmidt believed was central to the Realist project; Heinrich’s development 
remained, as I have argued above, as ambiguous as ever.   
 What, then, did Keller offer as a counter model to the teleology of the 
Bildungsroman or the moral instruction of the Grenzboten circle? The answer, I would like 
to suggest, lies in the unique, highly digressive structure of Der grüne Heinrich. Although 
ostensibly rooted in Heinrich’s perspective, Keller’s “protagonist” disappears for large 
portions of the text—to tell the story of his father, of young Meretlein, of Albertus 
Zwiehahn, of Wurmlinger and Meierlein, and many others. And in this, the passivity that 
Schmidt so disdains in Heinrich is in fact simply an openness and a receptivity to the world 
around him. Heinrich’s life is of value—as is any life—because other lives cross it, pass 
through it, become knotted and entangled in it. At the novel’s end, where other Realist 
works end in marriage, Judith scorns the idea. She refuses to make use of others for her 
own happiness. Heinrich’s own moral diffidence, and Keller’s, demonstrates echoes this 
sentiment in refusing to subordinate others to the narrative of his own self-development. 
Instead, Heinrich subordinate himself to them. Where the young Heinrich, raging with pain 
and loss, torments the creatures in his menagerie and destroys them when he loses interest 
with them, an older Heinrich who has learned the hard way something of the ways of the 
world, simply takes pleasure in the company of others. As he writes his autobiography in 
a state of utter destitution, he is able to lose himself in modes of being different from his 
own. In such moments, the typified Lebensarten that Heinrich encounters are not, as Ajouri 
argues, arranged in sequence, but rather exist side by side, as a kind of ethical compendium, 
a collection of ways of being in the world that, like the well-meaning neighbors offering 
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advice to Frau Lee, are both contradictory and complementary, each one arguing over the 
other.  
 In this respect, the humanity modeled by Der grüne Heinrich is not one of 
synthesis, as it was for Vischer—the synthesis of surface and depth, form and content, 
essence and appeareance, the harmony that comes with the unity of motive and action, 
narrative cause and effect—but is rather one based on the tolerance of difference, a resolved 
acceptance of the overwhelming and irreconcilable ambiguity that plague every person at 
every turn. Heinrich’s failures as a person, the painful irresolution that Heinrich faces every 
time that he must make a choice, make him an ideal narrator for Keller’s Lebensbuch, in 
that he seeks out multiplicity, disagreement and difference. He is uniquely attuned to 
contradiction and uncertainty. The allgemein Menschliche of Der grüne Heinrich lies 
specifically in rendering truthfully and honestly the pain of irresolution, in refraining from 
adding to that pain by proffering a false and artificial resolution and pronouncing it real. 
Der grüne Heinrich instructs by not instructing, but by showing at every turn the folly of 
instruction. Happiness, such as it is in Der grüne Heinrich, is not something that can be 
cultivated in its reader because it is not attainable; others bring it into Heinrich’s life, where 
it shines brilliantly for a moment and is gone.  
 
V. Conclusion 
In the introduction to this dissertation I observed that as an artistic movement 
Realism in Germany was characterized by two key oppositions. First, the Realist author 
sought to represent the world “as it is,” such as it had never been rendered before in the 
German language, and in a poetically heightened manner that beautified and clarified it. 
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And second, the Realist author hoped to have an instructive effect on his readership without 
either sinking into the didacticism of the moral weeklies or retreating into quietism, into 
impassivity. What seemed at least in theory to be irreconcilable opposites would prove in 
actual fact—on the page—to be complementary terms synthesized by the poetic 
imagination and technical skill of the author. Keller, I have argued, is unique among these 
German authors for the emphasis that he places on modes of comportment, or Lebensarten, 
in his approach to this aesthetic problematic. Of the works of the Realist period, Der grüne 
Heinrich demonstrates by far the most serious commitment to the question of how one 
ought to live, and a far greater curiosity about how people do live, than any other work, 
literary or critical. Such questions risked disturbing the narrative unity of cause and effect, 
of motive and action that German Realism praised so highly. In this respect, Keller’s novel 
proves itself far more interested in depths than in surfaces, far more concerned with the 
nature of belief than, say, showing scenes of worship in a village church.  
 It would not be accurate, however, to say that Keller is a discontent in Realism, or 
that his work is anti-Realistic. Keller was, after all, close friends with Vischer, without 
whose considerable input and tireless personal encouragement there would likely never 
have been a second version of Der grüne Heinrich. Though in review Keller did not spare 
Gotthelf, Storm, and Auerbach, he corresponded with them actively and solicited their 
opinions on his work. What I wished to argue here is that Keller at once embraces and 
subverts the Realist program’s emphasis on synthesis, clarity, and unity in its depictions of 
ordinary life. Like Vischer’s Idealisierungen, the characters in Der grüne Heinrich have 
been clarified into a perfectly rounded balance of disposition, appeareance, and action. It 
is for that reason that so many of the anecdotes and asides in the novel—each itself 
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perfectly streamlined to run from its premise to its conclusion—have the feel of fables or 
parables, gaining as they do their dramatic impulse from the way that Keller pulls these 
types together and watches them explode apart again, often adding a comic fillip to drive 
the point of the story home. (The agonizing death of the tailor comes to mind here, as does 
Wurmlinger’s leap of faith into a fish net.) But, at the same time, Keller layers and 
combines these types and these parables, whose meaning appears at first to be so 
transparent, into narrative constellations that are anything but unified. When, after a lecture 
on materialism, Heinrich observes a spider tirelessly weaving its web, is that an emblem 
of the indomitable human will, or blind nature, which appears purposive but is in fact pure 
mechanism? Heinrich himself does not know. In place of Vischer’s “Harmonie und 
Versöhnung,” Der grüne Heinrich favors everything that is unfinished, open-ended, 
incomplete—green. 
 Keller’s Realism, then, is devoted to the painstaking representation of life’s 
ambiguities, without sacrificing, as does the chaotic modernist novel, the belief that 
meaning is nonetheless possible, that clarity is, at any rate, an ideal to strive for. And in 
offering a clear-eyed, unsentimental, one might say, Stoic representation of life’s pain and 
confusion, Der grüne Heinrich is able to preserve that element of humanity and dignity 
Schmidt found in depictions of bourgeois diligence, and that Vischer believed could only 
be offered by art insofar as it presented itself, and life, as a harmonious whole. What is 
striking about the second version of Der grüne Heinrich is the way that the disappointments 
and defeats that the first version treats as tragic are presented as ordinary, and in that way, 
something marvelous. It is, ironically, the pessimism of Keller’s worldview, the central 
place that he affords indecision, missed opportunity, and the pain of irretrievable loss that 
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allowed him to create a work that found the humane in offering the reader not the false 
hopes of a verklärte reality, but the compassion of ordinary human suffering and confusion, 














































1. Introduction  
 
The biographical study of Gottfried Keller written by Adolf Muschg in 1977 opens 
with a curious anecdote about the young Keller recounted by an unnamed friend of 
Keller’s. He recalls a long hike through the woods that he had taken with Keller, who was 
in usually high spirits that day; for the entirety of their walk, Keller leapt from rock to rock, 
joked, and chattered amiably—until, at the end of the hike, they’d noticed that Keller had 
lost his walking stick. To his surprise, Keller, who had frequently chided his friends in his 
Berlin circle against the unmanliness of tears, sat down on a rock, and began to weep 
inconsolably. Later, it was discovered that the walking stick had been the only remaining 
of possession that Keller had of his father. But upon reflection this seeming explanation 
only deepened the mystery. Keller’s father had been dead for decades; since then, Keller 
had faced a good number of far more pressing hardships, poverty, displacement, a failed 
artistic career. Why cry now? What memories, and what hopes had his friend invested into 
that unremarkable object?85 
 As Muschg notes, the mysterious nature of the commerce between human beings 
and objects is one of the predominant themes in Keller’s work. One need think here only 
of the skull of the ill-fated Albertus Zwiehahn that follows the young Heinrich as he leaves 
to Munich, serving both as a grim memento mori and an amiable travel companion; or the 
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deeply emotional relationship that Pankraz, the young moper, has with the mashed potatoes 
that his mother serves him and his sister for dinner every night, at once bitterly resented 
for their meagerness, and blown up his imagination into a fantastic battlefield on which he 
battles his sister for his proper portion. That, in their association with people, objects take 
on a life of their own right, that they are, in a sense, also citizens of the world, is a discovery 
made by the young Heinrich when a salesman comes to his mother’s house peddling the 
complete works of Goethe. These inanimate volumes, which the friendless Heinrich 
describes as “eine Schar glänzender, und singender Geister,” teach the aspiring painter a 
proper respect for the material world: 
Es war die hingebende Liebe an alles Gewordene und Bestehende, welche das Recht und 
die Bedeutung jeglichen Dinges ehrt und den Zusammenhang und die Tiefe der Welt 
empfindet. Diese Liebe steht höher als das künstlerische Herauasstehlen des einzelnen zu 
eigennützigem Zwecke, welches zuletzt immer zu Kleinlichkeit und Laune führt; sie steht 
auch höher als das Geniessen und Absondern nach Stimmungen und romantischen 
Liebhabereien, und nur sie allein vermag eine gleichmässige und dauernde Glut zu geben. 
Es kam mir nun alles und immer neu, schon und merküurdig vor und ich begann, nicht nur 
die Form, sondern auch den Inhalt, das Wesen und die Geschichte der Dinge zu sehen und 
zu lieben.86 
 
To respect each individual object as having its own right, in the full political sense of that 
term, and its own significance is the lesson imparted by Goethe to the young Heinrich. 
Heinrich is dazzled by Goethe’s ability to pick individual objects out of the flux of the 
world and to fix their meaning, not only by slavishly copying them or by picking out and 
exaggerating their singularity, but by demonstrating, with his Olympian prose, the web of 
mutual necessity that entwines things with one another, as well as with the human beings 
in their midst. This unity prevents the text from dissolving into a repetitive list of objects, 
like the Bible’s accounts of livestock, or the exotic treasures of the Arabian Nights. 
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 This moment of artistic insight comes at a decisive moment for the Heinrich, just 
as he is about to embark in earnest on his career as a painter, and the tribute doubles for 
him as a profession of artistic faith, a programmatic statement staking out the aesthetic as 
unique mode of perception and being in the world. But can it also double as a programmatic 
statement for the deeply expressive and dramatically rich descriptions of objects, clothing, 
and landscapes in Keller? Certainly, the language tracks closely with that of the critical and 
programmatic pronouncements of Realism published concurrently with the first version of 
Der grüne Heinrich, which wondered how a genuinely realistic literature, rooted in 
empirical reality, might be fashioned in Germany. In Vischer’s Ästhetik, he argued that, 
since such a literature had never actually existed—apart from Goethe, whose Wilhelm 
Meister was admitted as a qualified exception—the modern novel might look back to the 
epic and its mastery of “objectivity”, the technique by means of which the author’s voice 
retreated back completely and events and environments simply emerged as though of their 
own right, “als tue [der Dichter] nichts dazu, als mache sich die Fabel von selbst.”87 The 
absence of the distorting, poeticizing presence of the author introduces verisimilitude, 
likelihood, and believability as categories of aesthetic judgment; the story, and its 
environment, must seem to come from life itself, and not from the author’s imagination. 
To this, Vischer also adds the significant addition of ‘epic totality; the technique of 
presenting objects, events, and characters in their necessary relation to one another; the 
limiting of digression and useless details as in Sterne and Dickens, to those details that only 
serve to express the whole of events, the unity of the world described. The same language 
can be found in Julian Schmidt, in Gustav Freytag, in Otto Ludwig, and in Theodor 
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Fontante—the descriptive detail is the point at which Wirklichkeit, or die Mannigfaltigkeit 
der Dinge reveals the Notwendigkeit or the Einheit or the Zusammenhang of the world, 
combining surface and depth into a single representation. By way of practical example, we 
might consider here the way that Theodor Fontane begins his Irrungen, Wirrungen with a 
description of the dilapidated, would-be castle on the Invalidenstrasse that is the setting for 
the story—a detail that sets the story for the reader in a world that is recognizably his own, 
while providing a unity of setting and motivation for its characters. 
 Scholars like Yomb May and Michael Andermatt have argued that the Realist 
program offers, at the very least, a framework with which to approach Keller’s use of 
description—as a social reality mediated through individual details.88 But the 
contemporary scholarship largely tends to jettison the grander claims of Realism in order 
to focus on the description as a technique, by means of which poetic imagination and 
empirical reality are synthesized—in other words, as transfiguration, or Verklärung. Ernst 
Osterkamp, for example, explores the links between the descriptions of landscapes in Der 
grüne Heinrich and landscape painting, which he characterizes as an allegoresis. Sabine 
Schneider has used the concept of Verklärung to approach the difficulty of categorizing 
Der grüne Heinrich as an autobiography and to describe the process by which Heinrich 
idealizes and erases the women in his life, while Antje Harnisch argues that Keller’s 
descriptions of female clothing as it is donned by men introduces an element of ambiguity 
that disrupts fixity and contiuinity sought by Realist poetics.89 (I have already mentioned 
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Reiner Nägele’s analysis of the affective role played by description in Die Leute von 
Seldwyla, comparing the process to the waking dreams in Kafka’s prose.) The focal point 
of these studies is the manner in which life—unruly, indifferent to human agency, and 
cryptic in its meaning as it is—is turned by poetic consciousness into a dense weave of 
signs that never achieves complete coherence. Typical of these essays is the skepticism 
with which they regard the more troublesome concepts of the Realist program, apart from 
its emphasis on the conception of reality and of the artwork as a cogent unity, a totality 
governed by inner necessity. These concepts clash with the modern view of Keller’s 
texts—and all texts—as fundamentally open, their contradictions unresolvable; reality is 
treated as the liminal, the unassimilable, the extraneous. 
 It is these concepts that I wish to pick out of the above tribute to Goethe, which 
provides, I believe, a different path for understanding this notion of inner coherence and 
necessity. This different understanding emerges in the second sentence of the quote, in the 
playful metaphoric language Heinrich employs to contrast Goethe against other modes of 
perceiving and representing the physical world. On the one hand, Keller rejects the 
“Herausstehlen” of details “zu eigennützigen Zwecke,” a rejection of an overly close 
attention to detail without consideration for the whole with which Realism charged the 
French novel, the authors of Junges Deutschland, and the weaker works of Charles Dickens 
and Sir Walter Scott; he also rejects the “Geniessen und Absondern,” here expressly linked 
to romanticism, which inflates and distorts individual details according to the author’s 
fantasy. Both examples use the metaphoric language of a mode of comportment, an inner 
disposition, to describe an aesthetic technique, the former a kind of undignified pilfering 
that leads to insignificance, that fails because of its narrowness and selfishness, while the 
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latter is an unrestrained, over-passionate pleasure-taking, a kind of aesthetic gluttony. Both 
fail because they are fundamentally selfish, too oriented towards the self and its demands. 
Against these Goethe is contrasted as a “hingebende Liebe,” a selfless devoted love, a care, 
a stewardship. This language might be taken as a colorful and playful way to add dramatic 
tension to the consideration of aesthetic technique by, in effect, anthropomorphizing them. 
But, in this chapter, I will argue, that the relationship works in reverse as well—that each 
technique has its roots in, stands in for, and fosters in its reader a disposition towards the 
material reality. Inner coherence, necessity, harmony, resolution have, as I have argued 
earlier, an ethical valence for Keller and the Realists in addition to an aesthetic one; 
“Zusammenhang” may be understood not simply as a principle guiding description as 
technique but as a mode of being, a value towards which the individual might aspire. This 
is precisely the question that I will approach in my chapter, what is the relationship between 
description, and the modes of comportment towards the world, what I called Lebensarten, 
in the last chapter?   
To that end, I will move away from Der grüne Heinrich and examine Keller’s 
novella cycle, Die Leute von Seldwyla.  For Gottfried Keller, the relationship between the 
depiction of objects, both man made and natural, and the task of representing the world “as 
it is” is as its most complex in the richly descriptive novellas. Keller’s intent in writing the 
cycle, he explains in the oft-cited preface to its first volume, published in 1856, just after 
the first volume of Der grüne Heinrich, is to paint life in the titular Swiss village, a 
provincial backwater that lives in happy ignorance and perpetual resentment of Zürich, the 
seat of administrative power, culture and industry in Switzerland. Because Seldwyla’s 
founders thoughtlessly placed the town thirty minutes away from the nearest navigable 
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river, the village has neither industry nor trade; nor can the village grow crops and sell 
them, like the fully rural precincts of Switzerland. Consequently, the distinguishing 
characteristic of Seldwyla life is its utter lack of productivity. The village’s only product is 
its wine, which only further slows the pace of life in the village, and its timber; its primary 
occupation is the borrowing and lending of money. The Seldwylers are Geschäftsleute, 
which, as Keller dryly puts it, only means that they are adept at the art of profiting from 
the toil of others. The only hope for the young people of Seldwyla looking to make their 
way in the world is to join a foreign army, or to try their luck in one of the far-flung corners 
of the earth newly opened at the dawn of the Age of Capital. Seldwylers, who just decades 
before would have lived and died without traveling fifty miles in their life, may now be 
found in the unlikeliest places as far away from home as India or California.  
Part introduction, part statement of purpose, this preface gives us to understand, as 
we read the novellas that follow, that the descriptions we will encounter are intended first 
and foremost to evoke this time (the 1850s) and this place (provincial Switzerland). Here 
description encompasses the sociological eye that Keller casts on the tools and products of 
labor; the painterly interest he takes in natural landscapes and the interiors of his characters’ 
homes; his recounting of what they eat, what they wear, their physical appearances, their 
knick-knacks, their trinkets, and the cast-off objects that may be found all over town. For 
Keller, as is apparent in his preface, the physical world is the common plane on which 
society and the individual meet. To be of Seldwyla means to be subject to the influence of 
the particular material conditions that hold sway there: its geography and its climate, which 
in turn influence the Seldwylers’ prospects for work. Work, as the actual production and 
transformation of one’s own material circumstances, is the key concept for Keller here. 
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Everything about life in Seldwyla, from the village’s religious attitudes to its politics to the 
way the villagers spend their leisure time, springs from their attitude towards work. When 
there is work, Keller observes, life in Seldwyla runs smoothly; if there is political or 
religious strife, it may be assumed that the Seldwylers are hard up.  
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I argued that what makes Keller a particularly 
worthy object of study for the scholar of Realism is his highly idiosyncratic approach to 
the so-called Realismusproblem, the question of which aesthetic disposition and, 
consequently, which literary techniques, are most properly suited to represent the world. 
This approach, I argued, was marked above all by the centrality of all its formal elements, 
from the construction of characters to the development of plot and the placement of 
essayistic digression, of the ethical, which I opposed to the moral as the question of 
character, value, and disposition that precedes moral action. For Keller, I argued, 
representing the world is inextricable from the question of how one ought to live in it. What 
was true for Der grüne Heinrich, namely, that its formal elements were a means of 
addressing the question of whether a right life was possible in a world in which it is 
increasingly impossible to determine one’s own fate, remains true for the descriptive 
passages of his novella cycle. Though the enumeration and representation of Seldwyla as 
a material environment serves to give the reader clues to the inner life of its residents, their 
position in the world, their aspirations, and their self-perceptions, the digressive character 
of these passages, which frequently halt a propulsive plot in order to describe a gingerbread 
house purchased by an orphaned girl or the pot of mashed potatoes over which two 
impoverished siblings bicker at every mealtime, serve in fact to equalize the position 
between person and thing. Instead of the object performing the labor of characterizing its 
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owner by serving as status symbol or social marker, things appear in Keller’s novellas as 
entities in their own right. In addition to doing the work of representation, the description 
of objects in Keller opens the question of what modes of comportment are possible not 
only towards those objects, but towards the entire physical world in a society for whom the 
object’s only possible existence is as a tool, a resource, or a commodity, as a producer or a 
bearer of value. 
A similar emphasis on the ethical may be found in the highly metaphorical character 
of Keller’s descriptions of Seldwyla. Just as Seldwyla is both a place and, as Keller clarifies 
in his briefer introduction to the second cycle (written, he claims with a wink, in response 
to seven Swiss villages proclaiming themselves the inspiration for the fictional town), a 
way of life that has spread out over all of Europe, so too do individual objects double as 
conceits, standing in for a deeper consideration of some Lebensart. What starts as a 
description of a card game among the local functionaries of the town of Goldach becomes 
in Keller’s hands a picture of the world itself, its fortunes ever rising and falling. To Jobst, 
a journeyman comb-maker, a tiny bedbug crawling along the wall besides his bed is a 
perfect illustration of the journeyman worker, condemned to wander the earth without 
cease to earn his daily bread. Whereas, as I argued in the last chapter, every character in 
Der grüne Heinrich was emblematic of some ethic, here the descriptive passages serve the 
same purpose as the Sinnbilder decorating the lintels of the houses the village of Goldach, 
each portraying a virtue to which the house is uniquely devoted—or so it seems to the tailor 
Wenzel Strapinski, in a moment of poetic fancy. In Keller’s treatment, Seldwyla is both a 
place where the worst tendencies of his time have free reign and, at the same time, a place 
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where his protagonists struggle to live rightly, to find a lasting and genuine happiness. (In 
the Alemmanic dialect that was once spoken by the town Seldwyla means “happy place.”) 
Considering thematic complexity of the Seldwyla cycle, a comprehensive view of 
the entire project would lie beyond the scope of this dissertation. As with my treatment of 
Der grüne Heinrich, I will investigate the relationship between two tendencies in Keller, 
one the observation and representation of ordinary life in his native Switzerland as 
agriculture and handicraft were overtaken by investment and speculation; the other an 
inquiry into what I referred to in the last chapter as Lebensarten, inner dispositions towards 
the world, ways of living in it.90 I will ask: what is the relationship between these two 
tendencies? Are they in conflict? Do they bolster one another? How, specifically, does they 
manifest in Keller’s prose? And how can they deepen our understanding of Realism as a 
self-designation on the part of a work or an author? 
To answer this question, I will take a brief detour into a story by Keller’s 
contemporary, Adalbert Stifter. Like the Seldwyla novellas, “Kalkstein,” from Stifter’s 
Bunte Steine collection, which appeared the year before the Seldwyla novellas, grapples 
explicitly with the program of Realism. In telling the story of the friendship between a land 
surveyor, dispatched to a far-flung region covered with limestone hills, and the  local parish 
priest, the story explicitly asks, in its framing narrative, whether it is the ordinary—here 
the figure of the priest—or the remarkable that is literature’s proper object. Stifter’s story 
makes it allegiance clear by paying minute attention to common objects of seemingly little 
importance, like the dishes and utensils carried by the land surveyor, which are rendered 
in stark, spare prose completely shorn of the associations of characterization and social 
                                                
90 In the Seldwyla cycle, Keller seems to prefer the term Lebensweise to Lebensart. I will use the two 
interchangeably throughout. 
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placement. “Kalkstein”, I will argue, sheds light on the reciprocal relationship between 
ethics and realism in Keller by confronting the same crisis, equal parts perceptive and 
ethical, laid out in the Seldwyla novellas: the disharmony between human beings and their 
material surroundings sown by the lending of money and the investment of capital. In 
Stifter the close observation of objects and, by extension, the work of description is meant 
to bring about a change of disposition in the author and, above all, in the reader. Martin 
Heidegger noted that for Stifter the poetic word is not only a sign but also a “call” that 
enjoins the reader to turn his attention to the invisible, all-pervasive natural forces that hold 
sway over the earth.  
It is this notion of Realism as a disposition, a way of comporting oneself to the 
world that I wish to highlight in both authors. As in “Kalkstein”, the descriptive Sinnbilder 
in the Seldwyla novellas are directed against the increasing disparity of appearance and 
reality in the world observed by Keller. Die Leute von Seldwyla is filled with cases of 
mistaken identity, transformed appearance, cross-dressing, and what might now be termed 
“conspicuous consumption”; Keller’s protagonists, like his reader, must learn to free 
themselves of these mirages of capitalism. I wish, however, to highlight an important and 
instructive distinction between the two authors: where in Stifter’s story close description 
is meant to foster an ethic of fixity and constancy—in his “Vorrede” to Bunte Steine, Stifter 
compares himself to the naturalist observing the quiverings of his compass, Keller’s prose 
embraces above all an ethic of play. For the protagonists of the Seldwyla novellas, the act 
of poetic imagination by which ordinary objects are transformed into ethical symbols 
substitutes for the productive, personally satisfying labor of which their life is otherwise 
empty. Gerhard Kaiser has pointed out that Keller frequently associates writing with the 
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act of spinning, or weaving, a handicraft that produces no fixed, final object. In this way, 
description in Keller does not so much clarify things so that their essences may be grasped, 
as the discourse around Realism held that literature must do, so much as it subjects to them 
to an ongoing process of transformation whose purpose in joining an ethical dimension to 
physical description is to imagine an inhospitable world as being more humane, however 
temporarily. 
It is not the simply the case, then, that an “ethical Realism” is a literary genre in 
which different Lebensarten are represented. Rather the ethical Realism developed by 
Keller holds that, despite the vividness with which it represents the Switzerland of Keller’s 
time, that reality is transient, damaged, incomplete—imperiled not only by the damage 
done to it by the social changes that Keller witnessed in his time, but by the transient nature 
of all human life. An ethical Realism tasks itself with rescuing this world, to imagine how 
it might look if it were fixed. That is its ethical dimension. But its Realist character lies in 
its awareness that such a project cannot succeed. Keller, like his protagonists, is a 
“schwerfüßige Träumer,” to use Gerhard Kaiser’s phrase. The Sinnbilder in the Seldwyla 
novellas are recompense for the compromises demanded by the world of work, which 
offers nothing in return for the loss of the comforts of home and of personal fulfillment in 
labor.  In the final analysis, Die Leute von Seldwyla depicts the world in order to console 
the reader for having to live in it. 
 
2. Description as Socio-psychology 
 
I would like to begin this chapter by examining a particularly rich passage from Die 
Leute von Seldwyla, the description of Züß Bünzlin’s drawer in “Die drei Gerechten 
Kammacher”, the fourth novella of the first cycle. In this novella, three journeyman comb-
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makers toil for a master in hopes of becoming master themselves. After a time, their master, 
who cheats them by insisting that they all sleep in one bed, and by serving them sauerkraut 
and insisting that it is fish, announces that he can only keep one of them. Dietel, a young 
journeyman comb-maker from Swabia, decides to forego the competition and secure his 
livelihood by marrying a young Seldwyla woman. Searching through the town, he comes 
upon Züß Bünzlin, the twenty-eight year old daughter of a washerwoman, who, Dietel 
discovers, has a Gultbrief of seven hundred gilders. This Brief is kept  
in einer kleinen lackierten Lade, wo sie auch die Zinsen davon, ihren Taufzettel, ihren 
Konfirmationsschein und ein bemaltes und vergoldetes Osterei bewahrte; ferner ein halbes 
Dutzend silberne Teelöffel, ein Vaterunser mit Gold auf einen roten dursichtigen Glasstoff 
gedruckt, den sie Menschenhaut nannte, einen Kirschkern, in welchen das Leiden Christi 
geschnitten war, und eine Büchse aus durchbrochenem und mit rotem Taft unterlegten 
Elfenbein, in welcher ein Spiegelchen war und ein silberner Fingerhut; ferner war darin ein 
anderer Kirschkern, in welchem ein winziges Kegelspiel klapperte, eine Nuß, worin eine 
kleine Muttergottes hinter Glas lag, wenn man sie öffnete, ein silbernes Herz, worin ein 
Riechschwämmchen steckte, und eine Bonbonbüchse aus Zitronenschale, auf deren Deckel 
eine Erdbeere gemalt war und in welcher eine goldene Stecknadel auf Baumwolle lag, die 
ein Vergißmeinnicht vorstellte, und ein Medaillon mit einem Monument von Haaren; 
ferner ein Bündel vergilbter Papiere mit Rezepten und Geheimnissen, ein Fläschen mit 
Hofmannstropfen, ein anders mit kölnisches Wasser, und eine Büchse mit Moschus; eine 
andere, worin ein Endchen Marderdreck lag, und ein Körbchen, aus wohlriechenden 
Halmen geflochten, sowie eines aus Glasperlen und Gewürznageln zusammen gesetzt; 
endlich ein kleines Buch, in himmelblaues geripptes Papier gebunden, mit silbernem 
Schnitt, betitelt: Goldene Lebensregeln für die Jungfrau als Braut, Gattin und Mutter; und 
ein Traumbüchlein, ein Briefsteller, fünf oder sechs Liebesbriefe und ein Schnepper zum 
Aderlassen.91 
  
Having finished the description of this drawer of curiosities, the description passes over to 
a collection of presents given to Züß by other journeymen who, like Dietel, have fallen in 
love with her: a temple made of cardboard with a love-letter hidden away in a secret 
compartment, a set of bound calendar books, little soap-figurines. It then returns to the 
story of Dietel and his fellow comb-makers Jobst and Fridolin, who, catching wind of 
Dietel’s plan, now compete to marry Züs for her money. The three decide to run a race, 
and once again it is Dietel, who, by choosing not to compete, wins Züs’s hand. The two 
                                                
91 SW, Vol. 4, 228. 
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purchase the house from the master, but their marriage proves an unhappy one. Jobst hangs 
himself, when Fridolin sees his body, he goes mad and begins to run without cease. 
 The passage describing the miniature Wunderkammer in Züß’s drawer is 
immediately striking for the sheer density of its descriptive detail. One is immediately 
taken not only with the exhaustive length of the list, but also with the heterogeneous 
character of the objects reverently guarded by Züß. Some of these objects, particularly the 
certificates of confirmation and baptism, are obviously of great personal and religious 
significance to their owner, as are the more dubiously religious but nonetheless fascinating 
trinkets like the painted Easter egg, the tiny piece of glass painted with the Lord’s prayer, 
and the cherry pit depicting the suffering of Christ. The sheer variety of the other objects, 
however, reveal this piousness to be an acquisitiveness that snatches up any and all objects 
that strike its owners’ fancy—a thimble, a bit of ivory, a little candy box made of lemon 
peel, a needle, and perhaps most tellingly, a tiny mirror. The passage is particularly striking 
for its earthy emphasis on the varieties of texture and odor: the sweet smelling cologne, the 
astringent ether, the foul duck droppings. Like Pantagruel’s mouth, Züß’s drawer contains 
an entire world, a micro-cosmos whose completely unrelated elements are united by the 
curiosity and, less charitably, the avarice they must have stoked in their owner.  
 Of the ten novellas that comprise the Seldwyla cycle, “Die drei gerechten 
Kammacher”, with its themes of romantic love as co-extensive with social standing, and 
economic self-interest, is likely Keller’s strongest point of commonality with the familiar 
tropes of the Realist novel. While Züß, as the daughter of a washerwoman, ostensibly 
belongs to the lowest rung of Seldwyla society, the attention that Keller pays to the cheap 
trinkets that she owns, the care with which he depicts the interior space of her room, as 
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well as her concern with her own marriageability place her in the liminal space between 
poverty and respectability inhabited by characters like Charles Dickens’ Miss Jellyby or 
Balzac’s Eugénie Grandet.92 That her sole point of desirability is her small dowry gives the 
reader to understand that, as with her counterparts in Dickens and Balzac, the only event 
of importance in her life will be her marriage. The inclusion of the Goldene Regel in her 
drawer, a religious book enjoining its female reader to sexual continent, casts Züß’s 
Christianity not as spirituality or as a cosmology but rather as pure economic self-interest, 
a means of securing for herself the best possible marriage. In the passage that follows, 
detailing Züs’s unconsummated love-affairs with various journeyman passing through 
Seldwyla, Keller paints her chastity as not only hypocritical, in that she encourages the 
attentions and accepts the lovingly made gifts of men in whom she has no interest, but as 
ultimately indistinguishable from the same acquisitiveness with which the master comb-
maker exploits Jobst, Fridolin and Dietel. (Though comb-makers’ interest in Züs is hardly 
more noble—each character in the story seeks to exploit the others.) In this respect, the 
character of Züß, at once piously chaste and flirtatious, calls to mind Nietzsche’s many 
unfortunate epigrams on “woman”, such as “Du willst ihn für dich einnehmen? So stelle 
dich vor ihm verlegen—” or “Wem im Glück ich dankbar bin? Gott! Und meiner 
Schneiderin.”93 For Züß, religious wonder is hardly to be separated from a childish 
fascination with baubles and trinkets, many of which are products of the sort of unskilled 
mass production that would eventually replace the laborious craftsmanship of the comb-
                                                
92 The former, from Bleak House, is the penniless daughter of a woman who spends all day writing 
philanthropic letters, leaving her family in a state complete poverty and neglect. She later marries the equally 
penniless son of the instructor of a failing dancing academy. The latter, from the novella of the same name, 
is the daughter of a wealthy but miserly vintner who eats little and goes to sleep early so as to avoid wasting 
candles. She falls in love with her dandy-ish spendthrift cousin. 
93 Nietzsche, Vol. 15., 185. 
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makers. Züß’s piety, her chastity, and the carefully tended objects in her room are for Keller 
only the reverse side of the rough, bare, masculine environment in which the comb-makers 
share a single bed. In Züß’s room the exploitation of the working world has simply been 
covered over with the gauze of femininity and religious feeling.  
No less significant than the thematic content of the passage is the way that this 
content is introduced by Keller: not through a direct description of Züß’s inner thoughts or 
the omniscient voice of the narrator, but rather through the enumeration of the many objects 
in her drawer, which give simultaneous material expression to their owner’s self-perception 
and the social reality of her existence. This technique is hardly unique to Keller; it is 
constitutive of Realism as a literary movement in Germany. In Otto Ludwig’s 
programmatic essay of 1858—the essay in which he coins the term poetischer Realismus—
he insists that literary prose capture the “objective Wahrheit in den Dingen”, that is capture 
the empirical reality of dwelling in the physical world precisely as it appears, in all its 
abundance and clamor, without any poetic distortion on the part of the author, and at the 
same time, that physical reality, be represented as the coherent world, unified by the laws 
of necessity, that appears to human consciousness. These two opposites, synthesized into 
a single poetic unity, would result in “eine Welt, in der die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge 
nicht verschwindet aber durch Harmonie und Kontrast für unsern Geist in Einheit gebracht 
ist; nur von dem, was dem Falle gleichgültig ist, gereinigt. Ein Stück Welt, solchergestalt 
zu einer gemacht, in welcher Notwendigkeit, Einheit, nicht allein vorhanden sondern 
sichtbar gemacht sind.”94 Ludwig stops short of stressing that this “Notwendigkeit” be a 
social reality; he, like the other Realists, rejects that literature must intervene in the now of 
                                                
94 Ludwig, Otto. Cit. “Der poetische Realismus aus den Jahren 1858-1860. Ed. M. Hezdrich. Genesius 
Verlag. 1911. n.196 
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a historical situation. But, as the scenes of Thüringian life in his work demonstrate, to depict 
visible reality as unified into a single world means demonstrating the customs, beliefs, and 
practices of a society; making that law “sichtbar” means making use of typifying indicators 
of social position. Julian Schmidt expresses this point more clearly in an article from 1850 
on the Märzpoeten: Gesetz, Verfassung, Moralität erschöpft sich nicht mehr in allgemeinen 
Formeln, [...] sondern es expliciert sich in bestimmten, concreten Vorstellungen, es wächst 
in das unmittelbar gengewärtige Leben hinein [...] Diese Ausbreitung und Vertiefung der 
sittlichen Ideen in das Detail des wirklichen Lebens ist eine nothwendige, die einzige 
Grundlage einer echten und großen Poesie.”95 The social fabric of present reality is the 
stage on which perpetual and general human conditions play out; consequently, telling 
details are a necessary to produce a coherent plot, a recognizable setting, and characters 
with credible motives. 
 Particularly in the later decades of Realism, the observation of social reality, 
though ostensibly neutral, often takes on a critical edge. In Theodor Fontane’s 1890 novella 
Stine, for example, the middle class’s longing for pedigree is made manifest in the three 
pictures hanging in the parlor of Pauline Pittelkow: “Zwei davon: ‘Entenjagd’ und 
‘Tellskapelle,’ waren nichts als schlecht kolorierte Lithographien allerneusten Datums, 
während das dazwischenhängende dritte Bild, ein riesiges, stark nachgedunkeltes 
Ölporträt, wenigstens hundert Jahre alt war und einen polnischen oder litauischen Bischof 
verewigte, hinsichtlich dessen Sarastro schwor, daß die schwarze Pittelkow von ihm 
abstamme.”96 Together with the cheap lithographs, the dubious painting is cast by Fontane 
                                                
95 Schmidt, Julian. Die Märzpoeten, Grenzboten 1950/I, 11. Cit. Kinder, Hermann. Poesie als Synthese. p. 
185 
96 Fontane, Theodor. Stine. Munich: Phillip Reklam Verlag, 1986. p 19. 
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as the very embodiment of bourgeois insecurity, a way of assuaging Pauline’s uneasiness 
at the fact that her apartment is paid for by the Baron Papageno, who uses it to conduct a 
liaison with her. That Pauline sees lineage as a purchasable commodity paints for the reader 
a portrait of the wants and the values of Pauline’s class in a few carefully-executed strokes. 
And while the description of the drawer in “Kammacher” is far less pointed in the picture 
it paints of Züß, there is a similarly critical edge to the way that Keller turns reveals most 
private possessions as telling signs of an objective social reality. There is no mistaking, in 
his portrayal of chastity as a virtue preached by a tiny book stored alongside a miniature 
bowling game, his disdain for Züß’s tartuffery, as well as for its proximate cause: the social 
arrangement that demands that women sacrifice their pleasure, and consequently, their 
happiness, to secure their livelihood. 
The use of objects to depict the inner lives and social positions of their owners in 
Keller and Fontane is not simply a literary technique. It doubles as an expression in nuce 
of the anthropology underpinning Realist prose. The very precision with which Keller 
describes Züß’s forget-me-nots, her little scented sponge, his silver teaspoons provides a 
harsh contrast to the romantic vagueness of Züß’s inner life. In Keller’s work in general 
and in the Seldwyla novellas in particular, human beings’ aspirations for happiness and 
self-determination invariably run up against the hard edges of a material reality, whose 
inflexible arbitrariness is evoked for the reader by Keller’s exhaustive listing of seemingly 
random nouns: Teelöffel, Kirschkern, Menschenhaut, Elfenbein, Spiegelchen.  Why a 
teaspoon and not an egg spoon? Why a forget-me-not and not a pansy? Why ivory and not 
ebony? Throughout the Seldwyla novellas the thisness of things, that for no discernible 
reason they are as they are and not otherwise goes hand in hand with the resistance of 
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objects and, far more significantly, of social realities to human agency. Indeed, at certain 
points, observes Hans-Joachim Hahn, objects seem perversely, to contradict the will of 
their owners, as does the fancy coat worn by Wenzel Strapinski that causes the townspeople 
of Goldach to mistake him, despite his poverty, for a wealthy count.”97 Keller has an 
unfailing eye for the material signs of a hopeless existence, from the butter pot in the home 
of the destitute Pankraz, whose empty green bottom is a sight seen as regularly “als 
irgendeine am Himmel,” to the thimble that Wenzel Strapinski thumbs for lack of anything 
else in his pockets, to the dirndl that Sali’s aging mother is forced to wear in hopes of 
scaring up a few tips from her leering customers. What the objects secreted by Züs in her 
drawer tell us first and foremost is that, despite the grandiosity of her daydreams, the 
circumstances of her existence are utterly and immutably fixed. 
The central tenet of Keller’s Realist anthropology, then, is the understanding that 
the seat of man’s being, and by extension, his true happiness, is not the mind or the heart, 
but in fact the material world. Before the sense of utter powerlessness in the face of an 
exploitative social order that offers no chance “die Welt zu fassen und etwas zu werden,” 
as Pankraz ruefully puts it, is felt rationally or emotionally it is felt materially, in the 
meagerness of one’s surroundings and in the inability to change them. And yet this 
pessimism contains, for Keller, a corresponding optimism: because the constraints placed 
                                                
97 Hahn, Hans-Joachim. “Die ‘Tücke des Objekts’ – Ein Strukturenmerkmal in den Seldwyla Novellen?” 
Gottfried Keller, Die Leute von Seldwyla. Kritische Studien. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2007.  
Hahn argues for the influence on Keller of Theodor Vischer, the aesthetician and friend of Keller’s who 
encouraged him to revise Der grüne Heinrich, and his famous ‘Tücke des Objekts’, loosely if awkwardly 
translated as ‘the perfidy of objects’ from his novel Auch Einer. The operative idea is akin to “Murphy’s 
Law”—that just when a pair of glasses is needed most, they are bound to disappear.  
For a lengthier and more substantive consideration of the concept, see Matias Martinez’s essay, “Die Tücke 
des Objektes als negative Theodizee” in his book Doppelte Welten: Struktur und Sinn zweideutigen 
Erzählens. Much of what Martinez argues about Vischer’s approach to the comic may also be argued for 
Keller, f. ex: „Nur in der komischen Handlung kann die für die modernen, prosaischen Zeiten so 
kennzeichnende, nicht assimilierbare Widerständigkeit des Faktischen wiedergegeben werden.“ 
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on man’s being are above all material, as in the hunger he feels when he cannot find work, 
his only chance for happiness lies in accepting and celebrating this reality instead of 
searching for a beyond, whether religious, philosophical or artistic, in which he may avoid 
it. This hope, argues scholar Martin Swales, is the central insight of the Seldwyla cycle. 
Swales writes that the novellas in general and their descriptive passages in particular 
“generate a climate of reflection in which we are invited to notice the commerce between 
human self-hood and materiality.” What the reader experiences in the novellas is not 
simply “a bitter constatation of the undeniable authority of material things.” Rather, “when 
the literal facts come into alignment with the force of aesthetic statement, then men and 
women can truly be home again.”98 
 Swales argues that if Keller’s description of objects reveals a critical view of the 
relationship between human beings and their material circumstances, then they also contain 
an image of the happiness that is Seldwyla’s namesake. As I argued in the first chapter of 
this dissertation, happiness for Keller is no abstraction. It is the moment when striving 
abates and desire is, even for a fleeting moment, fulfilled. That moment of emphatic joy in 
the present described in Rousseau’s Fifth Promenade, “when the soul can find a resting-
place secure enough to establish itself and concentrate its entire being there, with no need 
to remember the past or reach into the future, where the preset runs on indefinitely but this 
duration goes unnoticed, with no sign of the passing of time and no other deprivation”99—
is to be found throughout the Seldwyla novellas in the many passages describing plenitude 
and satiety. Such a moment comes to John Kabys, the protagonist of “Der Schmied seines 
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Glücks”, when, having secured his fortune, he steps out into Augsburg sunshine and 
realizes that he is famished:  
Er ging ernsthaft hinus auf die Straße, um die Ecke, und trat in einen Gebäckladen, wo er 
zwei warme Pastetchen samt zwei Spitzgläsern feiner Weines zu sich nahm. Hierauf kehrte 
er in den Garten zurück und spazierte abermals eine halbe Stunde, doch diesmal eine 
Zigarre dazu rauchend. Da entdectke er ein Beet voll kleiner zarter Radieschen. Er zog ein 
Büschel davon aus der Erde, reinigte sie am Brunnen [...]und begab sich damit in ein kühles 
Bräuhaus, wo er einen Krug schäumendes Bier dazu trank. Er unterhielt sich vortrefflich 
mit den Bürgern und versuchte schon seinen Heimatdialekt in das weichere Schwäbische 
um zu wandeln, da er voraussichtlich unter diesen Leuten einen hervorragenden Mann 
abgeben würde.100 
 
The happiness experienced by Kabys at this moment is no less tangible, no less real for the 
fact that Keller is having a bit of fun at the expense of his countrymen, for whom the 
greatest imaginable happiness is a glass of beer and a bundle of radishes.101 What marks 
the moment as a glimpse of what life in Seldwyla might be like were it lived rightly is not 
simply its sensuality. Keller, for all of his praise of food, good cheer, and, albeit more 
subtly, of sex, is no hedonist; in fact, in the cycle’s third novella, “Frau Regel Amrain und 
ihr Jüngster” he goes so far as to caution mothers against raising their children to have too 
great a preoccupation with food. Rather, for the duration of the passage, which goes on for 
two more pages, the prose allows itself and its protagonist to lose track of the ongoing plot 
and to exult in the power of language to bring into view the objects nearest at hand. For a 
brief moment Kabys and the reader are freed from concern for what has happened and from 
what is still to come and allowed a moment of peace. That peace doubles as a rebuke to 
Kabys’s unquenchable desire to succeed in the world of business, a desire that Keller scorns 
for its demand that one toil today to be happy in a tomorrow that never comes. Keller might 
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mock the attention Züß lavishes on her baubles and criticize her treatment of Jobst, Dietel 
and Fridolin, but his prose, which gives each object its full, unhurried attention, shares in 
her delight, which brings into sharp relief the arid, pleasureless existence of the comb-
makers. Each of her baubles requires a care and a touch of which the callused hands of an 
over-worked journeyman would not be capable. This joyful care for the material is echoed 
in her name, which stretches out the speaker’s lips into a kiss. (A “Bünzlin”, for that matter, 
is a small cask of wine.) 
 Züß’s drawer is hardly the only point at which the novellas in Die Leute von 
Seldwyla break off from their main plot to describe in detail an object of peripheral 
importance to the plot; similar moments of emphatic joy are to be found in Keller’s loving 
description of the gingerbread house purchased by Sali and Vrenchen, showing a small 
gingerbread couple living in conjugal bliss, or the sleigh ride at the marriage of Strapinski 
and Nettchen, which describes the sleigh of each of the town functionaries in their wedding 
party in minute detail. In each of these, description is linked, by means of Keller’s loping, 
detail-rich prose style, to the momentary abandonment of past resentment and future worry. 
So effectively do they achieve this sense of momentary suspension that they end up 
achieving the opposite of their intended purpose. What begins, for example, as a tongue-
in-cheek skewering of Züß’s carnal forbearance—necessary to establish the race between 
the three comb-makers that serves as the novella’s climax—quickly loses sight of the 
character and gives itself over completely to the trinkets in her possession. The work of 
establishing Züß is quickly forgotten and the drawer is freed of its subordination to its 
owner, inverting the expected relationship between object and owner: each bauble is freed 
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from the work of social signification and given a stature in the novella’s narrative space 
equal to, if not greater than, that of Züß herself. 
 In his remarks on the Seldwyla cycle, Keller linked the digressive character of his 
novellas to their fundamentally epic structure. In an 1854 letter to the Germanist Heinrich 
Hettner, Keller observed that the narrative mode of his novellas was meant to be far closer 
to the loose, open-ended, oral tradition of “Witzen, Motiven, Fabeln, Anekdoten,”102 of 
which the epic is part, rather than the tedious and solitary “Strickstrümpfen” of writing a 
novel.103 But where, for Vischer, the Homeric epic was to be praised first and foremost for 
its balance and unity, for Keller its charm lies precisely in the equal dignity that it affords 
each of its parts, the lack of hierarchy in its narrative and poetic elements. In this, he echoes 
not Vischer and Schmidt, but the far more subtle classicism of Goethe and Schiller, the 
favorite authors of young Heinrich. In their correspondence of April 1797, Goethe and 
Schiller, the young Heinrich’s favorite reading, identify the suspension of plot as key 
element of the epic poem. On the 19th Goethe praises the epic over the drama for its 
digressive or “retardierende” motifs: “[das epische Gedicht] geht immer vor und zurück, 
daher sind alle retardierende Motive episch.”104 Schiller, in his response on the 21st, agrees 
that the “Selbststandigkeit seiner Teile einen Hauptcharakter des epischen Gedichtes 
ausmacht.”105 Instead of suborning each element of the epic towards the end of plot, 
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continues Schiller, each detail emerges in the full light of its own being: “Die bloße, aus 
dem Innersten herausgeholte, Wahrheit ist der Zweck des epischen Dichters: er schildert 
uns bloß das ruhige Dasein und Wirken der Dinge nach ihren Naturen.”106 What Keller 
critics like Swales describe as the “charm” of his descriptive passages is directly attributed 
by Schiller to the tendency of epic writing to see each element of the story, no matter how 
trivial, as an end in itself: “Sein Zweck liegt schon in jedem Punkt seiner Bewegung. darum 
eilen wir nicht ungeduldig zu einem Ziele sondern verweilen uns mit Liebe bei jedem 
Schritte.”107  The long descriptive passage of the Seldwyla novellas are precisely such 
“retarding motifs,” deliberating slowing and stretching the action so that each object 
populating Keller’s fictional village can shine forth in its “simple truth.” A passage like the 
one describing Züß’s cabinet deliberately reverses the relationship between narration and 
description prescribed by the Realist program—rather than careful pare down its 
descriptions to better serve its narratives, Keller chooses a narrative mode to better bring 
forth the unique life and character of the objects in his descriptions.   
I do not, therefore, see the epic mode of description and of narration as simply a 
matter of textual reference for Keller, as do scholars like Catherine Watts108. Depicting 
“the quiet existence and operation of things in accordance with their natures” is the key to 
the ethical stance of Die Leute von Seldwyla in several respects. The first is in Keller’s 
choice of subject. By applying the style of the epic to ordinary people and their possession, 
Keller ennobled them. He demonstrated that the people of far-flung, provincial Seldwyla 
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were no less worthy of poetic representation than were Achilles, Odysseus, Egmont, and 
Wallenstein.109  If each thing is allowed to shine forth in its being, then there is, in Keller’s 
view, no sense that the wealthy are more deserving of description than the poor, or, more 
decisively for his provincial approach to Realism, whose scene is so often the urban center, 
that the periphery is less worthy of description than the bustling city, center of life. The 
second respect is that, for Keller, observing the world carefully requires the cultivation of 
an inner disposition that runs sharply counter to the innate acquisitiveness of the 
Seldwylers, who only have eyes for that which has a use or can be sold. Keller’s unhurried 
prose is meant to foster a relation to the world that allows the reader to see objects not as 
something to be mastered, but as entities in their own right, sharing the same rung in his 
poetics as do the human beings in his story. And finally, the close observation of things, 
the ability to take pleasure in them as they are, is meant as an antidote to the brooding 
narcissism engendered in Keller’s protagonists by a time in which fortunes are suddenly 
and fantastically made, that they are being given less than their share, that the world owes 
them their proper portion. Kabys ends his days not as a successful business man but 
working in a blacksmith’s shop forging nails and with them, his happiness.  
What we may conclude, at least preliminarily, is that the uniqueness of Keller’s 
approach to Realism in Die Leute von Seldwyla lies in the fact that his use of description 
to build a world, to fix his characters socially, or to evoke their inner life is also the point 
at which he raises the question of how human beings ought to comport themselves towards 
the objects, as well as towards one another. We will see that, despite the critical force Keller 
brought to bear on those tendencies in his time he considered highly corrosive to the lasting 
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In the previous chapter, I observed that, though Keller’s work addresses complex 
social and aesthetic questions, he typically abstains from using scholarly vocabulary in his 
prose, making use instead of a more conversational terminology. Though both Der grüne 
Heinrich and Die Leute von Seldwyla clearly deal with the question of the right life, and of 
how one might best attain it, the word “ethics” or “ethical” never appears in either book. 
Instead, Keller prefers the more conversational term “Lebensart,” or, in Die Leute von 
Seldwyla, “Lebensweise,” to describe different values and temperaments. By the same 
token, the relationship between the description or depiction of the ordinary and the ethical 
is repeatedly referred to by Keller by means of the more conversational term, “Sinnbild,”—
meaning a symbol, or allegory, or more simply, an instructive image.  
The word “Sinnbild,” to be sure, has an extensive history particularly in painting, 
specifically in the painting of the Renaissance and in the Baroque. Without a doubt, Keller, 
who studied as a painter and makes repeated reference to the German literature of the 
Renaissance, was aware of this history. (Keller would later write a Sinngedicht which I will 
consider later in this dissertation.) But as with the term “Lebensart,” rather than make use 
of a word and fully expecting his readers to be aware of its complex meaning, in the novella 
“Kleider machen Leute,” Keller offers the reader a little scene explaining his private notion 
of the “Sinnbild.” Walking in a poetic mood along the streets of Goldach, Seldwyla’s 
prosperous neighbor, Wenzel Strapinski, the penniless tailor, regards the houses of the 
town, more specifically, their name plates and lintels:  
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Mit ganz anderer Miene besah er sich die Stadt, als wenn er um Arbeit darin ausgegangen 
wäre. Dieselbe bestand größtenteils aus schönen, festgebauten Häusern, welche alle mit 
steinernen oder gemalten Sinnbildern geziert und mit einem Namen versehen waren. In 
diesen Benennungen war die Sitte der Jahrhunderte deutlich zu erkennen. Das Mittelalter 
spiegelte sich ab in den ältesten Häusern oder in den Neubauten, welche an deren Stelle 
getreten, aber den alten Namen behalten aus der Zeit der krigerischen Schultheiße under 
Märchen. Da hieß es: zum Schwert, zum Eisenhut, zum Harnisch, zur Armbrust, zum 
blauen Schild, zum Schweizerdegen, zum Ritter, zum Büchstein, zum Türken, zum 
Meerwunder, zum goldenen Drachen, zur Linde, zum Pilgerstab, zur Wasserfrau, zum 
Paradiesvogel, zum Granatbaum, zum Kämbel, zum Einhorn, udgl. Die Zeit der 
Aufklärung und der Philanthropie war deutlich zu lesen in den moralischen Begriffen, 
welche in schönen Goldbuchstaben über den Haustüren erglänzten, wie: zur Eintracht, zur 
Redlichkeit, zur alten Unabhängigkeit, zur neuen Unabhängigkeit, zur Bürgertugend a, zur 
Bürgertugend b, zum Vertrauen, zur Liebe, zur Hoffnung, zum Wiedershen 1 und 2, zum 
Frohsinn, zur inneren Rechtlichkeit, zur aüßeren Rechtlichkeit, zum Landeswohl, (ein 
reinliches Häuschen, in welchem hinter einem Kanarienkäfig, ganz mit Kresse behängt, 
eine freundliche altre Frau saß mit einer weißen Zipfelhaube und Garn haspelte) zur 
Verfassung (unten hauste ein Böttcher, welcher eifrig und mit großem Geräusch kleine 
Eimer und Fäßchen mit Reifen einfaßte und unabläßig klopfte); ein Haus hieß schauerlich: 
zum Tod! Ein verwaschenes Gerippe erstreckte sich von unten bis oben zwischen den 
Fenstern, hier wohnte der Friedensrichter. Im Hause zur Geduld wohnte der 
Schuldenschreiber, ein ausgehungertes Jammerbild, da in dieser Stadt keiner dem anderen 
etwas schuldig blieb.110 
 
In his state of poetic reverie, Strapinski imagines that each Sinnbild perfectly encapsulates 
the life that is going on each house; that each house is uniquely devoted to the 
“Lebensweise,” to use Keller’s term, depicted on its door, so that as he returns to the house 
where he is staying, “zur Wage,” it strikes him that perhaps here the unevenness and 
injustices of fate are brought back into balance, and that a penniless tailor might find 
himself the recipient of incredible good fortune. The Sinnbild, then, is either an inscription, 
or a picture of an ordinary object that, by virtue of being selected, of being attached to a 
home and a life grows by means of metaphor into an entire mode of comportment, and 
understanding of the world and a way of being in it.  
Keller is not insensible to the humor in Strapinski’s willingness to see a sword as 
the image of warfare itself, scales as the belief in the justness of fate. After all, the occupant 
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of “zur Verfassung” does not draft constitutions but puts together barrels and kegs. But 
here the author also offers what might be taken as a programmatic statement on his own 
approach to depicting the ethical in his work. Like the name plates on the Goldachers’ 
doors, the titles of the Seldwyla novellas themselves function as inscriptions describing the 
disposition, or Lebensweise to which the novellas are devoted. Jörg Schönert has argued, 
in his essay “Bürgerliche Tügenden auf dem Prüfstand der Literatur” that novellas like 
“Kleider machen Leute” itself, or the following novella in the second cycle, “Der Schmied 
seines Glücks,” which take sayings specifically related to achieving success, are designed 
to test the maxims of middle class life. The other novellas, like “Pankraz der Schmoller” 
or “Die drei gerechten Kammacher,” or “Das verlorene Lachen,” however, explore not 
maxims, but more complex characters and dispositions. Just as each house in Goldach is 
named after a single virtue to which it is devoted, each of Keller’s novellas may be 
understood as devoted to a single Lebensweise, like the sense of aggrievement that causes 
Pankraz to mope, or the righteousness of comb-makers, which consists of keeping the 
counsel of the Lord’s Prayer to forgive others their debts (the German rendering of 
“trespass”) just as their debts are forgiven, or the laughter and mirth that existed between 
Justine and Jukundus in “Das verlorene Lachen.” 
The same is true of the description of objects in Die Leute von Seldwyla. While 
description, as I argued above, itself emerges from an ethic of close observation and respect 
for the material, each descriptive passage begins by describing an ordinary object and ends 
as a Sinnbild for some disposition towards the world. The ethic of emphatic joy we 
considered above, of plenitude and satiety, may be found in the novella’s lengthy 
descriptions of food. One such memorable description is in the beginning of “Kleider 
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machen Leute” itself, in which two whole pages of description and dialogue are devoted to 
listing the delicacies offered by an inn-keeper and his wife to the starving Strapinski under 
the mistaken impression that he is a wealthy count. Strapinski is served, among other 
delicacies, Rindfleisch, Hammelkeule, Rebkuhnpastetln, Kotelette, Schnepfen, Forellen, 
Brühe, Gurken, Kirschen, Birnen, Aprikosen, some unspecified Backwerk and several 
Torten. These details are a bit of local color, treating the reader to a vivid picture of an inn 
whose idea of a sumptuous meal consists of beef and trout. At the same time, the inn and 
the meal served there are transformed into an emblem of Gastfreundschaft contrasted 
against the house of the master tailor from which he has been ejected where every morsel 
of food is to be repaid by trade. To Strapinski, the joy evoked by the sheer variety of dishes 
is a recompense for the renunciations of his work, which demand that he walk from town 
to town, searching for a fixed position: “Begann der Hunger, der immerfort so gefährlich 
gereizt wurde, nun den Schrecken zu überwinden, und als die Pastete von Rebhühnern 
erschien, schlug die Stimmung des Schneiders gleichzeitig um und ein fester Gedanke 
begann sich in ihm zu bilden: ‘Es ist einmal, wie es ist,’ sagte er sich, von einem neuen 
Tröpflein Weines erwärmt und aufgestachelt; ‘nun wäre ich ein Tor, when ich die 
kommende Schande und Verfolgung ertragen wollte, ohne mich dafür sat gegessen zu 
haben!’”111 Where privation and limited circumstances cause a character like Heinrich to 
escape into daydream,: the kindness of the inn-keeper and the feeling of well-being 
engendered by the wine, by satiety, give Strapinski to see the momentary courage necessary 
to accept his fate.   
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Not all depictions of food are so joyous in Keller, and not all ways of being are 
necessarily positive. For the sullen Pankraz, for example, the table, and the privation he 
feels there, is the stand-in for the perpetual sense of inferiority, of being withheld from, 
that sets him moping until his near-death experience in the wilderness of India cures him 
of it. As a child who grows up obsessed with the idea of joining the military, and who 
embraces the notion of military orderliness and regularity, being daily cheated of his 
mashed potatoes is the daily humiliation that eventually causes Pankraz to run away from 
home and find his fortune in England’s colonial army in India: 
Das Söhnlein [Pankraz], welches bei aller Seltsamkeit in 
Eßangelegenheiten einen strengen Sinn für militärische Regelmäßigkeit 
beurkundete und streng darauf hielt, daß jeder nicht mehr noch weniger 
nahm als was ihm zukomme, sah stets darauf, daß die Milch oder die 
gelbe Butter, welche am Rande der Schüssel umherfloß, gleichmäßig in 
die abgeteilten Gruben laufe; das Schwesterchen hingegen, welches viel 
harmloser war, suchte, sobald ihre Quellen versiegt waren, durch 
allerhand künstliche Stollen und Abzugsgräben die wohlschmeckenden 
Bächlein auf ihre Seite zu leiten... Alsdann warf er den Löffel weg, 
lamentierte und schmollte, bis die gute Mutter die Schüssel zur Seite 
neighte und ihre eigene Brühe voll in das Labyrinth der Kanäle und 
Dämme ihrer Kinder strömen ließ.112 
 
Here, as with Züß’s drawer, the description of Pankraz’s inner life occurs not through inner 
monologue or from the omniscient voice of a narrator who might let us know what 
Pankraz’s secret thoughts are; the boy’s longing for military order, measure and dignity in 
a life that lacks all three, his sister joyfully surmounting the difficulties of her life with play 
and winking subversion, are both conveyed exclusively through the description of the 
mashed potatoes, their little hillocks and streams and canals of butter. The effect is doubly 
striking because instead of simply describing a fixed object here Keller is, in fact, 
narrating—describing an iterative scene in the home of Pankraz’s family, thereby setting 
the mashed potato pot all the more explicitly as the center of the family’s entire existence. 
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The playful metaphorical register in which Keller describes the battle over the potatoes 
begins as a bit of humor, but it opens the idea for the reader that the mashed potatoes are 
more than mashed potatoes, which the adult Pankraz confirms upon his return: “Wenn ich 
haupstächlich wegen des Essen böse wurde und schmollte, so war der geheime Grund 
hiervon das nagende Gefühl, das ich mein Essen nicht verdient, wel ich nichts lernte und 
nichts that, ja weil mich gar nichts reizte zu irgend einer Beschäftigung und also keine 
Hoffnung war, dass es je anders wurde.”113  What Pankraz eats—or does not eat, as the 
case may be—is his Teil, his Los, his portion, his lot, his fate.  
 What is true of the mashed potatoes is true of nearly every object in Die Leute von 
Seldwyla; there is no detail, no descriptive passage that that does not stand for some facet 
of character. Even limiting our scope simply to “Die drei gerechten Kammacher” furnishes 
us with a number of suggestive examples. The combs labored over by the eponymous 
comb-makers are instruments of the socializing process of which the sterilized, desireless 
comb-makers are victims, meant to tame the unruly, the desirous, the animal. (Their 
opposite may be found in the wild-haired lion that menaces Pankraz, in the half-civilized 
Vrenchen in “Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe” who, we are told, has “wild” hair, and in 
the wild natural growth of the patch of land contested by Vrenchen and Sali’s father.) Züß 
is not only chaste but chastity incarnate, working among vats of clean white linen, wearing 
trinket carved from soap. The emotional peak of the novella comes when Jobst, the 
Swabian comb-maker, encounters a perfect cipher for the desolate rootlessness of his own 
life in the form of an insect painted to the wall against which he sleeps every night that 
suddenly gets up and begins to move over the mottled landscape of the wall. Just as with 
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Pankraz seated before the glum sight of the mashed potatoes, the little bedbug trundling its 
way across the endless expanse of the wall gives Jobst bitter insight into his own existence: 
“Wehmütig sank Jobst in den Pfülmen zurück; so wenig er sich sonst aus dergleichen 
machte, rührte diese Erscheinung doch jetzt ein Gefühl in ihm auf, als ob er doch auch 
endlich wieder wandern mußte.“114 What I wish to stress here is that Keller’s understanding 
of the ethical is not simply to give an injunction to the reader to live differently but contains 
also a profound anthropological interest in the different ways that the Seldwylers find 
themselves being in the world, providing in its variety a kind of ethical compendium akin 
to that of Der Grüne Heinrich, whose focus is on objects rather than people. 
 The key to the social observation in Keller, then, is that the social reality he depicts 
is not simply spatial or temporal, but itself a depiction of an ethic. Keller makes this explicit 
at several points throughout the novellas cycle, most pointedly in the introduction to the 
second Seldwyla cycle, then, gives us a different perspective on the time and place he is 
portraying. It is not simply reality, but is itself a “Gemeinwesen.” Keller assures the Swiss 
villages he claims are bickering over which is the model for Seldwyla, “es rage in jeder 
Stadt und in jedem Tale der Schweiz ein Türmchen von Seldwyla.” Seldwyla the place is 
less a fixed place than a tendency, a “Zusamenstellung” of all these little towers, that has 
no fixed location but is instead, to use Keller’s wonderful formulation, painted on the bright 
blue sky of Switzerland. Seldwyla, in short, is less a specific place than a manner of being 
a Lebensweise, potentially practicable by anyone, while the capitalism that reigns there is 
neither an economic system nor a historical moment, but above all, as he writes in “Romeo 
und Julia auf Dorfe,” a set of “habits, mores, principles, and hopes.” In a passage of far less 
                                                
114 SW. Vol. 4, 229. 
 116 
charitable terms than the gentle humor he describes how speculators from Seldwyla fanned 
the rivalry between the two farmers, Manz and Marti, over the narrow strip of land between 
their two fields, and how they suddenly found themselves in the snare of a new and 
drastically unfamiliar way of living: 
Da sie eine faule Sache hatten, so gerieten beide in die allerschlimmsten 
Hände von Tausendkünstlern, welche ihre verdorbene Phantasie 
auftrieben zu ungeheuren Blasen, die mit den nichtsnutzigsten Dingen 
angefüllt wurden. Vorzüglich waren es die Spekulanten aus der Stadt 
Seldwyla, welchen dieser Handel ein gefundenes Essen war, bald hatte 
jeder der Streitenden einen Anhang von Unterhändlern, Zuträgern und 
Ratgebern hinter sich, die alles bare Geld auf hundert Wegen abzuziehen 
wußten. Denn das Fleckchen Erde mit dem Steinhaufen darüber, auf 
welchem bereits wieder ein Wald von Nesseln und Disteln blühte, war 
nur noch der erste Keim oder der Grundstein einer verworrenen 
Geschichte und Lebensweise, in welcher die zwei Fünfzigjährigen noch 
neue Gewohnheiten und Sitten, Grundsätze und Hoffnungen annahmen 
als sie bisher geübt.115 
 
The fundamental feature of the capitalist disposition is, for Keller, not its wonted 
practicality and its materialism, but its fundamental opposition to reality, in the sense that 
it stokes unquenchable desires and bitter resentments out of all proportion to their causes. 
Seldwyla is as much a part of the expansive panorama of Lebensarten as the living 
characters in Keller’s works, while capitalism is treated not as a social or a historical or 
economic structure but above all as a part of human nature and of human behavior—
perhaps more accurately a kind of folly, or, as Keller portrays it in the case of the two 
warring farmers in “Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe”, a kind of madness that reduces those 
who are afflicted with it to a near-animal state of idiocy from which there is no return. In 
both cases Keller portrays the social events of his time with a human face, at human scale, 
one folly alongside the many others that are characteristic of human life.  
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 We see then that in Keller’s notion of the Sinnbild the observation of everyday life 
and the ethical are fused together by means of the metaphorical. Representing objects “as 
they are” for Keller goes hand in hand with imagining them as products of some way of 
being, some Lebensweise, that they in turn produce, and for which they stand as an emblem. 
Tellingly, the word Ding never refers simply to objects in Keller, but always to human 
affairs, the commerce between individuals: the Seldwylers, we are told, are always “guter 
Dinge.” Life is not merely “das Leben” but “der Schauplatz der Dinge.” Sometimes, as 
with the barrel-maker whose business is called “zur Verfassung” this connection is a 
fanciful or humorous one, a conceit meant to show off the range of Keller’s descriptive 
powers; sometimes, as with Pankraz’s mashed potatoes or Jobst’s bedbug, the connection 
is a poignant one, illuminating the core of that character’s being. In either case, Keller’s 
recourse to the symbolic speaks to an understanding of the task of an ethical Realism as 
making the world legible, an understanding of the world that holds that even if things are 
resistant to individual human agency, it is nonetheless because of human dispositions, 
human character, human values, that everything in it is and is and not otherwise. This raises 
the possibility, which Keller dangles for himself as a possibility, but to which he never 
wholly commits, that the cultivation of the self and that careful development of more 
conscientious character and value can allow individuals to achieve happiness in a world 





At this point then, we have considered several answers to the question of the relationship 
between ethics and Realism in Keller. One answer was that, by describing things, Keller 
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championed an anthropological materialism as means for man to claim his happiness 
through a renewed attention to his own material being. The second was that the observation 
of things was a way of drawing a compendium of different ethical modes, or Lebensweise, 
which was anthropological in its scope, of cataloging human values and characters, and 
anthropological in the sense that it attempted to make sense of the world by trying to 
connect objects and tendencies in the world with human characters and dispositions. I wish 
now to consider a third answer: that the observation and description of things is itself a 
mode of comportment, one that is meant not to represent an ethic that it enjoins to the 
reader but to directly bring that change about. Up until this point, I have attempted to show 
Keller’s distinctive approach to these questions by contrasting him, where appropriate, 
against contemporaries like the Grenzboten circle, Balzac and Theodor Fontane. To 
consider this third perspective, I would like to consider a writer whose work deals with 
precisely the question of description producing an ethical change in the reader—namely, 
Keller’s contemporary, and his companion in any cursory overview of German literature, 
Adalbert Stifter.  
The assertion that Keller and Stifter share an affinity is by no means a self-evident 
one. Keller made no secret of his low opinion of Stifter’s work. In a letter to his friend Emil 
Kuh, responding to a monograph on Austrian literature by the latter, Keller echoes the 
criticism made by Friedrich Hebbel that prompted Stifter to write the “Vorrede” to Bunte 
Steine, namely, that his writing is boring and deals with inconsequently matters, by 
referring to Stifter as a Tüftler, a fusspot. Keller adds, with an uncharacteristic lack of 
generosity, that Kuh is overgenerous in mentioning Grillparzer and Stifter in the same 
 119 
breath.116 All of what was distinctive in Stifter, from the close observation of nature, to the 
romantic critique of capitalism, and the loving portrayal of village, Keller found instead in 
the novellas of his fellow Swiss author Jeremias Gotthelf, whom he cited as a strong 
influence on his own work. When one takes into account the differences of birth, religion, 
and politics between the two men, the one a Lutheran Swiss democrat, the other a Catholic 
Austrian monarchist, the strongest point of commonality are the contiguity in time of their 
major publications, with Stifter’s Bunte Steine appearing in 1853, just a year before the 
first volume of Keller’s Der grüne Heinrich, while Keller’s Die Leute von Seldwyla 
appeared in 1856, a year before the publication of Stifter’s Nachsommer.  
There are two reasons why I hold, nonetheless, that Stifter’s work offers a valuable 
perspective on Keller’s. The first is that, as in Keller’s writing, Stifter’s writing places 
considerably more emphasis on physical details like knick-knacks, furniture, food, 
clothing, and nature than he does on rising action or the inner lives of his characters. Stifter, 
like Keller, creates dramatic tension not by means of plot but rather through the description 
of objects, man-made and natural. The second is that Stifter, like Keller, sees the onset of 
speculation and investment, and its replacement of handicraft and agricultural labor, as the 
cause of a perceptive and ethical crisis that severs human beings from a connection to the 
material world that is the seat of their existence. Accordingly, the description of things is 
means both of depicting and resolving this crisis. These similarities are grounds for a 
productive comparison that will sharpen, I hope, what is unique in Keller, and give us a 
clearer understanding of his ethical understanding of Realism.  
                                                
116 Krummel, Charles. Gottfried Keller’s Estimation of Men and Literary Movements. Palala Press. 2015.  
p. 41 
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To that end, before resuming my discussion of Keller, I would like to examine a 
passage from Adalbert Stifter’s novella “Kalkstein,” from the Bunte Steine collection 
published in 1853. In this passage, a land surveyor sent to the Kar, a distant region covered 
with limestone hills, makes the acquaintance of the local parish priest. During a terrible 
thunderstorm, the priest, who is known in the region for the uncommon austerity of his 
living, takes in the traveler to shelter him from the rain. To reciprocate his generosity, the 
land surveyor opens his knapsack and, though his ashamed at the comparative decadence 
of the meal he has packed for himself, offers it to the priest:  
Der arme Pfarrer sah mir zu, wie ich meine Vorrichtungen auseinander packte. Er 
betrachtete die kleinen blechern Tellerchen, deren mehrere in eine unbedeutende flache 
Scheibe zusammen zu packen waren. Ich stellte die Tellerchen auf den Tisch. Dazu that 
ich von meinem Fache Messer und Gabeln. Dann schnitt ich Scheibchen von feinem 
weißen Weizenbrote, das ich wöchentlich zwei Mal kommen ließ, dann Scheibchen von 
Schinken von kaltem Braten und Käse. Das breitete ich auf den Tellern aus. Hierauf bath 
ich ihn um eine Flasche Wassers; denn das allein, sagte ich, führe ich nicht mit mir, da ich 
es in der Natur über finden müsse. Als er in ein einem Kruge Wasser gebracht hatte, legte 
ich meine Trinkvorrichtungen auseinander. Ich that die Flasche, die noch halb voll Wein 
war, heraus, ich stellte die zwei Gläser—eines habe ich immen zum Vorrathe—auf den 
Tisch, und dann zeighte ich ihm wie ich den Wein kühle. Das Glas wird in ein Fach von 
sehr lokerem Stoffe gestellt, der Stoff mit einer sehr dünnen Flüssigkeit, die Äther heißt, 
und die ich in einem Fläschen immer mit führe, befeuchtet, welche Flüssigkeit sehr schnell 
und heftig verdünstet, und dabei eine Kälte erzeugt, daß der Wein frischer wird, als wenn 
er eben von der Keller käme, ja als ob er sogar in Eis stünde. Da ich auf diese Weise zwei 
Gläser aufgefrischt, mit Wasser vermischt, und eins auf seinen Plaz gestellt hatte, lud ich 
ihn ein, mit mir zu speisen. 
 
Er nahm, gleichsam um meiner Einladung die Ehre anzutun, ein winziges bißchen von den 
Dingen, nippte an dem Glase und war nicht mehr zu bewegen, etwas weiteres zu nehmen.  
 
Ich aß von den aufgestellten Speisen nun auch nur sehr weniges und packte dann alles 
wieder zusammen, indem ich mich der Unhöflichkeit, die ich eigentlich in der Übereilung 
begang hatte, schämte.117 
 
This meal becomes the occasion for a lifelong friendship between the land surveyor and 
the priest, who tells his life story and chooses him to execute his will. The centrality of this 
meal is signaled to the reader at the story’s very start, when the story’s unnamed narrator 
recalls encountering the now elderly land surveyor at a dinner. Evidently the priest’s ascetic 
                                                
117 Stifter, Adalbert. Werke und Briefe. Vol. 2.2 Kohlhammer, 1982. 
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manner has deeply impressed him because he eats little and keenly observes the goings-on 
around him. 
 Before we enter into an analysis of the passage itself, it is worth noting the manner 
in which Stifter introduces it into the narrative. Stifter, as a rule, never makes use of an 
active narrative voice, imparting information or judgment beyond that possessed by the 
characters. The reader is given only the few bits of dialogue necessary to set the meal into 
motion. The interaction of the men up until this point is painted in a series of scenes, in 
which the two men examine the weather, debating whether or not the thick haze that is 
hanging over the region will break out into rain, then walking back to priest’s house. 
Instead of giving the reader a glimpse of either character’s inner state, Stifter turns his full 
narrative attention to the meal—or, more accurately, to the food and utensils of which the 
meal is comprised. The objects, like the actions before them, are presented one by one, 
threaded together only with the conjunction dann. The reader is given no description of 
their color, their odor, their heft; nor is any attempt made to try to flesh out the world of 
the Kar. It may be presumed that the land surveyor’s mention of the fact that he sends for 
bread twice a week is only introduced in order to explain how it is that he obtained in an 
area with no arable land.  
 In a broad way, of course, the scene and the description of the meal accomplish the 
work of scene-setting and characterization on which the novella hinges. Stifter takes the 
land surveyor and, by extension, the reader into the home of the priest. The priest, the 
reader is told, is an object of fascination to his fellow villagers and here we discover why. 
Not only does he sleep on a board but he uses a Bible as a pillow. He eats only black bread. 
Most puzzlingly of all, he wears fine linen beneath his cassock, though this latter detail is 
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less a piece of characterization than the enigma that propels the narrative. By the same 
token, the scene provides a glimpse into the character of the land surveyor. The land 
surveyor’s tastes are more worldly than those of the priest; he carries meat, cheese and 
wine with him. Not only that, but he is a man of learning and science who, unlike the priest, 
who is able to predict the weather based on years and years of steady observation of natural 
phenomena, sets Nature to work for him by using ether to cool his wine. Nonetheless, there 
is something in him—the reader is not told what—that feels a strong affinity with the man 
and that is deeply impressed by his ascetic lifestyle.  
And yet, if the passage is meant to give the reader insight into the characters by 
describing the objects that they possess, as Keller does with Züß’s drawer, it is striking just 
how much Stifter chooses to leave out. We learn that a cold roast is served, but not whether 
it is, for example beef or pork—a detail Keller would not have failed to supply. John Kabys, 
toasting his success in Augsburg, drank that region’s particular beer and its particular wine; 
the land-surveyor and the priest, by contrast, drink Biblical water and wine, the one the 
drink of refreshment, the other the drink of company and joy. Most striking is Stifter’s 
repeated use of non-words like Stoff and Zeug that stress the bare, non-particular materiality 
of the object, instead of trying to evoke it by describing its color or its texture. Though the 
meal is a substantial one, one wouldn’t sense that from the prose: the whole passage, it 
might be said, is no less ascetic than the priest himself. The words are shorn of all but their 
primary signification and their most distant allegorical connotations; the grammar is 
forbidden to do anything but declare. Stifter does not allow the ostensible reason for the 
food being offered, a spirit of gratitude and generosity, to color the description, which 
sooner communicates to the reader the shame that the land surveyor feels at carrying such 
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luxury with him in his knapsack. Stifter carefully removes everything that might draw the 
reader’s attention away from the simple fact that the meat, the water, the wine, the fork and 
the knife are there. As the table is set, the characters recede into the background and the 
object—mysterious, auratic—moves to the fore.  
The effect of this foregrounding of the material is to shift the novella’s focus away 
from the relationship between the two men and from life in the Kar, what would be the 
novella’s focus in a more traditional Realist narrative, like, say, Tolstoy’s Cossacks, and 
towards the relationship of the men to the physical world around them. The meal itself, the 
taste of the food and the pleasure it brings, is dispatched two lines: the priest hardly eats, 
while the land surveyor eats with a pervasive sense of shame in the decadence of his own 
meal. (Tellingly, the men are brought together by the landscape itself, whose unique 
character to which the priest teaches the land surveyor, an agent of political and scientific 
mastery of the natural, to submit himself.) In this respect, Stifter’s relationship to the 
discourse of Verklärung, or the poetic intensification of reality, that dominated the 
discourse of Realism in his time is as ambiguous as Keller’s. While Stifter certainly shares 
the Realists’ antipathy towards the fantasias and lofty subject matter of Romanticism, and 
while, though his contemporaries may have disagreed, his prose style might certainly be 
described as an attempt to recover the poetic in the prosaic, Stifter is also clearly concerned 
with the perceptive relationship between the reader and the world that precedes Realist 
distinctions like “essence” and “appearance,” “poetic” and “prosaic.” “Kalkstein” is as 
much a story about learning to see the world and orient oneself in it, as it as about the 
traumatic experiences of the priest’s childhood that have caused him to adopt his ascetic 
lifestyle.  
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What is it, then, that Stifter wants his reader to see? What is Realism’s proper 
object? Stifter offers the answer to this question in the famous “Vorrede” to Bunte Steine 
by arguing that literature’s fascination with the great has blinded it to wonder of the small. 
Instead of portraying erupting volcanoes, earthquakes and lightning storms, Stifter holds it 
as his mission to portray the seemingly insignificant and the ordinary. He regards as great 
“das Wehen der Luft, das Rieseln des Wassers, das Wachsen der Getreide, das Wogen des 
Meeres, das Grünen der Erde, das Glänzen des Himmels, das Schimmern der Sterne.” 
Stifter compares these phenomena to the magnetic field all around the earth. On its own, 
this enormous field which encircles the entire earth cannot be seen. But when the scientist 
steps out every day to the same spot and records the tiny quiverings, now in this direction, 
now in that, of the needle on a compass, he gradually becomes aware that of the enormous 
force all around him, invisible but nonetheless present, which is responsible for even the 
needle’s tiniest motions. Stifter does not simply want the reader to look to the waves on 
the ocean or the wind whistling through a field of grass. He wants his reader to search for 
the invisible force that controls them and reveals them in the first place—the sanfte 
Gesetz.118 Stifter’s descriptions are, then, as Martin Heidegger wrote in his 1961 essay on 
Stifter’s “Eisgeschichte,” both a way of showing and a way of calling. In representing the 
small and the insignificant, like the plates carried by the land-surveyor, they demand that 
the reader change his disposition towards the world and towards himself. The religious 
dimension of this “call” is not accidental: in his “Vorrede” Stifter styles himself as a priest 
and his literature as religion, exhorting his reader to take notice of “things” as he passes 
them, to see them as touched by an awesome force that makes itself in every single existing 
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object, no matter how insignificant. In this respect, Stifter must be differentiated sharply 
from his fellow Realists, for whose poetics the perceivable and representable nature of 
experience is a fundamental assumption.  
Consequently, before the question of style has even entered into the equation, in 
Stifter’s selection of subject matter the question of how one must comport oneself towards 
the world has already been identified as underpinning the question of how the world is to 
be most accurately represented. In his reading of “Kalkstein” in his book Exemplarity and 
Mediocrity, Paul Fleming has stressed this ethical side of Stifter’s selection both of objects 
and characters to portray as the key to resolving the tension between Stifter’s claim to 
represent the ordinary, and obviously marginal and unusual nature of characters like the 
priest, whose extreme asceticism and total unfamiliarity with basic social customs makes 
him an outsider in the community of the Kar. It is not the priest’s ordinariness but his 
fidelity to the ordinary, the care that he lavishes on the few possessions that he has, on 
Nature, that make him exemplary. In Stifter’s view, writes Fleming, the gentle law is less 
an active principle always in sway than an ideal to be striven for and maintained. His view 
of literature is that it should offer “models of ‘good, simple lives for imitation—all, one 
could say, in the service of the [gentle] law. Since the supposedly world-maintaining law 
is itself in need of maintenance, the function of literature vis-à-vis the gentle law is to 
provide exemplary, everyday heroes who can inspire others to conform to the law.”119 In 
depicting the priest and telling his story, Stifter enjoins the reader to imitate the behavior 
of the priest—if not the harshness of the askesis to which he subjects himself, then his 
attentiveness to and respect for nature, the kindness with which he treats the children of the 
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Kar, to whom he bequeaths the last of his money when he dies, both of which are possible, 
and above all his naiveté, the complete lack of awareness of social convention, from which 
the other two traits spring.  
It is striking to what extent an awareness of a Seldywla-like social fabric is lacking 
in “Kalkstein,” or the other Bunte Steine stories. Though the novellas ostensibly take place 
in the Austrian countryside, in actual fact their setting is the borderland between society 
and that which lies beyond it. In “Bergkristall,” Gschaid is nestled at the foot of a 
treacherous mountain that also supplies the village with water. The village in the Kar is set 
in a region of unmappable limestone hills, prone to dangerous flooding in the rainy season. 
Even “Turmalin,” which takes place in Vienna, quickly changes its setting to the woods at 
the outskirts of town. Rather than setting his work in the bustling city life that was both the 
origin and the subject of the Realist novel, Stifter chooses to describe a way of life that 
would have been utterly alien to the majority of his cultured, educated, city-dwelling 
readers. And what is true for his choice of subject matter is also true for the mechanics of 
his prose. Stifter deliberately avoids the use of use of any Realist technique that avails itself 
of an illusion to a familiar reality shared by the reader and the author. The use, for example, 
of demonstrative adjectives to make typifying formulations—“he was one of those men 
who”—such as Keller uses in Der grüne Heinrich is nowhere to be found in Stifter. Nor 
does Stifter avail himself of the metonymic use of small, familiar details to connote larger 
social forces, a technique ascribed by Roland Barthes to Balzac in his essay on the latter’s 
Sarrasine. In the sentence, “Midnight had just sounded from the clock of the Elysée-
Bourbon,” Barthes argues, “a metonymy leads from the Elysée-Bourbon to Wealth, since 
the Faubourg St. Honoré [where the Elysée-Bourbon is located] is a wealthy neighborhood. 
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This wealth is itself connoted: a neighborhood of nouveau riches, the Faubourg-St. Honoré 
refers by synecdoche where wealth is produced without origins, diabolically.”120 Stifter’s 
descriptions of wealth, by contrast, are blunt, direct and ahistorical. Of his grandfather, the 
priest recalls: “Er bauete auf diesem Grunde eine Werkstätte und ein Häuschen, heirathete 
ein armes Mädchen, und tried nun als eigener Herr sein Gewerbe und seine Handelschaft. 
Er brachte es vorwärts, und starb als ein geachteter bei den Geschäftsleuten angesehener 
Mann.“121 Even the presumably everyday objects in his novellas are described as though 
they are being encountered for the first time. In the opening chapters of Der Nachsommer, 
Stifter includes a lengthy passage in which the protagonist’s father pauses what a novel is: 
“In manchen Bücher sei zwar nichts erhalten, was geschehen sei oder wie sich manches 
befinde, sondern was die Menschen sich gedacht haben, was sich hätte zutragen können, 
oder was sie für Meinungen über irdische und über irdische Dinge hegen.”122 Stifter 
simulates reality as experienced by a human being utterly unfamiliar with it. It is no 
coincidence that the Bunte Steine collection was initially conceived as a series of books for 
children (“Spielerei for junge Herzen,” as he puts it in the collection’s “Vorrede”) with 
each novella either about a child or told from the perspective of a child. Children are for 
Stifter the ideal narrators, not yet entangled in the web of assumptions and half-truths that 
constitutes adult common sense. 
The opposite of this purified language is explicitly identified in “Kalkstein” as the 
irresponsible and frivolous use of language in culture and above all in business. In the 
death-bed confession of the priest to the land surveyor, the priest reveals to his to his 
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lifelong friend that he is in fact the son of a wealthy tanner, and that the reason he lives in 
such poverty is because of the poor business practice of his older brother, who inherited 
the business from their father. Here Stifter draws an explicit parallel between each brother’s 
education and the respective courses that their lives follow. The elder brother excels at all 
of his lessons, particularly the study of Greek and Latin, as well as French and Italian, and 
at the practice of essay-writing. This study of language is in fact a process of socialization 
that enables the elder brother to take over the tannery, a bloody trade in which animals are 
slaughtered for their skin. The priest, on the other hand, fails utterly at his lessons. He is 
unable to solve his math problems, unable to write clearly and unable to speak the 
languages he is supposed to speak.123 He is consequently relegated to the garden, where he 
learns to admire the peaceful growth of the plant life, which offers sustenance without the 
loss of life. When the elder brother attempts to expand their business by borrowing money, 
it is the duplicitous language of business that proves to be his ruin: “Ich weiß es nicht, 
haben andere Leute meinem Bruder den Glauben untergraben, oder hat der Wechsler 
selber, weil zwei Handelschaften, die uns bedeutend schuldeten, gefallen waren, und uns 
um unsern Reichthum brahcten, Mißtrauen geschöpft: er weigerte sich fortan die Wechsel 
unseres Hauses zu zahlen.”124 The already catacretic use of words like Glauben and Schuld 
flowers into the confusion of these “reports” that ruin the credit of a worthy man. “Worldly” 
language is, in short, a mark of Cain by means of which society brands its members; it is, 
not accidentally, through an act of language that the priest learns shame for the first time. 
While playing with Johanna, the daughter of the washerwoman next door—the source of 
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his taste for fine linen—Johanna’s mother calls out, “Johanna, schäme dich!”125 Stifter’s 
purified language is, like the linen that he wears, meant to be a sort of fresh, white garment 
that the reader draws over himself to purify himself of the duplicitous language of the world 
of men.  
 While the critics and authors among whom the discourse of Realism took place 
conceived of art as an intensification of reality that separates the essential wheat from the 
chaff of experience, Stifter’s “purified” prose adds an stringent, ethical dimension to that 
act of aesthetic cognition in regarding the discarded as tainted, as filth. Insofar as the Bunte 
Steine stories have a theme, it is that of reconciliation after an apocalyptic purification—as 
of the flood that befell the people of Noah’s time, or the fire that rained down on the cities 
of the plain. “Granit”, the first story in the collection, begins with the narrator being beaten 
by his own mother for tracking pitch into the house. The narrator’s grandfather takes the 
boy out to look at the unspoiled landscape all around them and, in an act reminiscent of the 
act of creation, has him name each village, each forest, each river, each field as he points 
to it. The novella’s dramatic peak is the story of a plague that ravaged the landscape 
generations ago. In “Kalkstein,” the Kar is beset by a heavy haze that makes it difficult for 
the land surveyor to distinguish the landscape. The haze is cleared with a terrifying 
thunderstorm that rattles the windows of the village, beats down on their roofs and floods 
the valley, leaving the air clear (“gereinigt”) so that the landscape can shine forth in its full 
beauty. In “Bergkristall” a deadly blizzard covers the mountain where two children are lost 
on Christmas Eve in a blanket of snow, bringing together the two villages in the vicinity in 
a search for them. The destruction of the familiar world and its usual order—above all its 
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language—goes hand in hand with a new clarity in men’s relations to one another and to 
nature. On the white of the page, what has been destroyed is called back into being once 
again, purified of its sinful associations. 
 What “Kalkstein” specifically offers us as we consider the function of description 
in Keller, then, is a model of Realism in which the ethical is primary not as something 
represented or as something counseled directly to the reader by the author, but rather as a 
way of being in the world that is demonstrated by the very mechanics of the writing itself. 
The attentiveness to the small, the ordinary, the everyday, the insignificant as that through 
which the great and imperceptible acts is enjoined to the reader not propositionally, but 
through the literary construction of the world of the Kar, by the way Stifter populates it 
with objects and human beings. Fleming is correct in arguing that the priest is held up as 
an exemplar to the reader, in that his child-like character, his generosity, his unconcern for 
luxury and social standing, his attentiveness to nature, his simplicity and his plain-
spokenness all make a lasting impression on the land surveyor, who serves as a surrogate 
for the reader. But simply constructing an idealized character is not sufficient—after all, 
the same character would be an object of pity in the world of George Eliot and a laughing 
stock in the world of Balzac. The force of his example comes from the way that his world-
view and Stifter’s, influence the sympathetic sparseness of the prose, the deliberate 
avoidance of social connotation, the privileging of the material over the human, which the 





V. “Unbewusstes Weben” 
 
In this final section of this chapter, I would like to take the model of an ethical 
Realism we discovered in Stifter’s “Kalkstein” and use it to return to Keller and his lengthy, 
detail-rich, often highly metaphorical descriptive passages. These, I argued, share with 
Stifter a desire to return the reader’s attention to the material dimension of existence, 
enjoining to the reader an ethic of joy in and care for the material. I further argued that, by 
means of their highly metaphorical character, each description in Keller was linked with a 
way of being in the world, what Keller refers to as a Lebensart or Lebensweise, such as a 
desire for order, a sense of rootlessness, chastity, animal desire, etc., become thereby not 
simply a representative account of a fixed reality but, to use Keller’s parlance, a Sinnbild, 
a symbol with an instructive meaning. Now, with our analysis of Stifter in mind, I would 
like to conclude this chapter by asking the question of whether this mode of digressive, 
metaphorical description is itself an ethic. If so, how does Keller intend for it to function? 
And what is its intended effect on the reader? If Stifter wishes to draw the reader’s attention 
to the das sanfte Gesetz, to attune him to that which is everywhere in the world and yet 
cannot be seen, what does Keller hope for his own descriptions?  
 Keller undoubtedly shares with Stifter the view that the continuity of essence and 
appearance in objects as in humans has been disrupted by the onset of crooked speculation 
and by the increasing absence of “honest” labor, the image of which is to be found in 
handicraft for both authors. Both authors see their world as one in which the appearance, 
or Schein, to use Keller’s term of honesty, virtuousness, square-dealing, and above all of 
happiness, no longer accords—indeed, runs sharply counter to—the actual nature, or 
Wesen, of a person or thing. In the Seldwyla novellas, these reflections are frequently 
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pinned on the comedy of mistaken identity, as in the beginning scene of the tellingly titled, 
“Kleider machen Leute,” in which Wenzel Strapinski accepts a ride in a fancy carriage and 
is mistaken for a count when he gets out in Goldach, or in the gender confusion of “Frau 
Regel Amrain und ihr Jüngster,” in which masculine characters of uncertain social position 
are mistaken for women. More often, the adversarial relationship between appearance and 
reality is staged by Keller as a pointed criticism of what would today be called 
“conspicuous consumption,” the compulsive cultivation of the image of wealth through the 
compulsive purchasing and display of visible markers of success. Rather than turning in an 
honest day’s work, John Kabys, the striving protagonist of “Der Schmied seines Glücks” 
turns all of his attention to his appearance—beginning with his name, which he has 
anglicized—in the belief that success will follow. The action of the novella starts when 
Kabys notices that to be successful businessman in Seldwyla, one must start a business 
with two names attached to it. Unable to find a business partner, he decides to marry and 
hyphenate his last name instead. Having made the acquaintance of a suitable woman, he 
spends the last of his savings on all sorts of finery, “die Idealausstattung eines Mannes im 
Glück,” as Keller puts it, in order to convince her father to grant him her hand in marriage: 
Diese bestanden in einer vergoldeten Brille, in drei emaillierten Hemdeknöpfen, durch 
goldene Kettchen unter sich verbunden, in einer langen goldenen Uhrkette, welche eine 
geblümte Weste uberkreuzte, mit allerlei Anhängsel, in einer gewaltigen Busennadel, 
welche als Miniaturgemälde eine Darstellung der Schlacht on Waterloo enthielt, ferner in 
drei Perlmutterfäßchen. In den Taschen trug, zog heror und legte er vor sich hin, wenn er 
sich setzte, ein großes Futterall aus Leder, in welchem eine Zigarrenspitze ruhte, aus 
Meerschaum geschnitzt, darstellend den aufs Pferd gebundenen Marzeppa;... ferner eine 
rote Zigarrentasche mit vergoldeterm Schloß, in welcher schöne Zigarren lagen mit 
kirschrot und weiß getigertem Deckblatt, ein abenteurlich elegantes Feuerzeug, eine 
silberne Tabakdose, und eine gestickte Schreibtafel. Auch führte er das komplizierste und 
zierlichste aller Geldtäschchen mit unendlich geheimnisvollen Abteilung.126 
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This passage perfectly echoes that of Züß’s drawer, from the listing style of the prose, the 
attention and care Keller, through Kabys, devotes to each trinket, even the vertiginous 
sense of the microcosmic, in which an event as cataclysmic and historically significant as 
the Battle of Waterloo is reduced to a tiny image on the tie pin of an aspiring Swiss business 
man. But here, the critical edge, which was subtler in “Die drei gerechten Kammacher,” is 
at the fore. Kabys’s person is covered with a sort of fool’s gold that, the wonder of the 
passage notwithstanding, is a bald-faced attempt to purchase an image of trustworthiness 
that ought by rights to be earned, and indeed, Kabys’s buffoonery, though it succeeds in 
the short term, quickly runs aground when, once the father acquiesces, Kabys learns that 
his hyphenated name will be “Kabys-Kopf,” or cabbage head.  
 If we return for a moment to the passage in which Strapinski strolls down the streets 
of Goldach peering at the Sinnbilder on each house, their particular charm lies not in their 
design, but in the feeling they produce in him, “es sehe hinter jeder Haustüre wirklich so 
aus, wie die Überschrift angab, so daß er in eine Art moralisches Utopien hineingeraten 
wäre.” Strapinski, being a tailor, is uniquely attuned to the matter of appearance—one 
might say, of vanity—and his deepest shame is that the poor circumstances of his life do 
not align with his taste, which he learned from his mother, for fine dress. This fantasy has 
a critical, enlightening moment. Keller has nothing but scorn for the misleading world of 
appearances, of playing-acting fostered by the world of business, which furnishes greater 
and greater rewards onto increasingly absurd confusion, lies and deceptions. The clear, 
unflinching eye with which Keller regards the world around him is meant to school his 
reader in spotting these deceptions, and in encouraging the reader to consider just what 
way of being the objects around him really embody, and thereby encourage. Like Karl 
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Marx, the critic of commodity fetishism, Keller sees himself as trying to break the spell 
that the appearance of value casts on a society whose life is increasingly subsumed under 
the profit motive. At the same time, the metaphoric play in the descriptive Sinnbilder all 
throughout Die Leute von Seldwyla are, to use the phrase from the above passages, meant 
to be morally utopian moments that allow the reader to imagine that, instead of providing 
a hard-edged barrier against their self-understanding and personal conception of happiness, 
that the objects all around one might instead embody, externally and fixedly, that inchoate 
self-understanding—that instead of the sharp dissonance Keller’s protagonists encounter 
between what they feel themselves to be and what they, in the eyes of others, actually are, 
that these two might actually be one again. The designation of a state of affairs is a utopia 
contains the implicit admission that this unity can and never will be the case except in a 
world of literature.  
 Keller’s sense that the solidity of reality is imperiled is not limited to the treatment 
of capitalism in Die Leute von Seldwyla. If we expand the range of our discussion 
momentarily to include the reflections on painting in Der grüne Heinrich, we see that the 
clear perception of the world is blocked not only by a misguided cultivation of appearance 
but by the transitoriness of human life itself. Tolstoy, it is said, wrote in the town square, 
taking note of all the faces that went by, the different manners of dress he saw, the bits of 
overheard conversation. By the 1870s, when Keller finished both Heinrich and the 
Seldwyla novellas, the provincial way of life, based around handicraft, he described in 
boths works was one that existed largely in the memory of their author—though 
industrialization was well under way by the end of Keller’s life, there are tellingly few 
factories to be found in either work. The sense of absence and loss that suffuses the world 
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of Keller’s characters is perhaps most vividly depicted in the scene in Der grüne Heinrich 
in which Heinrich, while keeping watch over the soon-to-die Anna, looks through the 
window—that most Realist of activities127—at the lake that he promised Anna’s father he 
would one day paint and sees the first light of dawn streaking across its surface: 
Ich machte das Fenster auf und sah lange auf den See hinaus, dessen waldige Uferhöhen 
vom Morgenröte beglänzt lagen, indessen der späte Mond noch am Himmel stand und sich 
ziemlich kräftig im dunklen Wasser spiegelte. Ich sah ihn nach und nach erblichen vor der 
Sonne, welche nun die gelben Kronen der Bäume vergoldete und einen zarten Schimmer 
über den erblauenden See warf. Zugleich aber begann die Luft sich wieder zu verhüllen.128 
 
The nearness of death fills Heinrich with an awareness of the transitoriness of all things, 
which is both art’s limit, as death is the limit of human endeavor, and its impetus. 
Likenesses, like the painting of Anna that hangs in her bedchamber, are frequently struck 
in Der grüne Heinrich so as to remind their owner of a loved one now gone; by the same 
token, the Sinnbild as a mode of representation that takes a transitory reality, vanishing 
even at is coming into being, and joins it to a fixed, unchanging symbol that the author 
hopes will be legible to future times. In this respect, Züß’s drawer and Kabys’s cigar case 
and satchel and Pankraz’s mashed potatoes and Vrenchen’s gingerbread house have much 
in commen with the objects on the shelves of Frau Margarete’s Trödelkammer, which is 
part pawn shop and part mausoleum. In his essay on Keller in Logis in einem Landhaus, 
W.G. Sebald writes that the rusty old weapons and torn-up oil paintings and old-fashioned 
tables covered in glass dishware and porcelain and figurines made of wood and clay on 
display in the old woman’s shop lead “ein stilles Nachleben. Anders als das forwährend 
umlaufende Kapital sind diese verdämmernden Dinge aus dem Verkehr gezogen, haben 
ihren Warencharakter längst abgebüßt und sind gewissermaßen schon in die Ewigkeit 
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eingegangen.”129 The same may be said of the objects described by Keller, which have 
been plucked up from the commerce of every day life and are now—such is the hope of 
the author—frozen in the preterite of literary prose. But the qualifying word 
“gewissermaßen” in Sebald’s analysis is not to be overlooked here. Beyond the book, life 
goes on, and the elegiac character of Keller’s describes can only be a way of coming to 
terms with that loss, of being compensated for it. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The critics that most perceptively treat the role of description and poetic 
imagination in Keller’s have been those who are most circumspect in assessing the power 
of literature to redress reality’s wrongs without, however, overlooking the humor, the wit, 
and the play at work in Keller’s representation of the everyday. In Das gedichtete Leben, 
his comprehensive study of Keller, Gerhard Kaiser notes that Keller observed the 
fundamental unity of pessimism and optimism in his own writing well before he had 
written anything. In a poem from 1843, ten years before his first mature works, Keller 
wrote: “Unverwüstlich sind die Dichter / Alles wird zum Traum verwoben; / Selbst der 
nahe Tod wird spielend / Noch mit Schein und Tand umschlungen.”130 The motif of an 
idle, unconscious, purposeless weaving to describe the turning of reality into poetic 
imagery is, so argues Kaiser, one that recurs frequently in Keller, for example in the figures 
of the two farmers plowing their fields at the beginning of “Romeo und Julia auf dem 
Dorfe,” each going back and forth, lost in thought, like the shuttle of a loom: “Und war er 
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webt, das weiss kein Weber!”131 (We might note here the contrast to Stifter and the image 
he offers in his “Vorrede” of the naturalist minutely examining the movements of the 
compass needle.) Unlike Kaspar Locher, who argues that day-dreaming is portrayed by 
Keller as a narcissistic activity that his characters learn to overcome, Kaiser argues that it 
is constitutive of Keller’s Realism. Imagining what that existence might be like if it were 
made whole again is frequently the only productive labor they are able to perform. The act 
of weaving or spinning, of turning the cotton of experience into the spun flax of symbol 
and metaphor is for Keller’s characters their sole compensation for a shattered and solitary 
existence. “Die unverwüstlichen Dichter,” writes Kaiser, “sind schwerfüßige Träumer, die 
aus einer zerstückelten einsamen Leben den Traum von ganzen Leben wecken, aus dem 
wiederum ein schmerzliches Erwachen herausreißt“132 Die Leute von Seldwyla is filled 
with such passages, perhaps none more poignant than the one in which Vrenchen, before 
killing herself, describes to the woman who has come to haul off her possessions what her 
life would be like if she were rich,  listing off the objects she would lend the neighbors who 
had never been generous to her: “Ein artiges Halstüchelchen oder rein Restchen 
Seidenzeug oder ein hübsches altes Band für Eure Röcke oder ein Stück Zeug zu einer 
neuen Schürze wird gewiß auch zu finden sein, wenn wir meine Kisten und Kasten 
durchmustern in einer vertrauten Stunde!” As with Stifter, the verisimilitude in these 
fantasies, that Vrenchen is describing a recognizable way of life, is significant to, but not 
identical with, its realism. What lends these passages their solidity is not only that they 
accurately describe Swiss life but that they come from a place of desperation, of hunger 
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and toil, charged at once with a joy in the power of imagination—one is reminded of 
Satan’s defiant pronouncement in Paradise Lost that the mind can make a Hell of Heaven 
and a Heaven of Hell—as well as with the ruefulness that comes with the knowledge that 
reality cannot be confronted. 
I will conclude, then, with the observation that both the socio-critical and the 
anthropological thrust of description in Keller originate in the view, implicit in the Realist 
program of Vischer, Ludwig, Schmidt et. Al, that reality on its own is insufficience, that it 
needs literary representation to supplement it, to make it whole. After all: of the purpose 
of art is simply to reproduce “das Reale,” then why does art need to exist at all? The idea 
of a reality that has been subjected to a process of Verklärung, that is the same but some 
how different, truer, sharper, more intense, was the Realists answer to this question. 
Keller’s own answer, which took the form of the descriptive prose we considered in this 
chapter, was that literature, in offering a glimpse of what a better, more balanced life might 
look like, offers the reader the courage to face the hardships of thankless work and financial 
uncertainty, ending in death, as they actually are. Perhaps the single most programmatic 
line in the Seldwyla novellas is the moment when, sitting down to his enormous meal at 
the inn, Strapinski ceases to struggle against fate and sighs, “Es ist einmal, wie es ist!” Like 
a good glass of wine proffered to a guest in a time of distress, the poetic description of the 
world in Keller would give his reader the courage to see things as they are and, with what 















 In November 1852 Gottfried Keller published a brief review in the Blätter für 
literarische Unterhaltung of Jeremias Gotthelf’s Zeitgeist und Berner Geist. The review 
takes clear-eyed stock of Gotthelf’s limitations as a writer; Keller notes his tendency, for 
example, to draw the Swiss peasants that populate his stories in stark moral colors, either 
as heroes or villains; but he also praises the intimate, organic connection Gotthelf has with 
the Swiss people that allows realism to “triumph” in his work. Keller senses that intimate 
connection above all in Gotthelf’s treatment of the political—that he does not avoid it, as 
he claims in the book’s introduction that his friends counseled him to do, but rather places 
it front and center in each story: 
Darin hat er als Bürger wie als Schriftsteller u.s.w. durchaus Recht, denn  heute ist Alles 
Politik und hängt mit ihr zusammen von dem Leder an unserer Schuhsohle bis zum 
obersten Ziegel am Dache, und der Rauch der aus dem Schornsteine steigt ist Politik and 
umhängt in verfänglichen Wolken über Hütten und Palästen, treibt hin und her über Städten 
und Dörfern.133  
 
Given Gotthelf’s conservative agrarian politics, this programmatic statement is a striking 
one from the ardently liberal Keller.  What distinguishes the Realist era, a time of continent-
wide political upheaval, from all other eras before it, Keller argues, is that no representation 
of it can credibly exclude politics. In Keller’s time, fidelity to country and fidelity to reality 
are one and the same; to discharge the duties of the author is also to discharge the duties of 
the citizen. 
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 To a reader sufficiently impressed by the review to follow Keller’s literary output 
through the remainder of the decade, Keller’s assertion of the ubiquity of politics in modern 
life would have been a puzzling one. To be sure, the young Keller had taken part in 
Switzerland’s national struggles against the Catholic Separatist League, and devoted years 
of his life to public service as the Secretary to the Canton of Zurich. Keller’s work is 
peppered throughout with approving references to anti-imperial struggles, from the Greeks 
against the Ottomans, the Shamil’s against the Tsar, and Switzerland itself against 
Napoleon III. Still, politics, as the organization of human beings into institutions of 
governance is only glancingly touched upon in the work for which Keller is best known. 
Der grüne Heinrich opens, as I have noted, with a poetic sketch of the liberal period of the 
1830s and closes with its protagonist’s jaundiced reflections on public life; “Frau Regel 
Amrain und ihr Jüngster” contains an episode that makes comedic light of provincial 
politics; but apart from these, Swiss citizenship is rarely fore-grounded in Keller’s work. 
This hypothetical reader would have been well justified in placing Keller in the company 
of other intellectuals from the period—Robert Prutz, Julian Schmidt, Otto Ludwig, Gustav 
Freytag, Richard Wagner, Friedrich Hebbel, and Franz Grillparzer, to name only the most 
notable—whose youthful revolutionary beliefs cooled as they matured, and curdled into 
bitterness when they witnessed the bellicose, materialistic, authoritarian nation that came 
into existence in 1871. 
 And yet, a commitment to democracy, to the equality of all citizens before the law 
does lie at the heart of Keller’s writing—as its aesthetic program. For Keller, the 
Freidenker, democracy meant self-governance, the abolition of hierarchy, the self-identity 
of the rulers and the ruled. Democracy in art, for Keller, meant that the art’s   
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sublimity only had substance insofar as it had an organic relationship to the life of “the 
people”—the lowest and least influential citizens of the nation. Such is the praise Keller 
lavishes on Shakespeare in the oft-cited opening lines of “Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe:”  
Diese Geschichte zu erzählen würde eine müßige Nachahmung sein, wenn sie nicht auf 
einem wirklichen Vorfall beruhte, zum Beweise, wie tief im Menschenleben jede jener 
Fabeln wurzelt, auf welche die großen alten Werke gebaut sind. Die Zahl solcher Fabeln 
ist mäßig; aber stets treten sie in neuem Gewande wieder in die Erscheinung und zwingen 
alsdann die Hand, sie festzuhalten.134 
 
For Keller any story, from the simplest fable to the most complex work of Shakespeare, is 
legitimated not by its excellence but by its rootedness in the life of the people. He insists 
on the underlying unity of his story and Shakespeare’s, despite the class difference of their 
subjects; the authenticity of its existence in real life compels the author to capture it. In 
response to a review of the novella by Berthold Auerbach, who found the recourse to 
Romeo and Juliet too pretentious a means for recounting the double suicide of two destitute 
farmer children, Keller insisted on the necessary continuity of art and life, material and 
abstract, rarified and common: “Erstens ist ja das, was wir selbst schreiben, auch auf Papier 
gedruckt und gehört von dieser Seite zur papiernen Welt, und zweitens ist ja Shakespeare, 
obleich gedruckt, doch nur das Leben selbst und keine unlebendige Reminiszenz,” he 
wrote.135 Though only a small portion of the German-speaking world can read 
Shakespeare, Shakespeare only tells of the same life lived by each person, no matter their 
station. For Keller, whose works are littered with references to Shakespeare, Greek 
mythology, the Bible, the Odyssey, and the works of Goethe and Schiller, this fundamental 
continuity extends in both directions; the Realist author is not only legitimized by his 
connection to the life of the people, but he serves, as well, in highlighting that aspect of 
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classic literature that is most intimately connected to the people. He gives readers access 
to the Bard’s work by expressing it in language more accessible to a less educated reader, 
by finding that same tragedy not in a distant, far-off place to which that reader might have 
no access, but in the world he recognizes, the world in which he dwells. The Realist author 
does not write only of democracy, but he writes democratically.  
 The first author to consider rigorously and systematically the relationship between 
Keller’s democratic commitments and the character of his prose is, unsurprisingly, Georg 
Lukács. In his 1939 reflection on Keller’s work, Lukács argues that it is Keller’s 
commitment to true plebeian republicanism—and not simply the advancement of the 
property-owning middle classes—that distinguishes him from what Lukács refers to as the 
sterile “bürgerlicher Realismus” of Gustav Freytag, as well as from the reactionary 
conservatism of the Dorfgeschichte. The belief that all of the citizens of a nation ought to 
be treated with equal dignity manifests in Keller as the demand that the high and sublime 
be conveyed in terms even those with little schooling can understand: “In this context,” 
writes Lukács, “Keller proceeds from the profoundly democratic presupposition that 
everything which is morally good will be understood by the people if it is portrayed with 
authentic realism... His whole literary activity is placed in the service of such a political 
and social, moral and emotional strengthening of the people.”136 The scenes showing both 
the destitution and the joy of village life in Keller are, then, counter-reactionary, meant to 
puncture the ideologies of capitalism and state that set the working poor at odds with the 
upwardly mobile middle classes. In demonstrating the necessary interdependence of the 
high and low, the ordinary and the extraordinary, in the way he uses alliteration, punning, 
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and colloquialism to convey complex philosophical concepts, Keller is, in the eyes of 
Lukács, a political pedagogue. His art instructs his countrymen in the way of a true and 
lasting democracy. In so doing, Keller takes impersonal historical forces and humanizes 
them by grounding them firmly in social reality, the realm of character, value, and 
disposition that in the previous two chapters we have called the ethical, or, as Lukács puts 
it: “in the relations between human beings, in their psychology, morality and world-view, 
in their feelings and experiences, thought and action... transforms all actions, even the most 
isolated ruminations, into social events.”137 
 In Lukács’ view, Keller’s ethical Realism is, above all, a political one. Politics 
provides the key concept that links the representation of the world in Keller to the 
cultivation of the self—both, he argues, are a form of political pedagogy. It is to test this 
hypothesis that I will examine Keller’s final novel, the social novel Martin Salander, 
published in 1886. Of all of Keller’s work, Martin Salander is the novel that deals most 
directly with the social, historical, and political problems of Keller’s day. The novel tells 
the story of the eponymous schoolteacher-cum-businessman-cum-politician, whose hopes 
for the Swiss republic are quickly dampened by the widespread corruption and rapacity he 
encounters, not least in his sons-in-law, the social climbers Isidor and Julian Weidelich, 
and in his lifelong friend Louis Wohlwend, a confidence man who repeatedly swindles 
Salander out of his fortune. The novel concludes with the triumph of civic virtue: the 
Weidelich twins are arrested and tried for the misappropriation of public finds, while 
Wohlwend is finally thwarted by Salander’s son Arnold. Throughout, Martin Salander is 
packed with references to constitutional reforms, banking crises, mass migration, 
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industrialization, school reform, deforestation, animal conservation, and Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory. It is the most concretely realistic of all of Keller’s work, an expansive 
panorama Swiss of life at the dawn of the Gründerzeit, and therefore the text that lays out 
most explicitly Keller’s hopes for and criticisms of the Swiss people and the Swiss republic.  
 That Keller waited until the end of his career to attempt a Zeitroman is, in itself, 
striking and suggestive for our consideration of his relationship to Realism. The social 
novel, in which the author seeks to depict a dramatic social change or a particularly 
pervasive social problem—the rise of industrialization, for example—by dramatizing its 
effects on the individual, was hardly a new one in 1886. In the German-speaking world, 
the 1840s and ‘50s saw a veritable explosion of the genre. A period of nearly fifteen years 
saw the publication of Karl Gutzkow’s Die Ritter vom Geist (1850-2), Gotthelf’s Zeitgeist 
und Berner Geist (1851), Ludwig Steub’s Deutsche Träume (1858), Berthold Auerbach’s 
Auf der Höhe (1865), and most significantly, Gustav Freytag’s Soll und Haben (1855), the 
most successful novel of the German nineteenth century. (This is to say nothing, of course, 
of the enormous impact of the novels of Sir Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, and Balzac). 
Broadly, the Zeitroman can be characterized as a novel that uses its characters and plot to 
depicts the effects of dynamic historical changes in the lives of individuals and 
communities. But for those authors who, like Freytag, the world that they observed around 
them, the Zeitroman contained a predictive element as well; its task was to identify those 
acorns—the German nation, for example, then only a loose customs union; or 
industrialization, still laggard and behind in the 1850s, merely a promise held in a few 
miles of railroad track—and to portray the oaks that they would some day be. “In a dynamic 
and progressive society reality was, after all, not static,” writes Eric Hobsbawm in a 
 145 
thumbnail sketch of the period, “Was it not realism to represent, not the necessarily 
imperfect present, but the better situation to which men aspired and which was already, 
surely, being created?”138 Seen in this light, by presenting the ideal historical reality that 
was just around the corner, the Zeitroman became a tool of political pedagogy. It unearthed 
its latent elements in the present, and strengthening them, charging the reader’s energies, 
by drawing his attention to them: the Zeitroman offered a civic education for a German 
nation that did not yet exist.  
 Following Lukács, scholars like Michael Feldt, Richard Ruppel, and Peter Bichsel 
rightly observe that Keller places this pedagogical aspect of the Zeitroman front and center 
in Martin Salander.139 All three authors stress the educational and aspirational aspect of 
Salander’s civics. Salander, whose biography tracks quite closely to that of the author 
himself, is guided in everything he does, as are his fellow Realists, by an ardent idealism, 
a belief that human beings are perfected by being made to imagine an ideal, that of 
republican self-rule. Salander eagerly embraces anything and everything as a potential 
pedagogical tool for perfecting the Swiss citizenry; nature, romantic love, politics. In this, 
Martin Salander is without a doubt his most ethical novel—the novel that most openly 
embraces that there is a right way to live, and that, rather than simply observing the way 
that human beings do live, asks what can be done to make them live the way they ought to. 
Against these, we must observe that there is virtually nowhere in the world of Martin 
Salander that these pedagogical ambitions succeed; not a single action taken by Salander 
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brings his ideal republic any closer to reality. School, family, nature—every pedagogical 
tool is ineffective against the decadence and the inertia of mass democracy. Keller’s final 
novel is, at once, his most directly engaged in the Swiss life of his time, the most optimistic 
about the possibilities for its improvement, and the most pessimistic about what those 
possibilities might finally yield.  
What, then, is Martin Salander, as a work of ethical Realism? And given that the 
very future of the Swiss people is at stake in Keller’s portrait of a republic in crisis, what 
role does he envision for art as a tool of ethical, and therefore, civic pedagogy? 
I will consider two answers to this question. The first will be the topos of the 
Festspiel in Keller’s oeuvre, which I will explore in three works: the Tellfest from Der 
grüne Heinrich, in which the entirety of Heinrich’s native village takes part in a rowdy 
performance of Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell; Das grosse Schillerfest, which he wrote on the 
occasion of the centennial celebrations of Friedrich Schiller’s birthday in 1859; finally, the 
wedding of Salander’s daughters, Setti and Netti, to the Weidelich twins; at which Salander 
stages an impromptu comic play intended to reconcile the two political parties in 
Switzerland. In Keller, the festival—a city-wide celebration whose centerpiece is a play 
arranged and performed by the townspeople—is held up as both an artistic and political 
ideal. By abolishing the distinction between art and life, audience and performer, author 
and reader, the Volksfest is the ultimate pedagogical tool: in it democracy is not simply 
depicted but actually performed and momentarily achieved. But this ideal nonetheless 
contains, at the same time, a deep ambivalence towards the instructive power of art. It 
achieves its civic ends only by entirely liquidating its poetic dimension and dissolving into 
life itself. If the first two works are optimistic, if uncertain, about the power of art to reach 
 147 
a citizenry to whom the high and the sublime is often remote and illegible, then Martin 
Salander vehemently rejects art as a tool of civic instruction. Salander openly despairs of 
art’s instructive possibilities in the age of mass democracy, and breaks firmly and 
permanently with the idealism on which his earlier work draws. Tellingly, the only 
successful and enlightening public spectacle in Salander is a criminal trial—“ein 
öffentliches Schauspiel,” as the narrator dryly calls it. 
The second answer may be found in the emphasis placed by the novel on modes of 
comportment towards the self and towards the world. In the episodes of Isidor and Julian’s 
courtship with Salander’s daughters, and in Martin Salander’s own wooing of a Greek 
beauty named Myrrha Glawicz; Keller offers not only a political critique of artistic beauty 
but an ethical one, as well: namely, that beauty stokes desire, that it causes it to grow and 
feed on itself, and in so doing, sharpens in him the hunger for what might be, rather than 
the courageous acceptance of what is. In the idealized character of Arnold, Salander’s son, 
and the family’s savior, Keller offers a counterweight to the idealism of Salander and 
Wohlwend; a critical ethic of renunciation that punctures all ideals, and that holds itself 
apart from the fury of sexual desire, from the greed of acquisition, and finally, in any and 
all political idealism. To cool desire so as to see the world clearly, and to see the world 
clearly so as to free oneself of desire, that is Arnold’s hope, and it is on that critical note 
that Keller’s final novel, both his most cynical and his most hopeful, leaves his reader.  
 
2. Excelsior!: Zeitroman as Pedagogial Form 
 
 I would like to begin, as in the previous chapters, by examining closely one passage 
from Martin Salander. Here, in the novel’s sixth chapter, Martin Salander has just returned 
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from a second sojourn to Brazil, lasting three years. From afar, he has keenly followed the 
constitutional battles in Switzerland, which have resulted in the ratification of the direct 
referendum. As he tours his native city, the fictional Munsterburg—based on Zurich—with 
his son Arnold in tow, he hopes to see an enlightened citizenry practicing self-rule: 
Salander machte mit dem Knaben [Arnold] einen weiten Weg in der Runde um die Stadt; 
überall hörte man Tanzmusik, welcher junges Volk beiderlei Geschlechts zustrebte. Man 
sah auch etwa einen Zug Schützen, die mit ihren Gewehren einer letzen Sonntagsübung 
nachgingen, oder eine Schar Turner mit Stäben auf der Schulter, den Tambour voran. 
Dazwischen mannigfaches Volk durcheinander wimmelnd, fröhlich oder gleichgültig, 
einzelne mürrisch und über irgend etwas fluchend; den Hauch und Glanz aber der neuen 
Zeit, das Wehen des Geistes, den etwas feierlicheren Ernst, den er suchte, konnte er nicht 
wahrnehmen. Man hörte Singen auf den Gassen und in den Schenkhäusern, es waren die 
alten Lieder, von denen die Leute, ganz wie ehemals, nur die erste Strophe kannten und 
etwa die letze: wenn Einer noch eine mittlere aufbrachte, so lallten die Anderen das Lied 
ohne Worte mit. Auf einer staubigen Straße balgte sich ein Haufe angetrunkener Jünglinge, 
als ob es keine edlere Verständigung für junge Bürger gäbe, welche über die Gesetze 
nachzudenken gewohnt sind, über die sie mitzustimmen haben. Alle hundert Schritte 
bettelte ein Mann mit einer Ziehharmonika oder einem leeren Rockärmel, während der 
Arm auf dem Rücken lag. Kurz, es war Alles, wie es vor Altem an einem Herbstsonntag 
gewesen, und zu gewärtigen, daß später am Tage einige der freiesten Männer nicht mehr 
auf ihren Füßen würden stehen können.  
 
Salander schüttelte leise den Kopf, indem er sich aufmerksam umsah. Nun, sagte er bei 
sich selber, alle großen Veränderungen müssen einen Übergang haben und sich einleben. 
Aber ich ich hätte geglaubt, schon die Tatsache eines solchen Ereignisses würde Land und 
Himmel eine andere Physiognomie machen! Am Ende ist es aber und wird wohl sein die 
angeborene Bescheidenheit des Volkes, seine schlichte Gewöhnung, welche es nicht leicht 
die anspruchsvollere Toga umwerfen läßt!140 
 
This passage introduces early on the motif of music as to describe Switzerland’s public 
life. Everywhere, the residents of Switzerland are in good cheer, find much to celebrate, 
and yet the music lacks the spirit of a truly binding communal force. Though everyone 
appreciates the good cheer of the old patriotic songs, nobody can remember their words or 
their melody, and such a corrosive individualism has set in that no two Swiss citizens can 
sing in key together. The endless festivity masks not only the lack of a true civic culture in 
Switzerland, but also the inequality of the nation’s newfound fortune, observable in the 
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beggars playing the harmonica on every corner. So unrestrained is the celebration that, as 
the narrator ruefully observes, later in the day the freest citizens on earth will find it difficult 
to stand. The reader gains some insight into Martin Salander’s tendency to see the best in 
the Swiss people despite all evidence to the contrary in his speculation that this dismal 
public culture is due to the Swiss people’s natural modesty, and their habituation to the 
plain and the simple, that refuses to be covered up by the more demanding toga they have 
donned.  
 What the reader first notices about this passage is its clever reversal of a familiar 
motif from Keller’s earlier work. In the Seldwyla novellas, as in Der grüne Heinrich, Keller 
makes repeated use of the trope of the returning Weltreisender—for example, Pankraz 
returning home after decades abroad, to the astonishment of his mother and sister, with a 
lion’s pelt slung over his shoulder. Keller is able to produce both considerable dramatic 
impact and a light comic effect by contrasting between the newly-opened global scope of 
mid-nineteenth century and the sleepy provincialism of his nation; Herr Lee, Heinrich’s 
father, produces a near-magical effect on his fellow countrymen when he returns from an 
apprenticeship in Germany speaking Hochdeutsch. Like Gulliver before the 
Lilluputians,141 Salander observes the new developments in his native land with the 
curious, unfamiliar eyes of a sailor washed up on the shores of a previously undiscovered 
civilization. Salander’s ardent patriotism, together with the expansive, idealist cast of his 
character, allows the novel to momentarily detach itself from his perspective and take in 
the entire Swiss people in one sweeping glance. Here, for the first time, the Swiss people 
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enter into the novel’s dramatic space altogether, en masse, and stand before the reader, 
offering him a full, panoramic view onto die neue Zeit. 
 How does the new age differ from the one before it? The scholar John B. Lyon 
stresses the overwhelming sense of displacement that hangs over Salander’s encounters 
with his fellow Munsterburgers upon his return. “Keller begins the novel with a loss of 
certainty about place,” Lyon writes of the book’s opening scenes. “A man… searches 
fruitlessly for the paths to his family’s home, for these paths, ‘lagen auch weiterhin unter 
staubigen oder mit hartem Kies beschotterten Fahrstraßen begraben.’ Familiar place is 
buried for the protagonist; modernism (in the form of gravel-surfaced roads) has relegated 
it to the realm of memory and excluded it from present experience.”142 The townspeople 
that Salander encounters evince a distinct discomfort at being identified as Swiss. Two 
boys mock another for using the German Mutter, with its plebian, instead of the French 
and therefore socially aspirational Mama. Their mother, a washerwoman pretentiously 
dressed in an expensive hat, bristles when Salander mentions the Swiss Volk; they are 
simply Leute, she insists, “die Alle das gleiche Recht haben, empor zu kommen!”143. A 
large, modern train station—based on the Zurich train station, completed in 1871—is now 
in the heart of the town. Five chapters later, Salander’s stroll through Munsterburg confirms 
on a broad, sweeping scale the worries that these first episodic impressions have raised in 
him. A corrosive individualism and decadent love of pleasure have taken hold of the 
country. Compulsory military duty—an indispensable tool during the mid-nineteenth 
century for constructing a sense of national identity in fledgling countries—has been 
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replaced by frivolous shooting contests. Patriotic songs are still sung over a glass of beer, 
but their substance has been forgotten. Where, thirty years before, the Seldwylers were 
always “guter Dinge”—what Salander praises as “feierlicher Ernst”—here that cheer has 
curdled into an idle pursuit of pleasure. Since no one can hear what anyone else is singing, 
all that can be heard is disharmony and discord. No one in Switzerland can see past the end 
of his own nose to the common good. 
 No less noteworthy is the concrete setting of this passage in the now of the reader’s 
present, so often absent from Keller’s other prose work. The novel achieves this sense of 
presence through its use, from the very beginning, of historical details to anchor the 
characters and the action. Based on the references to the Munsterburg train station and the 
constitutional battles alluded to by Salander, a contemporary reader would have had little 
difficulty identifying the time as the end of the 1860s. From the loose biography of himself 
and the account of his financial troubles that Salander gives to his friend and ally Möhni 
Wighart in the second chapter, the reader can infer that Salander was born in the twenties. 
He would have witnessed as a child the rise to power of the liberal government in 1832, 
and would therefore have come of age during the era described by Keller in the first two 
chapters of the revised Der grüne Heinrich. In the 1840s, at the height of liberal nationalist 
sentiment in Switzerland, Salander attended the Lehrseminar to become a teacher at a 
secondary school—the decisive nation-building tool of the nineteenth century republic. 
Following his account, Salander guaranteed Wohlwend’s disastrous loan in the 1850s, just 
as Switzerland finds itself in the midst of a period of massive economic growth, and when 
he is ruined, he goes seeks his fortune abroad, as did hundreds of thousands of other Swiss 
men and women. And finally the main action of the novel coincides with the banking crises, 
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bankruptcies, and other famous instances of white-collar crime that dominated Swiss 
headlines all through the 1860s. Salander’s travails are, in effect, those of Switzerland 
itself; his life registers, like a seismograph, the massive, impersonal forces bringing 
themselves to bear on what once been a seemingly unchangeable reality of agrarian labor 
and skilled handicraft. Consequently, Salander eschews the almost anthropological tone of 
the introduction to the Die Leute von Seldwyla, the residents of which isolated, far-flung 
town were worthy of literary representational as a wrinkle, an exception in the Swiss 
character. In fashioning itself as a Zeitroman, in claiming to describe the present moment 
in which the novel was composed, the passage above takes on an interpellative power that 
binds both the author and the reader to the fate of Martin Salander.  
 To the critics and novelist of the Realist period who shared Keller’s liberal 
democratic politics, the broad historical perspective of the Zeitroman was not simply a 
tendency or technique of Realism. It was the task of the modern novel itself. Why? 
Because, as Julian Schmidt observes in the third volume of his Geschichte der deutschen 
Literatur seit Lessings Tod, that the straight-forward, naïve representation of times past is 
no longer possible in an age whose day-to-day reality is so expansive, so multi-faceted, so 
rapidly shifting as that of the nineteenth century. “Es ist nicht möglich,” he writes, “das 
Leben in seinem beständigen Fluß zu photographieren, und das ist in der Tat das 
Hauptstreben des modernen Romans. Er steht nicht wie der ältere Erzähler gleichsam in 
der Mitte zwischen dem Gegenstand und den Zuhörern.”144 Instead, the author seeks to 
reproduce the strict necessity of life, the underlying laws that make objects visible as they 
are. Formally, this means the abolition of chance and unlikely occurrence in the 
                                                
144 Schmidt, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur, Vol. 3, 540. 
 153 
construction of plot and character, the strict enforcement of believability. It also means a 
shift of representational emphasis: “[Der Autor] sucht,” continues Schmidt, “den 
Gegenstand oder vielmehr die Lichtbewegung, in welcher derselber sichtbar wird, wirklich 
zu geben.”145 The recourse to the advancements of industry, science, technology, and 
communications media implied in Schmidt’s reference to optical and technical media—the 
telescope and microscope are also mentioned in the same chapter alongside photography—
is explicitly joined, in his analysis of Soll und Haben some pages later, to the advent of 
parliamentary democracy and the expansion of trade: 
Den Dichtern der classischen Zeit konnte man es nicht verargen, wenn sie mit gänzlicher 
Nichtachtung der sogenannten Philister, das heist des wirklichen Lebens, die Kunst in das 
Reich der Schatten flüchteten. Harmonische Ausbildung aller Kräfte war nur den 
bevorzugten Ständen oder den Vagabunden möglich, der Bürger ging in einseitiger 
Thätigkeit unter und hatte innerhalb der Gesellschaft keine Ehre. Seit der Zeit haben sich 
die Überzeugungen geändert: durch die allgemeine Wehrpflicht, durch die gymnastischen 
Übungen, durch die ersten parlamentarischen Versuche, sowie durch den ungeheuren 





Wer in der Gegenwart sich erhalten will muß in der Weise des Bürgerthums auf Erwerb 
denken, d.h. folgerichtig, mit ausdaurndem Verstand arbeiten. Die bürgerliche Arbeit ist 
die Grundlage der modernen Gesellschaft, das Gesetz der Volkswirtschaft das Gesetz des 
modernen Staats. 
 
In order to live in modern society, Schmidt argues, one must live and work like the middle 
classes—in an orderly, sensible, diligent manner. It is industry and trade that provide the 
funds that keep the modern state solvent, and, in so doing, guarantee the stability of the 
lives of its citizens. What follows, then, is that though many experiences of the present 
exist, they are not all equally real; only the middle classes, whose existence consists of 
grasping, confronting, and transforming reality, have a substantial relation with the laws 
that the Europe of the nineteenth century. It follows, then, that the middle classes are the 
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proper subject of the modern novel, whose proper perspective is, once again, that of the 
middle class. 
 Schmidt’s cultural analysis is of less interest to us for its originality, or lack thereof, 
than for the representational difficulties it poses to the German Realist. If it is true, as 
Schmidt claims, that in order to be “realistic” the modern novel must place the travails of 
individual characters against the background of industrial trade and liberal nationalism; if 
the affects it must seek to produce in the reader are “Lebensmuth” and “Selbstgefühl”, then 
how can the German-speaking novelist adequately represent these forces when they exist 
only in embryonic form in his daily life? It is precisely this problem that faces Martin 
Salander’s when he perplexedly observes, in the passage above, that he lives in an 
Übergangszeit—that the surface of reality has not yet caught up with the “real” currents 
beneath it. The Realist author has, therefore, a second task in addition to the first 
(discerning the strict necessity beneath the flow of surface reality): he has also to show this 
reality as it will be when these tendencies come to full fruition, as he might predict an acorn 
will one day grow into a tree. He must construct a single poetic reality, real and ideal, 
present and future, in a single organic unity. The temporal position and poetic task of the 
Realist author, as well as its concretely historical terms, are neatly articulated in the 
introduction to Soll und Haben itself: 
 Nur zu sehr fehlt das Behagen am fremden und eigenen Leben, die Sicherheit fehlt und 
der frohe Stolz, mit welchem die Schriftsteller anderer Sprachen auf die Vergangenheit 
und Gegenwart ihres Volkes blicken, im Überfluss aber hat der Deutsche Demütigungen, 
unerfüllte Wünsche, und eifrigen Zorn… Jetzt ein furchtbarer Krieg ist entbrannt, und mit 
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By discovering veins of patriotism, diligent work, and the abolition of old hierarchies and 
moribund ways of life in the rock of daily life, Freytag seeks to cultivate precisely that 
character and those values in the present that will bring about the better world he has 
envisioned. The verisimilitude of the Realist novel is, therefore, only an intermediary step 
to its true goal, which is to intervene in political history itself. It is for this reason that the 
poetic idealizations of Realism are real, while those of Romanticism are pure fantasy: “Die 
poetische Bewältigug [unseres bürgerliches Lebens] wird das Gefühl unsers Volkes mehr 
anregen und läutern,“ Schmidt writes, „also auch förderlicher sein, als die 
Treibhaushandlung griechischer und indischer Gewächse.”148 It is no accident that the 
Geschichte der deutschen Literatur ends not with an aesthetic reflection but a political 
exhortation to the German people to labor for their freedom. For the liberal-nationalist 
author, concludes the scholar Hermann Kinder in his analysis of Schmidt and Freytag, “das 
eigentliche Kunstwerk… ist nicht das ästhetische Werk sondern der humane und nationale 
Staat.”149  
 Martin Salander seizes on this pedagogical aspiration of the Zeitroman and places 
it in the foreground of its poetic treatment of the troubles facing the Switzerland of the 
Gründerzeit. Perhaps the most significant detail of the passage above is that Salander is 
accompanied by his son Arnold, the future inheritor and guardian of the Swiss republic. 
Arnold is Salander’s charge; unlike his daughters, he will one day be able to sit on the 
Geheimrat, and it is to him, as well as to the reader, that Salander’s disappointed remarks 
are addressed. Pedagogy, politics, and fatherhood are for Salander one and the same. So 
shaken is he by the distracted manner of his sons-in-law Isidor and Julian at the 
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Geheimrat—and by the memory of this stroll with Arnold—that he rushes home to inform 
his wife of his plan for a universal political education in Switzerland. As Salander explains 
to his bemused spouse, “Nähern sich die jungen Männer ihrem zwanzigsten Lebensjahre,”  
etwa im achtzehnten, werden sie staatsbürgerlich eingeschult. Die Verfassungskunde 
haben sie schon in der Alltagsschule rasch durchgemacht als Knaben; jetzt wird sie in den 
flüchtigeren Köpfen halb verblaßt sein. Sie wird also nochmals kräftig aufgefrischt und 
abschließlich sodann der ganze Kreis der Gesetzgebung für das Verständnis geöffnet, kurz 
ehe sie in den Genuß und die Pflichten der Volksrechte eintreten. Ich dächte, das wären 
Sachen genug, die Zeit auszufüllen! Schwierig wird es im Anfang wohl sein, gleichmäßig 
und beharrlich vorzugehen, doch es wird gehen müssen, wenn die Rechte selbst nicht eine 
Ironie werden sollen! Ich habe noch vergessen, daß nebenher jeder junge Bursche lernen 
soll, sich einen schlichteren Tisch oder eine Bank zu zimmern, und daß auch hiefür auf 
eine Einrichtung zu denken ist!“150 
 
Salander’s proposal is, of course, impracticable. Marie Salander quickly bursts her 
husband’s bubble by darkly quipping that the law would prove very costly—since the state 
would need to raise a considerable amount of money to wage wars to capture the slaves to 
work Switzerland’s farms in these boys’ absence. But Salander’s dream of compulsory 
civic education, along the lines of what an older American reader might recognize as 
"civics class,” is nonetheless a crucial moment in Keller’s work because it reverses the 
relationship between ethics and politics that orients his writing until then. By contrast, in 
Keller’s 1856 novella from the first Seldwyla cycle, “Frau Regel Amrain und ihr Jüngster,” 
Fritz, the eponymous youngster, enters into provincial politics as one to a lengthy process 
of socialization that involves affirming his gender identity, discovering and tempering his 
sexual desire, entering the military and learning to control his patriotic ardor, learning to 
run a business, and finally marrying and fathering a child of his own. Politics is the final 
step in this process, a time that comes in a man’s life, described by the narrator as a kind 
of civic puberty: “Denn die Zeit war nun da, wo Fritz, der Sohn, anfing zu politisiern und 
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damit mehr als durch Andere in die Gemeinschaft seiner Mitbürger gezogen wurde.”151 
Several lines down the page, Keller brings the point home: “Heute kann man sagen, sei 
einer so tapfer und… als er wolle, wenn er nicht vermag freisinnig zu sein, so is er kein 
ganzer Mann.” Politics is simply one part of this completeness, this entirety; it is important 
not because of what it achieves—though Fritz does succeed in keeping the Seldwylers from 
fleecing their rural neighbors—but as a means of taking the final step out of interiority of 
the self and the familial home, and into outside world, where happiness dwells.  
 This theme is frequently echoed in Martin Salander, which contains numerous 
passages praising politics as a sustained engagement with the procedures, limitations and 
possibilities of the outside world, salubrious to inward, dream-prone natures like that of its 
protagonist. After one morning at the Geheimrat, Keller’s hero marvels at how invigorating 
it is to follow the debate of learned men:  “In sich gekehrt, mit einem Gefühle von 
Zufriedenheit wie Einer, der den langen Morgen hindurch gearbeitet hat, schritt er dahin, 
obleich er keine Hand gerührt und kein Wort gesprochen. Lediglich die ununterbrochene 
Aufmerksamkeit, welche er während fünf Stunden den Verhandlungen gewidmet, gab ihm 
das Bewußtsein getaner Arbeit.”152 In Salander’s eyes, politics is itself a good, its 
achievements secondary. But it may be noted that these observations are inflected by the 
optimism of its protagonist, whose rosy view of the political process does not always track 
with the grimmer realities of governance. Enlightening though the practice of politics may 
be, however, the novel repeatedly shows that a seat on the Geheimrat cannot fundamentally 
improve a man’s character. Salander’s hopes for his future sons-in-law, for example, the 
frivolous Weidelich twins, are quickly dashed when he sees that rather than follow the 
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debate, the two frequently leave assembly early to go hunting. For politics to bring about 
an effective change in a person’s disposition, he must already possess the curiosity and 
capability for practical affairs, the belief in the common good, the active, self-sufficient 
disposition Schmidt and Freytag hoped the Realist novel would husband in its readers. 
Salander’s own career in politics is launched by the resignation of his friend Kleinpeter, 
whose avaricious wife and spendthrift sons demand that he misappropriate public funds to 
pay off their debts; to thwart them, Kleinpeter gives up his seat. “Niemand würde geglaubt 
haben, daß ein Mensch, welcher im eigenen Hause so elend dastand, das Wohl des Landes 
beraten und fremde Leute zu regieren sich unterstehen könnte,” Kleinpeter complains to 
Salander. Salander’s plea for universal civic education affirms Kleinpeter’s complaint: in 
order to advise the country on how best to run itself, a man must first have his own house 
in order; and it is to that end that pedagogy and self-cultivation are needed. In this sense, 
Martin Salander reverses the relationship between politics and ethics in Keller’s earlier 
work. In a republic, in which the government and the people are one, the government of 
the self is a preparation for the government of others. The individual does not take up 
politics because of its effects on his spirit, rather, he attends to his spirit knowing that a day 
will come when it will fall to him to lend a hand in ruling his nation.  
The scholar Michael Feldt rightly argues, then, that Martin Salander shifts the focus 
that Keller’s earlier work placed on Bildung, a self-directed cultivation of the self rooted 
in the arts, the humanities, religion, and nature, to an institutionally structured, 
pedagogically guided Edukation, “[eine] von außen gelenkte Edukation, die nicht 
segregativ, sondern integrativ orientiert ist. Dabei tritt ein besonderer Aspekt hervor; das 
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ex ducere, das Herausführen bzw. das Herausgehen anstelle der Einbildung.“153  In his 
article “Die andere Bildung,” Feldt argues that Martin Salander can be read as Keller’s 
attempt to dramatize a resolution to the dualism posited by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his 
“Königsberger und Litauischer Schulplan,” in which Humboldt conceives of two parallel 
educations, one for the public self, and one for the private self, one with an eye towards 
training oneself for a future a career and acquiring those skills that would be useful for the 
common good, the other a “freie,  selbständige Allgemeinbildung”, a free, open, self-
determined general educaiton on the other.154 Feldt reads the figure of Salander as Keller’s 
answer to the notion of the politically withdrawn, self-cultivated Bürger, with this latter 
term understood here in its narrow sense of a member of the propertied classes. Instead, 
Salander is struck in the mold of the citoyen, or the Staatsmann, whose social position 
brings with it the privilege and the responsibility of participating in public life: “Das 
Figurenbild des Staatsbürgers war im Umkreis der Französischen Revolution, in die Bürger 
Aufgaben und Dienste im Gemeinwesen durch Selbstentscheid übernahmen, neu lebendig 
geworden und hat sich unter dem Begriff des „Citoyen“ als Gegenbegriff zu dem des 
„Bourgeois“ formiert.“155 Edukation, then, is the process of cultivating citoyens and 
Staatmänner; as a common good it necessarily takes place between people, often within an 
institutional structure. And because it is intended to draw its subjects into a place in the 
outside world, the values that inculcates are very much the same as those praised by Julian 
Schmidt—above all, a sense of daring, a courage for enterprise, the confidence to leave the 
terra firma of the self and to venture out into the untested waters of the world. Feldt 
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concludes by drawing a connection between Salander’s civic virtue, and the doggedness 
with which he pursues his fortune in Brazil despite suffering from fever and being robbed 
of his possessions. The tirelessness with which Keller’s protagonist conceives and executes 
projects for the betterment of the Swiss people, the courage, fearlessness, and 
determination with which he pursues his fortunes in a lawless, uncultivated place like 
Brazil are, according to Feldt, Keller’s way of transposing Kant’s famous dictum of 
Enlightenment: Saper aude, or, Dare to know!, into a realm of action that seeks to enrich 
the well-being of the public.156 
 As the next section will show, I do not share Feldt’s largely uncritical perspective 
of Martin Salander as a protagonist; nor does Feldt account for the fact that Salander’s 
“Lehrhaftigkeit,” his refusal to set down the mantle of teacher and instructor in even the 
most inappropriate situations, is repeatedly deflated through the book. What I wish to add 
to Feldt’s reading is a closer consideration of the relationship between the novel’s social 
Realism, its careful anchoring of its plot, its central conflicts, and the biographies of its 
protagonists in the recognizable world of the Gründerzeit, its panorama of an industrialized 
Switzerland awash with capital, populated by white collar criminals, corrupt politicians, 
and riven with political strife, and the question of what role art might play in the Edukation 
described by Feldt, a collective process of learning by which individuals become virtuous 
citizens, and by means of which the nation itself emerges as a subject of cultivation and 
improvement. That much can be seen in the teacherly eye with which Salander regards his 
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countrymen in the passage above; not like the narrator of the Seldwyla novellas, who takes 
the Seldwylers as they are, but rather as a group of misbehaving children who must be 
somehow taught to recognize and to exercise the remarkable responsibility and privilege 
that they have seized for themselves with the ratification of the constitution. Salander 
returns from the walk feeling depressed, dispirited, and murky, and more determined than 
ever to change them.157 The novel’s central question remains the one that devils him 
throughout the book: what can be done to turn the purely political connection between 
citizens into a real and legitimate bond for which each person feels responsible, and what 
role does art, as a representation of the world shared in common by these citizens, play? 
  
3. “Jeder Mensch hat einen Ölgötzen…”: The Failures of Pedagogy  
  
 Martin Salander would seem, then, to indicate that, after decades of public life the 
commitment to radical democracy and political pedagogy that Lukács sees as the rote 
Faden running through his work only deepened—that, in choosing a Zeitroman as the form 
for his last work, Keller hoped to consider not only the social consequences of different 
modes of comportment towards the world and towards the self, but also to ask how, given 
the dire state of the Swiss republic, character can be better molded to serve it. The particular 
interpretative problem posed by Martin Salander is that, in his novel of political pedagogy, 
the novel does not contain a single example of successful instruction or education, of 
character successfully shaped by an institution, course of study, or even friendly counsel. 
Rather, many of the narrative strands around the protagonist, his wife, and his son end in 
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dashed hopes and ruined lives. Just as Der grüne Heinrich is a Bildungsroman in which no 
Bildung takes place, so too is Martin Salander a novel of civic education that considers, 
instance by instance, the failures and limitations of political education.  
 The first and most substantial failure of Martin Salander’s civic ideal is its 
insufficient attentiveness to the material reality on which the enterprise, full realized, would 
rest. Throughout the novel, the chief mouthpiece of this critique is Salander’s level-headed, 
long-suffering wife, Marie. Like Judith, Marie serves as a skeptical, often darkly comic foil 
to Salander’s overheated patriotism and over-ambitious planmaking. The reader first 
encounters her as a Penelope awaiting the return of her Odysseus from Brazil; during her 
husband’s absence, Marie has become the proprietress of a Gastwirtschaft frequented by 
well-off customers lazy about settling their bill. After watching gluttonous customers 
snatch away the dinner she has hidden away for her starving children, she gives expression 
to her feelings about the thankless toil she must perform every day in a fairy tale she tells 
her children to distract them from their hunger pangs. Marie’s Märchen tells the tale of a 
race of little Erdmänner and Erdweiber who stage enormous feasts in the banquet hall of 
their mountain home, where they eat rice pudding with raisins, bratwurst, skylark and pork, 
and drink Muscat wine from fresh peaches, surrounded with gold and jewels. Who cleans 
up after this feast? In Marie’s telling, “Ein einziges lediges Weiblein, das allerjüngste von 
etwa zweihundert Jahren… ist noch da geblieben, 
Es hat die Pflicht, das ganze Geschirr zu reinigen, trocken zu reiben, und in eine eiserne 
Truhe zu verschließen, die sie an der Stelle, wo der Regenbogen stand, in den Boden 
vergräbt. Hierbei helfen ihr die zehn Ritter, die mittlerweile draußen noch zurückgeblieben 
sind und ihre Pfirsischbowlen ausgeschlafen haben... Was tut aber nun das letzte Weiblein? 
Es nimmt das Säcklein, worin sein eigenes Goldschüsselchen gewesen, auf den Rücken, 
einen Stecken zur Hand, and und wandert seelenallein in die Ferne...158 
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Marie’s fairy-tale brings to light a very different kind of labor than that championed by the 
liberal Zeitroman. Proper patriotic labor—the “Arbeit” to which Schmidt enjoins the 
German nation to take up so that they can earn their freedom—has, of course, two distinct 
characteristics: it is industrial and it is male. The protagonist of Soll und Haben, Anton 
Wollfahrt delivers a paean to the German’s superiority over the Slav by sketching in 
sweeping poetic terms the network of industry, labor, credit and debit that suborns the latter 
to the former: “Wir bauen die Maschinen, wodurch sie ihre Spiritusfässer füllen,” he 
exclaims. “Auf deutschem Kredit und deutschem Vertrauen beruht die Geltung, wleche 
ihre Pfandbriefe und ihre Güter bis jetzt gehabt haben.”159 What is here described is the 
“Aufschwung des Handels” celebrated by Schmidt as the cradle of das Wirkliche in the 
modern novel. Like the forces of liberalism to which the Zeitroman gives aesthetic 
expression, industrial labor is turned towards the future, clearing away out-dated traditions, 
uniting regions all over the globe towards a common purpose, always growing, 
multiplying—at least from the perspective of the capitalist, if not the laborer. In Martin 
Salander, by contrast, the details of Martin Salander’s enterprise and endeavors in Brazil 
are hardly mentioned. Over the broad, macro-economic sense of Wirtschaft—the outlay of 
capital, the extraction of surplus value—Keller valorizes the distinctly female work of the 
household, the labor that produces no value, but without which no life could subsist. It is 
in the household and not at the desk of the loan officer or the factory manager that the 
intimate bonds that produce national feeling are forged —the bonds that provide that sense 
of place and home that the nation claims to substantiate in its parliament, its laws, its flags, 
its holidays. Fifty years before Brecht’s “Fragen eines lesenden Arbeiters”--“Cäser schlug 
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die Gallier / Hatte er nicht wenigstens einen Koch bei sich?”—Marie asks who will sweep 
the floor and dust the chalkboard in Salander’s civic school: “Wer soll denn den ärmeren 
Bauern die Feldarbeit verrichten helfen, wer die Jünglinge ernähren? Oder wollt Ihr diese 
besolden, bis sie zwanzig Jahre alt sind und dann Alles verstehen, nur nicht zu arbeiten, 
den gezimmerten Tisch und die Bank ausgenommen?”160 
 This disparity in the representation of labor in the anti-aristocratic, nationalist 
Realist novel is accompanied by another disparity, hinted at by the note of unfulfilled desire 
struck by the end of Marie’s fairy-tale ends—the uneven division of affective labor in the 
Salander marriage. In her book Gottfried Keller: Frauenbild und Frauengestalten, Caroline 
von Loewenich points out the extent to which Salander’s political and financial enterprises 
demand his wife’s renunciation not only of her material security, but of the opportunity to 
give expression to her own emotional life. When, during a walk through the forest, Marie 
gently rebuffs Salander’s annoyance at the fact that his children are ignorant of the names 
of trees and birds by pointing out that they are no less lovely for being unknown. Salander 
retorts by calling her a “Jesuitin, Verkünderin der “Mysterien”; she is an enemy of 
“Kennenlernen,” her way is too “gefühlsmäßig.”161 As Loewenich writes, “Salander sorgt 
immer dafür, dass seine Frau zu einem Verhalten findet, in dem ihre Gefühle 
ausgeschlossen bleiben, und das den gesellschafltichen Regeln entspricht. “Ihm selbst soll 
dies ermöglichen, sich dem unkontrollierten Bereich ‘Gefühl’ zu entziehen und Distanz zu 
wahren.”162 The emotion with which Salander sketches pedagogical plans for the children 
and for Switzerland is held back from his wife, while, apart from her rueful fairytale Marie 
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has no such realm into which to project her desires, excluded as she is from the realm of 
politics. The same dynamic, in which Marie serves to remind Salander of those who his 
high-flown plans would harm, inheres in all of the novel’s major episodes, from his sojourn 
to Brazil, to his encouragement of his daughters’ marriage to the Weidelich twins, his hopes 
of reuniting Switzerland’s two political parties at his daughters’ wedding, and his 
infatuation with Myrrha Glawicz. In each of these, Salander’s optimism lifts him into the 
realm of the ideal—understandable in a man who crossed the Atlantic Ocean to seek his 
fortune in a foreign land—while it falls to Marie to bring him back to earth, by reminding 
him of the labor, both material and emotional, that his fantasies exact, until, at the novel’s 
end, he finally submits wholly to his wife’s superior emotional wisdom and the story ends. 
 Marie is not the only voice in the novel reminding the reader of the cost, the labor, 
the difficulty, and the ultimate limits of civic pedagogy. These, too, are the themes of the 
novel’s climactic setpiece, the trial of Isidor and Julian for corruption and the 
misappropriation of funds. The trial of the two boys serves a crucial thematic function; 
since the twins are never portrayed as anything less than lazy, greedy brutes, and since their 
guilt is established from the very beginning, there is little suspense for the reader as to the 
outcome. Since the guilt of the young men is established in advance, it is not Isidor and 
Julian but education itself that is put on trial in the speeches of the prosecution and the 
defense: in the trial’s opening statements, Isidor and Julian’s defender argues that his 
clients’ failures, and all of the failures of Switzerland, can be blamed “an die 
beklagenswerte Mangelhaftigkeit des öffentlichen Unterrichts, der Volkserziehung, der 
alles Unglück beizumessen sei.”163 To this argument in bad faith, the prosecutor issues a 
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full-throated defense of the measures taken by the Swiss government to insure the civic 
virtue of its people: “Viele Millionen haben wir in fünfzig Jahren dafür geopfert,” he insists  
seit Jahrzehnten rühmen wir uns, daß die Ausgaben für unser Unterrichtswesen den 
obersten Posten in der Staatsrechnung bilden!... Und zur Erziehung des Volkens werden 
täglich neue Anforderungen gestellt, und alle werden erwogen und dass irgend Mögliche 
berücksichtigt, wenn es nicht geradezu verkehrt ist!164 
 
Though the prosecutor’s full-throated endorsement of education is launched at Isidor and 
Julian, it is, in effect, a belated rejoinder to Salander’s high-flown plans. Simply, education 
is not a method or a practice, fixed and unchanging, by means of which a population is 
transformed into a national citizenry. As a population grows in size, as the conditions, 
needs, and wants of the individuals who comprise it become more and more varied, the 
ability of a government to mold a nation’s character weakens proportionally; an adequate 
educational system is itself an institution that, like railroads, factories, and laws, must be 
created by compromise, that must be constantly revised and reconsidered. The prosecutor’s 
picture of the vast sums of money budgeted for education suggests just how unwieldy such 
an undertaking would have been, and just how different the problem of education stood for 
a Switzerland approaching the twentieth century and the age of 
mass democracy than it did for the Switzerland of the 1830s, when the Lehrseminar was 
established. No institution (the prosecutor) no matter how well-designed, can guarantee the 
civic virtue of nearly three million people. 
 But even if such an institution did exist, the transparent falsity of the defender’s 
argument, which, as the narrator notes with disgust, elicits smug grins from Isidor and 
Julian, throws light on the cracks in Salander’s individual and state, and the responsibility 
of the latter for the moral character of its citizenry. In effect, the public defender’s argument 
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only echoes Salander’s chagrin at the debased character of his fellow citizens as he strolls 
through Münsterburg in the passage with which I opened this chapter. Salander, too, places 
the blame for his nation’s condition on the cursory, superficial character of the classes in 
Verfassungskunde. In Salander’s dream, the state mints citizens like coins: institutions are 
constructed so as to be bred with a love of civic virtue, then, as adults, will devote 
themselves to statecraft, ideally after distinguishing themselves in some private, though 
publicly useful, career. And yet, as the narrator’s disgust for Isidor and Julian’s shirking of 
their own accountability makes abundantly clear, the conscience—as well as the court, as 
its institutional representative—revolts at the suggestion that it is the state, or the times, 
and not the individual who is responsible for his own misdeeds. National feeling, moral 
guidance, Lebensgefühl and Selbstmuth—the self-confidence and courage that necessary 
for all ambitious civic enterprise—cannot be publicly taught precisely because they are 
individual, they grow in the soil of trial, reflection, and experience, and cannot be written 
on a blackboard; it follows, conversely, that the state cannot be blamed for their absence. 
Isidor and Julian’s quick attainment of outward success spared them these experiences, and 
indeed, even after the trial, both remained unchanged by the civic discipline that has been 
handed down to them. One brother escapes across the Atlantic, while another complains 
about the quality of his accommodations in jail. The Salander sisters correctly observe that 
the brothers have no soul—no inner life that can grow and be cultivated into maturity, 
whether personal or civic. 
Where, then, does Volkserziehung take place, if not in school? The answer, 
according to the prosecutor, is the family home: “Denn ich glaube, das Haus des 
ungelehrten Landmannes kann noch heute, wie zu allen Zeiten, eine Schule der Ehrlichkeit 
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und Pflichttreue sein!”165 If all people are truly equal, and if all institutions are only the 
representative of the people themselves, then it follows that the peasant learns the virtues 
of honesty and fidelity to duty, those traits of character that allow the citizen to face up to 
consequences of that which he endeavors with his feeling for life and self-confidence—as 
much at home as he does in school. And yet, the family evinces no more success in 
inculcating civic virtue into the hearts of its citizens than does the school—least of all the 
Weidelich family, which is hardly the picture of a “Schule der Ehrlichkeit und 
Pflichttreue.” Rather, in Keller’s telling, Isidor and Julian’s corruption is the consequence 
of their mother’s taste for luxury and her desire for social status. To be sure, the narrator 
takes pains to distinguish Amalia Weidelich’s earnest desire for advancement from the 
corruption and indolence of her sons; she is the hard-working proprietress of a successful 
laundry, and is sincerely overjoyed by her connection to the upwardly mobile Salanders. 
Nonetheless, the boys are encouraged and supported in all of their disastrous decisions—
to start a career in politics, to marry the Salander daughters—by their mother, who spies 
an opportunity for advancement in both cases. And while, like the prosecutor, Keller 
hesitates to place the blame for the children’s behavior at the feet of their parents—indeed, 
Marie Salander scoffs when their father worries that the family’s troubles are all due to a 
thieving great-grandparent whose genes have been passed down—the family’s story is 
nonetheless, as Christa Grimm observes in her essay “Zwischen Illusion und Ideal,” a tragic 
one by Keller: the sins of one generation are paid for by the next. This tragic theme is 
brought home by the two details by which Amalia Weidelich is characterized at the novel’s 
start: the incongruously luxurious hat, which she wears over her smock, and which, at the 
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novel’s end, is swept into the river; and her mastery of the social indicators of speech, 
which is taken away from her when she suffers a stroke upon learning her sons’ fate and is 
rendered catatonic. “Die neue Sprachwelt soll den Übergang in die neue Sozialwelt 
unterstützen; dass die spätere Erfolglosigkeit das konstruierte Bewusstsein und damit die 
Sprache beschädigt, lässt Keller deutlich werden… was sie früher als Stärke auslegte, ist 
ihr abhanden gekommen.”166 Far from being a school of “Ehrlichkeit,” the Weidelich 
family’s upward aspirations are indeed, compounded as failures, in the egocentrism, 
mendacity, greed, and carelessness of the next generation. 
 What Martin Salander depicts is not the family’s legitimacy as a pedagogical tool, 
but rather the crisis of political paternity described by Reinhart Koselleck in his 
Begriffsgeschichten. In his entry for “Patriotismus,” Koselleck describes this crisis of 
republican fatherhood as a double bind: 
 […] Der Patriot, der in der Gewißheit seiner Vaterlandsliebe handelt, tritt in Konkurrenz 
zu dem <<Vater>> dieses Landes, dem pater patriae, dem Landesherrn. [..] Nicht mehr der 
Monarch ist, wie bisher der Wohltäter; aus der patriotischen Perspektive ist ein solcher 
Wohltäter Despot. Das Vaterland wird gleichsam entvatert. Statt dessen tritt es als ein 
neues, kollektives Handlungssubjekt auf, das Vaterland wird selbst zum gemeinen 
Wohltäter, im Klartext: zur Republik.167 
 
For Koselleck, the figure of the father as Wohltäter, who provides for his children both 
materially, spiritually, and civically exists only in a society in which both power and 
property are transferred from father to son. The father is a benevolent dictator, and vice 
versa—one might think here of such self-styled German fathers as Carl-Eugen of 
Württemburg, or Kaiser Wilhelm I. But, Koselleck continues, in the familial imaginary of 
the republic the collective subjectivity of the nation itself is father; the biological father 
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merely stand-in. (By way of illustrative example, we might consider here the scene 
described by Rousseau in the “Letter to D’Alambert on the Theatre” in which his father 
points to a celebrating regiment from St. Gervais and enjoins his son to love his country: “ 
‘Jean-Jacques,’ he said to me, ‘love your country. Do you see these good Genevans? They 
are all friends, they are all brothers… You are a Genevan; one day you will see other 
peoples, but even if you should travel as much as your father, you will not find their 
likes.”168) The total power that the father wields within the private space of his home is 
directly at odds with the view of a republic that every individual is free to dispose of his 
own destiny; that, to properly exercise one’s civic virtue, one must be the sole author of 
one’s thoughts, deeds and wants. As a republican father concerned with his family’s civic 
virtue, Martin Salander consequently finds himself doing either too much or too little. 
When he wishes to do good for his family, his idealism is not without its tyrannical side, 
as when he strikes upon the idea of turning his daughter’s wedding into a pretext for 
reuniting Switzerland’s two warring civil parties. This decision, which is made without the 
consultation of his wife or his daughters, leaves the daughters “im düsteren Sinn… ihre 
Augen waren sogar voll Wasser.”169 By the same token, Salander’s adventures render him 
absent for his children’s entire adolescence, leaving his family not only “entvatert” but 
destitute. Caroline von Loewenich rightly notes that the poverty into which his family is 
thrown effectively neutralizes his patriotic preaching by creating a deficit of pleasure and 
fulfillment in the Salander home, sending the Salander daughters into the arms of the 
flamboyant, decidedly unpatriotic Weidelichs: “Das schmerzliche Gefühl des Defizits, das 
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diese Isolation bei ihnen weckt, scheinen sie kompensieren zu wollen, wenn sie Ehemänner 
wählen, die sich die neue Wertigkeit zueigen gemacht haben, und damit ihre eigene 
gesellschaftliche Einbindung, und die ihrer Frauen, zu guarantieren scheinen.”170 Far from 
serving as an effective pedagogical environment, in Martin Salander parents’ deficiencies 
are not corrected in children, but only compounded. It is no accident that, at least in the 
narrative space of the novel, none of the children in Martin Salander express a desire to 
have children of their own.  
 Is Martin Salander then a novel of liberal democratic disappointment? Certainly 
the time of its publication, 1886, two years before Keller’s death was a time that hardly 
shared the eponymous character’s buoyant optimism. The boom of the fifties had ended in 
a worldwide depression. Schmidt and Freytag observed the Austro-Prussian and Franco-
Prussian wars with dismay, and later evinced disgust at the martial, materialistic German 
nation that came into existence in 1871, ruled not by the capable, diligent bourgeois but by 
the Prussian aristocracy; while the optimistic depiction of capitalism and democracy in Soll 
und Haben gave way to the grimmer depictions of industry’s victims in the naturalist novel. 
Keller, too, writes in an age when the claims of idealism, writ large and writ small, seem 
to have been voided. What distinguishes his novel, however, is the absence of idealism’s 
opposite—reality. Idealist though he is, Martin Salander has an excellent grasp of his 
world’s realities; he is, by any measure of Swiss life, a success—a wealthy businessman, 
politician and father. Martin Salander does not stage a conflict between the world as it 
ought to be and the world as it is, between personal authenticity and social demands, so 
much as it explores question of how one must comport oneself towards that reality.  
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 Nowhere is this clearer than in the slippery figure of Salander’s antagonist and life-
long friend, the confidence man Louis Wohlwend. At first glance, Wohlwend is the illness 
of Swiss society seen by Salander during his stroll through Münsterburg, or that he gleans 
at a barbershop, when a fellow customer observes that, during his shave, he saw four men 
walk by who have a relative in prison. (He might have seen more, he supposes, were it not 
for the position of the chair.) Wohlwend, we learn, is one of those Swiss whose desire to 
be perceived as an ardent patriot and lover of art causes him to sing patriotic songs out of 
tune and to recite Schiller poems on the wrong syllable. This combination of tone-deaf 
inattentiveness and over-eager shortsightedness cause him to borrow irresponsibly; when 
he is ruined, however, as his name suggests, he turns the situation to his advantage and 
simply takes on another guise, with no regard for the ruined lives and fortunes he leaves in 
his wake. Throughout the novel, Wohlwend takes on a wide variety of personae—patriot, 
lover of nature, teacher, international banker, and religious zealot. This fluidity of identities 
is only the natural consequence of the split between Schein and Sein I examined in the 
previous chapter on Die Leute von Seldwyla; indeed, Wohlwend finds good company 
among the other grifters in Keller’s novella cycle, like John Kabys and Viggi Störtler—
men restless in their provincial identities who take advantage of the changing times to try 
on new ones. Judith’s rueful observation, following Heinrich’s falling out with his painting 
teacher Römer, that they live in an age when men kill one another with words and paper 
instead of with daggers might be directed at the shyster Wohlwend, whose mastery of 
banking procedure allows him to rob Salander of his livelihood repeatedly without ever 
speaking an ill word against him. 
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 And yet, Wohlwend is not simply the novel’s villain. As each character in the novel 
observes, Wohlwend and Salander are united by an inexplicable bond that fuses one to the 
other even as their respective paths lead them all over the world. Wohlwend’s confidence 
schemes are not of the sort that mask his identity, like that of the three card monte dealer 
who changes locations when he has been discovered. Instead, Wohlwend’s repeated 
fleecing of Salander depends on the deep affinity and lifelong friendship between the two 
men. Like Salander, Wohlwend is a social climber from a provincial agrarian family. Both 
men attend the Lehrseminar, where they meet, both are ardent patriots, both try their hands 
at business, and when both men’s fortunes are ruined—Salander’s as a result of 
Wohlwend’s—they try their luck abroad. Having made his fortune in Brazil, Salander 
wires his savings to Switzerland via the dubious Atlantische Uferbank, only to discover 
that Louis Wohlwend is partner in the operation and his fortune is lost again. (He might 
have guessed Wohlwend’s involvement from the fact that the name of other partner, 
Schadenmüller, is the perfect inverse of his swindler’s.)  Shaken and pale as he realizes he 
has been scammed again, Salander finally realizes the obvious: “Es scheint, daß jeder 
Mensch einen Ölgötzen hat, der allerorts wieder dasteht und ihm entgegenglotzt.” 
Wohlwend is trickster and confidence man, but he is also Salander’s Doppelgänger, his 
shadow self, his William Wilson. That double extends beyond the coincidences that draw 
the two together into their very modes of comporting themselves towards the world. When 
Salander is expounding the salubrious and instructive character of nature to his family, he 
is shocked when the path turns and he discovers Louis Wohlwend, ankle deep in a stream 
where he is fishing for crabs, praising nature in precisely the same terms. Wohlwend 
complains that, because Salander has ruined his reputation, he cannot do business or show 
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his face around Münsterburg; he calls himself a victim of Verkehr, of the Kampf ums 
Dasein—a turn of phrase by means of which the structural inequalities of capitalism are 
explained as a natural condition—and longs, like Salander, for something beyond it: “Wo 
sollte ich am heutigen Tage mich hinflüchten, als an den Busen der Mutter Natur? [...] Du 
weißt, Freund Martin, daß ich von jeher einem edeln Idealismus gehuldigt; der kommt mir 
nun zu Gut und läßt mich an so idyllischen Gegenständen Trost suchen, wie sie sich hier 
darbieten!”171 Wohlwend, like Salander, is an optimist—he prefers to see what might be 
rather than what is, and it is precisely that, like Salander, allows him to slip off one identity 
and put on another, and consistently to escape ruin and turn it to his good fortune.  
 It is precisely this longing for something more, something different, something 
unseen, something ideal—whether the total trusting friendship that he uses to convince 
Salander to undersign his loan, or the unheard-of return on investment he promises his 
customers at the Atlantische Ufer bank—that is the lure in Wohlwend’s confidence 
schemes, just as it is the motive mechanism for all of Salander’s plans for Switzerland’s 
betterment. The two finally perfectly mirror one another when Wohlwend resurfaces after 
Salander’s second return in the guise of a priest soliciting funds for a Gottestaat der 
Neuzeit. Wohlwend’s plan “sich dem Vaterlande noch nützlich [zu] machen,”172 is to 
submit the Swiss government and its courts to a religious authority, a synod that would 
preside over all major legislative and judicial decisions. As befits a tolerant republic, the 
specific theological doctrine of this religious authority is immaterial: “Seiner weitgehenden 
Duldsamkeit sei es rein gleichgültig, welcher Gottesbegriff zu Grunde gelegt werde, ob der 
persönlich überweltliche oder der allsächlich innerweltliche, der dreieinige oder der 
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unbedingt einfachste, ihm komme es nur auf die Idealität des Gedankens an.” Like 
Salander’s civic education, Wohlwend’s Gottestaat hopes to place the mundane, everyday 
business of politics under the aegis of a higher authority, an ideal. And in Keller’s eyes, 
the two plans are equally insubstantial. Both are dreams not of the man of affairs, but of 
the schoolchild, speaking in high-flown words he hardly understands. “Sobald er 
[Wohlwend] sein Wort von dem ewigen Idealism ausgestoßen habe, auf dem Boden seines 
Schulsackes angelangt und dieser kleiner sei, als derjenige frisch konfirmierter Kinder. 
Und seine ehemalige Schulmethode, Anderen erst abzufragen, was er mit Vorteil sagen 
könne, ließ ihn jetzt ganz im Stich.”173 It is only by inflating their activities and their 
ambitions, by speaking them in iambs, as Salander accuses Wohlwend of doing, that both 
men can overcome the nagging insufficiency at the heart of their respective lives and of the 
age, the sense that something is lacking, that what one has is never enough. 
Keller never entirely lets on whether Wohlwend is aware of the crookedness of his 
own schemes; like Salander, he is a true believer, blind to those his schemes invariably 
harm. And he is able to repeatedly fleece Salander by forcing his friend to choose between 
his money and the optimism that girds his very existence, knowing full well that Salander 
must give up the former because he cannot give up the latter. Martin Salander cannot be 
called a novel of disillusionment because Wohlwend’s Wirtschaftskriminalität is not so 
much a rude check on Salander’s civic idealism so much as it is its inverse. To be sure, as 
the novel’s protagonist, Salander possesses virtues that Wohwend, its villain, entirely lacks. 
Unlike his friend, Salander is a capable businessman, a sincere patriot, a true appreciator 
of art; he has a rewarding family life and displays charity again and again towards friends 
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and acquaintances. And yet, Wohlwend and Salander are inseparably linked because both 
see the world through the idealizing eyes of the poetic Realist. Neither man can be satisfied 
with the world as it is, with what they have, or with who they are. Having come of age in 
a time of flux and change, a time of ideals, both men are unable to distinguish their personal 
wants from the higher purpose they claim to be seeking. And it is precisely the no longer 
political, now ethical question of how these wants, these desires can be trained, controlled, 
and curbed that the novel devotes its pedagogical attention. 
 
4. “Ein öffentliches Schauspiel”:  Festspiel as Artistic Ideal and Critique of Art 
  
 In summary, Martin Salander offers two, seemingly contradictory analyses of the 
political situation of Switzerland in Keller’s time. On the one hand, Keller’s novel depicts 
the Gründerzeit as a time in which republican self-rule has been achieved by the Swiss 
people, albeit at the cost of their civic spirit. The sense of national feeling and duty among 
the Swiss has deteriorated to the point that the only way to save the nation from the idleness 
and corruption to which it has fallen is to somehow mold the people’s character, to make 
them recognize the privilege of being able to participate in government as free and 
autonomous citizens. On the other hand, as I have demonstrated in the last section, Keller’s 
novel dramatizes the failure of one form of pedagogy, one form of instruction, after 
another. Given this skeptical treatment of education, what, role, then does Keller envision 
for the artistic representation of reality in his nation’s present situation? How ought the 
world be depicted to cultivate the sense of national connection and common purpose so 
little in evidence in the Switzerland of Martin Salander? The likeliest answer, I will argue, 
is to be found first in a consideration of the national celebration, or the Festspiel, a motif 
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that recurs throughout Keller’s work as an attempt to envision an art that might be a vehicle 
of political engagement for its viewers as well as its creators; and second in the figure of 
Friedrich Schiller, the author who recurs in Keller’s novel as the political poet par 
excellence.  
In his essay, “Performing Swiss Heimat,” Richard Ruppel describes the Fest- or 
Feierspiel as a civic festival celebrating a public or historical holiday, used by the liberal 
Swiss government of the 1830s  to produce a sense of national unity in a country that was 
as yet a patchwork of people, languages, and cultural histories. “Eine gemeinsame Herkunft 
mußte erst noch erzeugt werden, die noch stärker war als die individuelle kulturelle 
Herkunft der vier Sprachgruppen,” writes Ruppel. Das Bundesfeierspiel wurde von den 
Schweizer Behörden als ein Mittel betrachtet, wodurch die Bundesregierung die 
Traditionen einer gemeinsamen Herkunft erzeugen und dadurch diese ersehnte politische 
Einheit in einem Vielvölkerstaat fördern könnte.”174 In the second version of Der grüne 
Heinrich, Keller’s protagonist vividly recalls one such celebration as among the happiest 
days of his childhood, devoting multiple chapters to the description of all the day’s 
events—a striking and suggestive choice, given that politics plays a considerably smaller 
role in Keller’s Bildungsroman than it does in Martin Salander, a point I will return to 
shortly. For Heinrich, the day-long performance is the setting of his first and most ardent 
patriotic feelings, his first kiss with his cousin Anna, his first glimpse into Swiss politics, 
and his first sexual encounter with the widow Judith. The choice of play, Schiller’s Wilhelm 
Tell, is, Ruppel argues, hardly accidental. Schiller’s late play of the struggle of the Swiss 
cantons against tyranny dramatizes a crucial scene from historical mythology, the oath on 
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the Rütli, when the leaders and luminaries of the individual cantons vowed to put aside 
their differences and unite against foreign tyranny. The remembering and repetition of this 
scene from the distant past is intended not only to entertain or to provide pleasure, but also 
to bind the emotions roused in the viewers by the novel’s protagonists to the Swiss nation 
itself, to dramatize the creation of a people to a people in the midst of self-creation. 
 In his own colorful recollections of the Tellfest, Heinrich finds the civic value of 
the Festspiel not in the content of the play but in the sense of common purpose that the 
performance of Tell engenders in the town. Heinrich recalls not an event orchestrated by 
the government or by the town elders, but put on by and for the townspeople: 
 
Weitaus der größere Teil der spielenden Schar sollte als Hirten, Bauern, Fischer, Jäger das 
Volk darstellen und in seiner Masse von Schauplatz zu Schauplatz ziehen, wo die 
Handlung vor sich ging, getragen durch solche, welche sich zu einem kühnen Auftreten für 
berufen hielten. In den Reihen des Volkes nahmen auch junge Mädchen teil, sich höchstens 
in den gemeinschaftlichen Gesängen äußernd, während die handelnden Frauenrollen 
Jünglingen übertragen waren. Der Schauplatz der eigentlichen Handlung war auf alle 
Ortschaften verteilt, je nach ihrer Eigentümlichkeit, so daß durch ein festliches Hin- und 
Herwogen der kostümierten Menge und der Zuschauermassen bedingt wurde.175 
 
Every townsperson has a role in the play, if not as an actor, then as a costumed extra. Some 
of the props are taken from the town’s cabinet of curiosities, no longer curios behind glass 
but once again living objects in the hands of the people. In its turn the action of the play is 
woven into the town’s daily life. The scenes are broken up and switched around, depending 
on the ease of access to the various settings; the townspeople break off to go about their 
business as needed—the actor playing Tell stops, for a moment, to see to the sale of one of 
his pigs. Schiller’s name is printed on the play’s title page, but it is the townspeople who 
that day become not only the audience and the performers, but the ostensible authors of the 
work as well, since the script is taken from a slightly bowdlerized version of Wilhelm Tell 
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used by the public school. “Das [Schul]buch  ist den Leuten sehr geläufig,” says Heinrich, 
in defense of this decision, “denn es drückt auf eine wunderbare Weise ihre Gesinnung und 
alles aus, was sie durchaus für wahr halten; wie denn selten ein Sterblicher es übel 
aufnehmen wird, wenn man ihn dichterisch ein wenig oder gar stark idealisiert.”176 The 
language itself, and the style of recitation, conforms not to that of the the meeting house, 
picking up the music of everyday speech: “Die Rolle wurden nicht theatralisch und mit 
Gebärdenspiel gesprochen, sondern mehr wie die Reden in einer Volksversammlung, laut, 
eintönig, und etwas singend, da es doch Verse waren.”177 In Heinrich’s lively, detail-rich 
narration the play leaps off the stage and out into life itself; art’s privileged position over 
life is overthrown, together with the tyrant Gessler.  
 The language with Heinrich describes his first taste of public art closely evokes 
another celebration of the folk festival, the “Letter to D’Alambert on the Theater in 
Geneva,” written by Keller’s countryman, Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1758 nearly a hundred 
years before the first version of Der grüne Heinrich. In his polemic against the theater, 
Rousseau praises this tumult, this breaking-through of the representational medium—the 
stage—as the folk festival’s defining characteristic, the crucial structural feature that 
qualifies it uniquely to invigorate the public’s civic feeling. “Let us not adopt these 
exclusive entertainments which close up a small number of people in melancholy fashion 
in a gloomy cavern,” Rousseau writes, “which give them only prisons, lances, soldiers, and 
afflicting messages of inequality to see […] It is the open air, under the sky, that you ought 
to gather and give yourselves to the sweet sentiment of your happiness.” 178 Here Rousseau 
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slyly interpolates an iconic image from another foundational text of civic pedagogy, Plato’s 
Republic. The cave of miserable, entrapped prisoners by means of which Socrates 
illustrates ignorance to Glaucon is, in Rousseau’s conception, only the forerunner of the 
modern theater. Since its viewers had no hand in conceiving or bringing to life what is on 
stage, the contents of the play are wholly illusory—the compact between the performers 
and the audience only another variety of self-imposed ignorance and inaction. The festival, 
by contrast, draws the audience into the clear light of day. By dispensing with theatrical 
effects entirely, it transforms observers into participants: 
But what then will be the objects of these entertainments? What will be shown in them? 
Nothing, if you please. With liberty, wherever abundance reigns, well-being also reigns. 
Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square; gather the people together 
there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment 
to themselves; make them actors themselves; do it so that each sees and loves himself in 
the others so that all will be better united.179 
 
Where the rest of Rousseau’s anti-theatrical pamphlet closely analyzes the workings of 
specific artworks—Crebillion, Voltaire, and Moliere, among others—the only positive 
example is a childhood memory very much like Heinrich’s. In a footnote, Rousseau 
describes not sitting in the audience of a play or standing before a painting, but rather his 
recollection of watching with his father the spontaneous celebration of an arriving regiment 
from St. Gervais. The event simply occurs of the people’s own volition; it has no 
prompting, no script, no versification, it is the work of no author, and it has no afterlife 
once it has ended. Though the “Letter” cannot be taken for the whole of Rousseau’s highly 
complex aesthetics, the text’s premise remains that, if the author’s desired effect is to 
promote civic virtue, than all of the tools in the dramatic toolbox, plot, versification, rising 
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action, climax, denouement, form and content, are ineffective. Drama depicts only depicts 
the passions, which are the enemies of civic virtue. As Rousseau observes,  
[…] A man without passions or who always mastered them could not attract anyone,” And 
it has already been observed that a Stoic in tragedy would be an insufferable figure. In 
comedy, he would at most cause laughter. 
 
Let no one then attribute to the theater the power to change sentiments or manners, which 
it can only follow and embellish. An author who would brave the general taste would soon 
write for himself alone. 
 
For Rousseau as for the young Heinrich, the joy that binds the community together comes 
not from any one aesthetic practice or another, but from the rejection of the authority of 
the artist, and of aesthetic mastery entirely. The townspeople come together to celebrate 
themselves by tearing up the aesthetic rule-book entirely. And so for the young Heinrich, 
as for the young Rousseau, the recollection of these joyful festivals will grow, in their adult 
lives, into a powerful, nagging ambivalence, never resolved, about the ultimate value not 
only of their own artistic attempts, but of the value of artistic endeavor itself. In Der grüne 
Heinrich, the Tellfest is less a programmatic celebration of the festival as legitimate public 
art than a crucial moment in the dramatic narrative representation of the development of 
Heinrich’s highly conflicted relationship with art. 
 Seen from this perspective, it is clear that what Heinrich cherishes in the figure of 
Schiller, to whom he returns again and again throughout the novel, is not the poetic force 
of his language, the dramatic impact of his works, or the thoughtful complexity of his 
aesthetic writings but in its adaptability to all levels of literacy and cultural understanding. 
It is precisely this aspect of Schiller’s work that Heinrich praises in his recollections of the 
circle of artisans and laborers organized by his father to perform and celebrate the poet’s 
works: 
Wenn sie auch Schiller auf die Höhen seiner philosophischen Arbeiten nicht folgen 
vermochten, so erbauten sie sich um so mehr an seinen geschichtlichen Werken, und von 
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diesem Standpunkte aus ergriffen sie auch seine Dichtungen, welche sie auf diese Weise 
ganz praktisch nachfühlten und genossen, ohne auf die künstlerische Rechenschaft, die 
jener Große sich selber gab, weiter eingehen zu können.180  
 
So powerful is Schiller’s connection with the community of German-speaking readers that 
any person can enter into it with his particular experience and knowledge—even the 
illiterate. Keller would return to this theme again in “Die große Schillerfest,” a poem 
inspired by the celebrations of Schiller’s hundredth birthday from Hamburg to Bern in 
1859, twenty-five years before Martin Salander, with none of the experience of public life 
that inspired his final novel. As Peter Uwe Hohendahl describes the event in his study 
Literarische Kultur im Zeitalter des Liberalismus, these festivals occasioned not only the 
publication of essays, poems, published lectures and addresses, such as the poem Keller 
wrote and read aloud at the proceedings in Bern—but also of all manner of Festspiele,  
ceremonies, processions, festivities in schools, universities, churches, and synagogues, 
which formed the background for the countless speeches in which the German 
bourgeoisie—and to some extent the working class—affirmed that, more than anyone else, 
Schiller had voiced the longings and aspirations of the German nation; that he could 
consequently regarded as their spiritual leader on the road to national unity.181  
 
The cause of national unity allowed for the age of liberal Realism to rehabilitate the Idealist 
Schiller; his abstract pleas for a universal humanity could now be grounded in the 
“actuality” of a nation. Something of the flavor of this argument can be gleaned from the 
“Prolog zur Schillerfeier,” which Keller read publicly at the festivities in Bern, in which 
Theodor Vischer also participated, and which praises the beauty of Schiller’s work not as 
mere aesthetic pleasure, but as a champion of freedom. The poem is striking above all for 
the total absence of any of the distinguishing features of Keller’s writing, which he replaces 
with familiar aesthetic and political tropes of liberal Realism. He praises Schiller’s poetry 
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the “Vollkraft und Ebenmass […]” it lends the thought of its readers, the “hohes Ziel” it 
envisions that is no mere abstract, but an active force stimulating the Swiss to excellence 
by connecting the “Eigenart’ge and Besondre” of the Swiss experience to the universal 
experience of humanity. 182 
In contrast to this celebration of beauty as the champion of civic vigor and national 
unity, “Das grosse Schillerfest” finds Schiller’s virtue elsewhere. The poem, which was 
added as an Abgesang to Keller’s unpublished Apotheker von Chamouny in 1859, and did 
not see release until 1884, opens not with a stirring historical reflection on the portent of 
the occasion—in the “Prolog”, the image of Schiller’s mother holding the destined child to 
her breast—but with a destitute woman in tears, heavy with child, searching a forest for 
dry fire wood, her clothes and feet torn by brambles. Walking along the forest path, she 
encounters another woman, of a familiar type in Keller’s oeuvre, “Groß und stark und 
schwangern Leibes; / Schwere Hölzer auf dem Haupte.” The Amazonian woman asks her 
downtrodden companion what is troubling her; the latter replies that her husband was 
recently killed felling wood, while she herself is struggling to provide for her children. She 
feels herself reduced by her circumstances to a state of near-savagery:  
 
    Leben soll zu Leben kommen   
Und das drängt sich und das mengt sich,  
Und das Herz ist krank zum Tode!   
 
Wie ein Tier auf wilder Heide  
Schein’ ich mir, das ohne Gott,   
Ohne Gott und ohne Sterne   
Hungernd irrt und sich vermehrt!183 
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The statement provides a stark counterpoint to the silent, dignified motherhood of the 
“Prolog zur Schillerfeier,”184 significant only in that, aided by the nursemaid poetry, it 
nurtures the Swiss nation to manhood. “Die grosse Schillerfeier” turns its attention not to 
higher ideals but with the needs of base animal existence; instead of verses praising Swiss 
wheels speeding over land and sea, Swiss goods on the ocean, the latter poem describes 
the material struggle for sustenance. This cry, in turn, is met not with a high poetic 
pronouncement, but a burst of vernacular German:  “Hei! Was ficht dich an, du Blöde!” 
replies the poor woman’s cheerful interloctuor. “... Lustig bau’n wir uns’re Wölbung, / 
Lustig in das Reich hinaus.”185 Her husband, she explains, is unfortunately, alive, though 
she drove him from their home for eating their children’s food; her children batter her and 
bite her, still she is cheerful, and celebrates each day of life. At first, these encouraging 
words have no effect. But then, suddenly, the clouds part, and both women witness a great 
crowd passing by in the valley below:   
Lang hinwallende Bürgerzüge 
Sah man schimmernd sich d’rin bewegen 
Und es wehte die fliegende Seide 
Reichgebildeter Banner voran. 
 
„Freude, schöner Götterfunken!“ 
Hallte herüber der klingende Sturm; 
War kein Kirchenlied und kein Kriegslied; 
doch die Glocken schallten vom Turm. 
 
Neither woman is familiar with the lines of poetry recited by the crowd, or with the person 
whom the celebration is meant to commemorate. But both women are strengthened by the 
sight of people joined not by the institutions of church, army, or nation, but by the 
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Menschenbund of common humanity of the “Ode an die Freude.”186 If the Realists 
grounded Schiller’s universal humanity by attaching it to the aspirations of the German and 
Swiss nations, then Keller goes one step further: his Schiller is shorn not only of the 
abstraction of nationhood, but of art itself, and grounded directly in the simplest, most 
ordinary human life. Schiller’s connection to German-speaking people is so profound that 
any human being can grasp his meaning without having read him. Whenever a human being 
recognizes her own dignity, whenever a human being extends this dignity to another, she 
accesses directly the meaning of his work. The poem closes, accordingly, not with an 
evocation of the nation or the heights that it will reach, but with an invitation to household 
meal, served by a destitute mother to her new friend and their swarming children: “Brot 
und Wein hab’ ich im Hause, / Nüsse für die junge Brut; und beim frohen Mütterschmause 
/ Fassen wir einen guten Mut.”187 The peak of Schiller’s achievement is that he has so 
thoroughly expressed and transformed the life of his nation, so totally fused a poetic and 
political ideal to the reality of the German world that the reading of his work is all but 
superfluous.  
Twenty-five years later, one of the most striking aspects of Martin Salander is the 
bitterness with which it revisits the younger Keller’s more idealistic treatment of Schiller 
and the Festspiel. So frequently is Schiller mentioned in the novel that he is, in a sense, a 
character, a fixture of Martin Salander’s Switzerland who is constantly praised, read, 
invoked, and misunderstood. In the second chapter, for example the reader learns that 
Wohlwend and Salander both belonged the same society devoted to the recitation of 
Schiller’s poetry. It is during a reading of “Die Bürgschaft,” Schiller’s poem celebrating 
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the Greek ideal of friendship as self-sacrifice, that Wohlwend convinces Salander to stand 
as co-signer, or Bürgschaft, on the loan on which Wohlwend quickly defaults. Later, when 
Wohlwend shows Salander his prospectus for the Gottesstaat, Salander reminds him of the 
figure of the Grand Inquisitor at the end of Don Karlos. In vain—Wohlwend has never 
read the play. At Marie’s Gastwirtschaft, a professor orders an expensive bottle of wine 
from Marie and, in sight of her starving family, grandiloquently describes its effect as a 
Schiller producing prickling effects on the stage of his tongue. Evidently, over time, 
Schiller’s name has simply become cultural capital, another superficial adornment, for an 
increasingly materialistic, valueless society.  
 Keller’s most cutting reevaluation of Schiller’s political idealism and of the 
Festspiel as a kind of civic art comes, however, in the novel’s eleventh chapter, during the 
wedding between the Salander daughters and the Weidelich sons. Incensed by a letter from 
his son Arnold, who, studying abroad in England, scoffs at the idea of progress Salander 
so cherishes, Salander vows to turn his daughters’ wedding into a celebration of progress, 
political unity and national feeling. The outing begins not out in nature, as his daughters 
would have liked, but at the Münsterburg train station, the symbol of the progressing and 
growing Swiss state that Salander had found so bewildering at the novel’s beginning. 
There, by train, the wedding party arrives at the festivities, where the usual accoutrements 
of the wedding have either been given a patriotic undertone, or conversely, where patriotic 
elements have been made to fit the wedding, with mixed success. A pastor “verlas […] ein 
eigens verfaßtes Gebet, welches den kirchlichen Sinn und die Rechte, des freien Denkens 
gleichmäßig vertrat,” while a military marching band plays the Overture to Rossini’s 
Wilhelm Tell, played at such an unobtrusive volume and tempo that, instead of bringing the 
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crowd together into one celebrating people, “die tafelnden Völker weder im Essen, noch 
im gemütlichen Gemurmel der einzelnen Nachbargruppen beirrt wurden.”188 The same 
discordant singing that annoyed Salander so during his walk through Münsterburg with 
Arnold can be heard all through his wedding. Two choruses of schoolchildren greet the 
guests, each guided by its own schoolmaster “mit gelber Stimmpfeife angeführt, die ihm 
zugleich als Taktstock diente. Takt im weiteren Sinne besaßen sie nicht genug, denn statt 
sich als ein Chor zusammenzutun, hatten sie sich aufgestellt, als ob sie gegen einander das 
bekannte Pintschgauer Wallfahrtslied singen wollten.”189 Because of the celebratory mood 
the guests do not notice the disharmony, and those who do tolerate it. Later, Salander is 
irritated by the forced beauty and insistence on the harmonious whole of the pastor’s speech 
praising the Weidelichs and the Salanders, though he knows neither family particularly 
well. The pastor’s obsequious toast makes Salander’s sparer, more accurate well-wishes 
seem surly by comparison. Afterwards, when Salander confronts the pastor, the latter 
excuses himself by saying that he is simply following the laws of rhetoric. “Ein 
Volksredener muß immer ein Ganzes bieten, das sozusagen künsterlisch abgerundet ist,” 
he advises Salander. “Wer sich in Gefahr begibt, kommt darin um, das müssen Sie nicht 
vergessen!” The Weidelichs, for their part, are quite pleased. “Schön haben Sie’s gemacht, 
Herr Pfarrer; wenn ich so reden könnte!” Amalia Weidelich exclaims.190 Rather than 
bringing about the admiration for civic virtue in the guests that Salander had hoped for, the 
wedding succeeds only in flattering their gaudy tastes. 
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 The centerpiece of the festivities is a political satire written by Salander in hopes of 
re-uniting the conservative Alt-Liberalen with the more radical Demokraten. (Keller 
himself belonged to the latter party.) The play represents each party as a comic figure, the 
Alt-Liberals in the frock coat and high Vatermörder collar of the early 1830s, the latter, 
“die reine Demokratie, das heißt Volksherrschaft” as a peasant woman, like the pair in 
“Das grosse Schillerfeier.” The Alt-Liberal, who, to Salander’s embarrassment, cuts a far 
nastier, far less conciliatory figure than he intended as he wrote it, has heard that there is a 
democratic wedding, and he intends to woo democracy, “obgleich ihm sonst die 
Demokratie von Weitem lieber als von Nahem sei.”191 The comedy continues as he begins 
to make lusty advances to Democracy, taking and twisting her pronouncements to his own 
ends. Finally, seeing that they are getting nowhere, they declare a truce and dance in the 
spirit of the festivities so vigorously that the buttoned-up costume of Alt-Liberalism bursts 
open, his collar falling off and the tails of his frockcoat flying in the air, in the spirit of true 
democracy. The play is a success—except, of course, among the Alt-Liberals it is supposed 
to reach, who either do not understand it, or are insulted to have been so skewered at a 
wedding. Feeling that he has failed as a host, Salander finds himself compelled to give an 
explanatory speech explaining his intentions, “die reinere Idee, welche er in der Sache 
ursprünglich gesehen,” and it is only once their feelings have been salved, and the satire of 
the play defanged, that the guests of the other party are placated. The good mood is quickly 
soured, however, by the arrival of two tramps, in search of merriment and free-food, 
wearing powdered wigs, tow beards, and fake noses. Deciding that they will have an easier 
time mixing into the festivities unnoticed if they split up among the two wedding parties, 
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they decide to throw dice to see who will get which—inadvertently revealing the means by 
which Isidor and Julian chose their respective political parties. Here Keller offers another 
possible kind of civic art: one that rejects the values of “Harmonie und Versöhnung” 
vaunted by Vischer. Instead of presenting a mythology to serve as a maypole for the people, 
it tells them unwelcome truths, is unyielding in forcing them to recognize their own faults, 
and that must therefore risk only reinforcing the partisanship among the people, and must 
recognize that it itself may be resented and rejected by the very people it is trying to 
improve. Tellingly, the only enlightening public spectacle that takes place in the novel is 
the trial of Isidor and Julian—“ein öffentliches Schauspiel”, as the narrator approvingly 
calls it. 
 It is quite tempting, then, to conclude that, as Keller’s final novel, Martin Salander 
represents a gradual turning away on the author’s part from the idealized figure of Schiller, 
and from the hopes for a civic art Keller held as a young author of patriotic lyric poetry. 
But it must be noted that the skepticism of art’s civic powers was already present both at 
the depiction of the Tellfest in both versions of Der grüne Heinrich, as well as in his poetic 
tributes to Schillerfeier. The Festspiel is only able to strengthen its citizens in the belief 
that a better republic is possible because somewhere in Swiss life this republic already 
exists, however buried; but this belief remains exactly that—a belief. There are, after all, 
scenes of civic discord at the Tellfest, and the peasant women of “Die grosse Schillerfeier” 
are no less destitute than they were at the poem’s start. All that they have been given is the 
strength to persevere. Schiller, the greatest of political dramatists in Keller’s eyes, did not 
transform the German-speaking world into a utopia. No artist can, as Salander realizes at 
the novel’s end. 
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V. “Ein kritischer Gesell”: Politics as Ethic of Renunciation 
 
What position, then, does Martin Salander aspire to convey to its readers? Does its 
highly skeptical and ambivalent view of art’s capabilities for inculcating civic virtue in its 
readers mean that it is a work of political and ethical quietism? Is it merely a satire, in 
keeping with Keller’s remarks to Berthold Auerbach that poetry cannot be made to serve 
politics, but must be a Blumengarten and Erholungsplatz, a refuge away from the demands 
and disappointments of political partisanship?192 And given the central place that Keller 
offers the political in his last work, what is the novel’s relationship to the various ethical 
dispositions, characters, and values that his work explores? How can we finally understand 
this turn towards the question of politics and civic education in Keller’s final novel in light 
of with his skepticism of political pedagogy, and the ethical emphasis throughout his 
oeuvre?  
Martin Salander does not offer a direct, programmatic answer to these questions. 
Keller’s last work does not treat extensively of art or writing. But an answer can be found 
in the book’s treatment of a concept adjacent to art—beauty. Where, in Der grüne Heinrich, 
beauty had, by virtue of its intimate relationship with nature, an edifying effect on the 
young Heinrich, Martin Salander rejects out of hand the pleasure afforded by the beautiful. 
That hostility is first made explicit during the Weidelich twins’s courtship of Setti and 
Netti, the Salander daughters. One evening, Martin Salander follows his daughters to a 
secret rendezvous with the Weidelich twins in the moonlight by a fountain, with a classical 
motif. The waterwork “ein altes in Sandstein gearbeitetes und verwittertes Brunnenwerk 
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mit Delphinen und Tritonen umflüstert. Vor dem Brunnen dehnte sich ein geräumiger 
Rundplatz, von mächtigen Akazien umstanden, und da die Bäume noch unbelaubt waren, 
schien der Vollmond unverhindert auf den Platz, wie auf die Alleewege, die in in denselben 
mündeten.”193 The watery scenery that serves as backdrop to the four youths’ midnight 
assignation, which echoes not only the classicism of Goethe and Schiller, but also the 
fascination with the ruins of antiquity in the Romanticism of Tieck and Eichendorff, 
suggests that belying the fixed, idealized forms of the fountain is a slipperiness, a lack of 
fixity, a loss of form, that is confirmed when Salander spies his otherwise unremarkable 
daughters with the Weidelich boys: “Sie erschienen ihm wie zwei dämonische 
Verkörperungen einer und derselben Wahn-Idee, von welcher die unglücklichen [Jungs] 
bessessen waren.”194 Salander is instantly struck by the complete control that this demonic 
quality grants his daughters over the Weidelich boys, who attempt nothing improper and 
who are quickly dissuaded by the girls from dropping their schooling and politics careers 
to run away with them. Though Salander sweeps in to stop the proceedings—again acting 
as a force of deprivation in his daughters’ lives—he leaves that their demonic beauty might 
have a tempering, socializing effect on the boys’ characters: “Die Kinder scheinen eine 
merkwürdige Gewalt über die Bengel zu haben!” he reports to his wife. The opposite 
proves true. Unlike the intimate relationship that beauty had with nature, and the tempering 
effects of its’ balance and regularity, in detaching the viewer’s glance away from the 
essence of things and towards a dazzling surface, beauty stokes desire and detaches the self 
both from reality and from itself: at the height of their passions, when neither Setti nor 
Netti, nor Isidor nor Julian can identify any of the others.  
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Unsurprisingly, Salander’s tendency to displace his desires into the realm of the 
ideal leaves him highly susceptible to the dazzling effects of beauty. This weakness is most 
apparent in Salander’s hopeless love affair with the Thessalonian-born sister-in-law of the 
resurfaced Louis Wohlwend, the bait in his final scam. Upon his return from Hungary, 
Wohlwend decides to “cool” Salander by having his old friend fall in love with his sister-
in-law, Myrrha Glawicz, whose beautifully shaped head recalls the classical bust often 
found in the bourgeois home, the plaster copy of the Juno Ludovisi in Goethe’s parlor come 
to life: “[Salander] sah ein Paar leuchtende Augen, die sich ihm wie in gleichgültiger 
Trauer zuwendeten, aus dem dunklen Haarknotes eine tadellose Stirn- und Nasenlinie sich 
niedersenekn und unter dem schwellenden Munde das schönste Kinn sich runden, alles wie 
nach dem Rezept für altgriechische Frauenköpfe.”195 The young Myrrha, whose namesake 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses carries on an affair with her father, is instantly recognizable as 
a muse: a beauty who inspires poetic feeling, but is herself unable to speak. This link to art 
is explicitly several chapters later, when Salander accompanies the mute Myrrha on a walk 
and hears her praised by a passing artist: “…Welch ein einfacher Rhythmus, ohne allen 
Aufwand, man weiß kaum, wo es steckt, Form und Bewegung in Eines gegossen!” he 
gushes, availing himself of the vocabulary of Winckelmann.196 The praise has not an 
edifying, but rather an overwhelming, narcotizing effect on Salander: “Die Worte des 
Künstlers und Kenners bewirkten eine seltsame Aufregung im inner und äußern Martin; 
sie machten sein Herz klopfen und seine Augen glänzen, während sie zugleich seine 
Schritte lähmten, daß er sich auf eine im Gehölze befindliche Bank niederlassen mußte.”197 
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The pleasure and desire awakened by beauty are heady, intense, they cause the characters 
in Martin Salander to go head over heels; but what they do not do is invigorate or energize. 
Vigor and energy come, in Keller’s world, from a confrontation with reality; the desire 
quickened by dazzling surfaces leads, by a contrast, to complete paralysis. As Salander is 
increasingly overcome by his feelings, as the pleasure is accompanied by shame at his own 
ridiculousness in desiring a woman so much younger than he, and as the shame isolates 
him from his wife and from his civic responsibilities, the pleasure evinced by the beautiful 
is linked by the text to a humiliating, almost masochistic sense of resignation. Beauty 
proves a pedagogical failure not simply because, as Rousseau argues, the rules of art distort 
the messages of civic virtue, but because, as Martin Salander demonstrates again and again 
with its protagonist, beauty itself and the love of beauty only dazzles, only stokes a desire 
that paralyzes as it grows and grows.  
Why, then, is Salander’s son, Arnold, so easily able to resist Myrrha’s charms when 
Wohlwend discovers that his friend’s son has papers incriminating him and tries to have 
his sister-in-law seduce him? Partly because, like his mother, Arnold sees the unprocessed 
material reality beneath all idealizations. “Sie [...]mich sogar ein bißchen, weil sie 
jedenfalls kurz vorher Wurst gegessen hat, wie ich an ihrem Hauche spürte!” he complains, 
when Salander gathers the nerve to ask his son what he thought of the beautiful foreigners. 
“Wäre etwas Senf da gewesen, so hätte ich ihn dazu genossen!”198 In this, Arnold 
resembles his mother, who smiles approvingly when Salander, taken aback by the remark, 
exclaims, “Ja, er ist ein kritischer Gesell!”199 But Arnold’s disposition is not merely an 
attunement to the overworked labor that she herself performs. Rather, the sexual and 
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romantic continence practiced by Salander’s son extends to a critical rejection of all 
idealism, all progress, indeed, all exuberance, all excess of energy, as he describes to his 
father in a letter from England, recalling a conversation he had had with the visiting father 
of a fellow Swiss classmate—a surrogate father—after their studies. According to this wise 
man, whom Arnold quotes at length, “Der Fortschritt sei  
nur ein blindes Hasten nach dem Ende hin und gleiche einem Laufkäfer, der über eine 
runde Tischplatte wegrenne und am Rande angelangt, auf den Boden falle, oder höchstens 
dem Rande entlang im Kreise herumlaufe, wenn er nicht vorziehe, umzukehren und 
zurückzurennen, wo er dann auf der entgegengesetzen Seite wieder an den Rand komme. 
Es sei ein Naturgesetz, daß alles Leben, je rastloser es gelebt werde, um so schneller sich 
auslebe und ein Ende nehme.200 
 
The speech that Arnold quotes so approvingly is a direct rejection not only of his father’s 
political views, but of the orientation of the elder Salander’s entire being. There is, to begin 
with, the critique of progress that Arnold cites, that uses the image, familiar in English 
Romanticism, of progress as a blind rushing akin to that of a chariot led by a blind 
horseman.201 Arnold’s speech does not reject progress in romantic or nostalgic terms. There 
is no longing for a lost unity, continuity, or regularity of life. Instead, the young man rebuts 
modernity in starkly modern terms, using the biological, scientific, quasi-Darwinian terms 
of “life” and “natural energies” with whose worldview, Arnold feels himself completely 
and totally at home. Rather than representing progress as a striving for the higher, the ideal, 
the beyond, as do Salander and Wohlwend, Arnold represents the persistent longing for 
forward movement as base and animal, biological, a pre-social urge like that of the insect 
skittering across the table that must be restrained, and brought into measure—that must be 
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socialized. In this light Arnold’s view of his father’s desire for civic progress echoes those 
instances of unrestrained id and animal instinct that recur throughout Die Leute von 
Seldwyla—the wild-maned lion that Pankraz stares down in order to shake himself free of 
his own mopery, or the wild-haired Vreeli and the patch of uncultivated land in Romeo und 
Julia auf dem Dorfe. The contrast between Salander and his son is thus explicitly not 
between idealism and pragmatism, but rather between two Lebensarten: one a cultivation 
of desire, the other its disciplining and containment.  
For Arnold, this self-discipline manifests as a negative ethic of refusal and 
renunciation. Keller takes pains, however, to distinguish this renunciation from that of 
Anna in Der grüne Heinrich. Where, for Heinrich, his relationship with Anna and the 
physical renunciation that it demanded caused those unexpressed emotions and sexual 
energies to be expressed in an Christian idealism—in the ideal of art, to which Heinrich 
vows to commit himself ardently, as the repository of the sensual pleasure they refuse to 
feel, and in his hope, when Anna is sick, that if he keeps himself completely pure there will 
be a beyond where he may join her—in the character of Arnold, desire is not sublimated; 
it is itself renounced. Hence Arnold’s refusal to participate not only in his father’s business, 
but in any profit-producing enterprise at all, He responds to his father’s pleas by vowing to 
control his caprice, his will: “Das wäre nicht mein Standpunkt,” he replies coolly. “Ich 
möchte nicht Geldmacher für zukünftige Dinge sein, die ich nicht billigen kann. Ich werde 
vielmehr die Willkür bestreiten, so lang ich es vermag; siegt sie, wohl und gut so füge ich 
mich gelassen, dann ist es mir aber auch gleichgültig, ob sie uns zwei oder zehn Millionen 
nehmen.”202 Here, at the end, the vocabulary of the learned Arnold switches from the 
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learned to the beatific—“gelassen”, “gleichgültig,”—into a form of quietism, a fixing and 
coming to terms with the world that goes hand in hand with a perfect serenity, a suspension 
of the inclination to intervene or to act. When the time comes for Arnold, as it did for Fritz, 
to enter into an awareness of public life, Salander presses him to begin visiting the political 
clubs, observing votes, and listening to lectures explaining laws—Arnold refuses once 
more. He vows to remain informed, which he considers part and parcel of “die Erfüllung 
seiner Bürgerpflichten.” It is “Mitwirken” that he will not do:  
Das sogenannte Mitwirken wolle er an sich kommen lassen, wenn es einst sein müsse, bis 
dahin aber das faktische Geschehn beobachten und die Früchte desselben betrachten; an 
ihnen werde er auch die Personen erkennen, die sie hervorbringen, besser als aus ihren 
Reden, und die Parteien hinwieder an diesen Personen, sowie an den Zeitungsartikeln, die 
sie schreiben. Die hergebrachten Einflüsse möge er nicht auf sich wirken lassen und gehe 
deshalb auch nicht hin, wo sie ausgewechselt werden; nur so fühle er sich frei und einst im 
Stande, Jedem zu sagen, was er für wahr halte.203 
 
Arnold’s profession of political faith places the discourse of parliamentary—the discussion 
of politics, the weighing of issues, the representation of viewpoints, and the attempts to 
win over the public—under the same head as beauty and its dubious pleasures. In Arnold’s 
view political speech has no contact with reality; it is only the circulation of misleading 
narratives that manipulate the desires of the populace. Politics, then, leads not to 
understanding or to change but only to the same dizzying loss of self experienced by Martin 
Salander in the company of Myrrha Galwicz. In the place of speechifying, promise-making 
and opinion-having, Arnold submits a politics of ethical Realism: the renunciation of 
images, illusions, ideals, and of action as well. Arnold vows to limit his attention only to 
what is factual, and claims for himself on the ability to freely pronounce what he holds to 
be true—and then only when prompted. He cultivates in himself and only in himself the 
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freedom from influence without which the citizen cannot be truly autonomous. For fear of 
misusing that freedom, he promises never to exercise it.  
 It is with the idealized figure of Arnold and his critical, one might say, Stoic, 
Realism that the novel closes. Wohlwend is routed, the Weidelich twins crimes’ brought 
to light, the Salander daughters safely divorced, their reputations and fortunes intact, 
Marie’s emotional wisdom finally acknowledged, and the Swiss republic safely in the 
hands of Arnold and his young friends. The novel’s final scene is a dinner at which these 
representatives of the new generation invite Salander to dinner, where, as an eminence 
grise, he is the guest of honor; after much food and wine, to demonstrate that Arnold’s 
continence is not morbidity or joylessness, there is at last harmonious singing. Salander is 
able to go to sleep—to die—knowing that Switzerland will always find stewards among 
the civically virtuous. In the character of Arnold Keller offers a golden mean between 
withdrawing from the world and succumbing to its folly. The end of Martin Salander 
advances the hope that a representation of the world free of distortions, however well- 
meaning these might be, will teach the reader patience and acceptance with the world as it 
is, to be content to do what is needed and no more, to take satisfaction in the existing, no 
matter how little appeal it may hold. That Arnold remains free of his father’s pedagogical 
schemes suggests that this discipline can come only from the self, not from another—
though it would not be quite correct to say that, at the end of his life, Keller returned to the 
notion of Bildung with which his literary career began. Bildung is growth, change, 
development, the expansion of a point of view. Arnold practices the opposite: a negative 
ethics of fidelity. For him, the realm of action has irretrievably corrupted; in an era of 





Martin Salander leaves us with a different interpretative quandary than do Der 
grüne Heinrich and Die Leute von Seldwyla. Martin Salander is at once more realistic than 
these works, packed as it is with details anchoring its action in the recent past of Keller’s 
time, and at the same time, more direct in posing the ethical question implied in the other 
two: namely, how should a person live? These two aspects of Martin Salander are, as I 
have attempted to demonstrate, closely connected. The Zeitroman was, with the strong 
Idealist roots and liberal national politics that informed it in the German context, already a 
pedagogical form—by making his protagonist a schoolteacher, obsessed with saving his 
nation from widespread corruption and criminality, rescuing it from the mercy of 
capitalism’s booms and busts, Keller only made it explicitly so. The structure of Martin 
Salander is an episodic consideration of pedagogical modes, whether art, civics, family, 
love, politics, or nature, each investigated as to its ability to produce not only happy human 
beings, but responsible citizens as well. “Das ist kein Roman,” was the reaction of his wife 
reported by Paul Heyse to Keller upon the book’s publication. “Das ist ein 
Erbauungsbuch!204 
Each of these pedagogical attempts proves, for its own reasons, a failure. In this, 
Keller’s final novel is the most cynical of Keller’s works. The gentle irony of Keller’s 
earlier work ensured that each experience, however negative, at least contained within itself 
a kernel of truth, some valuable bit of instruction about the world. In Martin Salander, folly 
compounds into further folly; corruption begets further corruption until every character in 
the novel, the author, the reader, all of Switzerland—indeed, the entire age—has been 
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implicated. Error in Martin Salander is root and branch; the more so because every single 
effort to correct those errors is born of error itself. Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
novel’s persistent use of the motif of twinning to blur the distinction between presumptive 
opposites: between, Salander the hero and Wohlwend the confidence man; between Isidor, 
the Liberal, and Julian, the Democrat; and between the corrupt, social climbing Weidelich 
boys and the polite, well-heeled Salander girls. The novel rejects all idealism, all 
imagination, all deviation away from reality, however well-intentioned, as wrong-headed, 
a view that it advances not only in its plot and themes, but in its sparse, pared-down style, 
shorn of the descriptive arabesques and playful humor that makes Keller’s earlier writing 
so pleasurable and distinctive.  
 Martin Salander attempts to resolve the difference between its hope for a steady 
instructive hand on the rudder of the Swiss republic and its rejection of all pedagogy by 
holding up the example of Arnold Salander. A person of decency and common sense, 
ability and capability, driven by a sense of duty, Arnold emerges as the novel’s ideal, who 
wisely avoids the romantic, financial, and political errors into which the rest of the novel’s 
characters’ fall. That Arnold is so transparently an ideal renders his character rather 
flimsy—he is missing the longing, her defiance, the rueful acknowledgment of life’s losses 
that give Keller’s other ideal, Judith, human depth. But he is nonetheless a way not only 
for Keller to return the political and social questions animating his novel to the ethical 
questions that run through his work, but finally to offer a concrete, dramatized answer to 
the question of how a person should be, and to construct a literary style that might steer his 
readers to that balanced, fully autonomous way of being. In Arnold Keller advances the 
notion that the freedom and autonomy necessary that each citizen must cultivate in order 
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to fix Switzerland’s social fabric demands the exercise of an active attention to the factual, 
to the material, to that which is actually taking place; to be witness and custodian to the 
world exactly as it is. Though the more tragic and more foolish character of Martin Salander 
is treated with great sympathy, Arnold offers a way forward for the world of German 
letters. He represents Keller’s desire for a realism of fixity and clarity over the 
seductiveness of beauty and the frivolity of poetic play—he represents, then, the end of the 
era of poetic Realism.  
 And yet, here too, Keller evinces a hesitation to guide the reader. Arnold’s behavior 
is, after all, ultimately characterized not by what he does, but by what he does not do—he 
does not work to produce profit, he does not participate in politics, he does not consort with 
women. In his letter to his father, Arnold rejects as foolish and short-sighted the desire of 
one generation to instill values in the next. Sons repeat their fathers oaths, he says, with far 
too much enthusiasm, expanding and distorting their meaning until they have no relation 
whatsoever to the reality that give them rise. Arnold wants nothing except to not want; the 
freedom that he earns for himself is a sterile one that produces nothing and is thus hardly 
suited to serve as the basis for an artistic program. Keller expressed as much to his friends: 
“Es ist nicht schön! Es ist nicht schön!“ he complained to Adolf Frey after the book’s 
publication. “Es gibt zu wenig Poesie darin!”205 Martin Salander therefore finds itself in 
the strange and ultimately unresolvable position of carefully diagnosing a host of social ills 
for which it conceives a cure that it does not ultimately prescribe. It is telling that it is the 
foolish Salander father, and not the practical son, who is the novel’s protagonist. The 
political hopes of the character for progress, for equality, for the rule of the people and 
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immediacy of human relations—and the poetic imagination of his author are one and the 
same. It is with resignation, neither resentful nor wholly serene, that the novel, and with it, 















































 I would like to close with some observations on what, in these three chapters, I have 
been referring to as Keller’s “ethical Realism.” To be an ethical Realist, in the sense that I 
have designated for Keller does not mean simply to thematize or to foreground the question 
of how to live, of how one should be, of how one should dispose oneself towards reality, 
to do so within a text whose characters and setting plausibly resemble the author’s 
biographical world. This condition is a necessary one, and Keller does do exactly this, as 
numerous scholars from Keller’s lifetime to the present have ably demonstrated. But, were 
we to regard him in this light, there would be little to differentiate him from contemporaries 
like Tolstoy or Eliot, of whom it might also be said that the question of how to live is the 
impetus driving the dramatic conflict in their novels. It has been my argument throughout 
that the scope of the question of ethics in Keller becomes fully apparent only when it is 
considered in light of his Keller’s close conceptual relationship to the categories and 
techniques of the German Realist movement. These authors, I argued, perceived a direct 
relationship between a work’s formal construction—in the “harmonious” construction of 
characters, the plausible and necessary unfolding of the plot, the fixing of perspective for 
description—and an actual harmony between individuals and the world. The poetry of the 
work of poetic Realism proves that better human relations are possible, and its Realism 
proves that they are possible in this world. Keller’s ethical Realism, therefore, is one of its 
formal elements—the construction of characters, the development of plot, the breakdown 
of chapters, the development of symbolic themes and metaphorical language, the 
description of physical environments—all these are given shape by the question of how a 
person should be, of how one should live. I have attempted to stress that for Keller this 
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question is not simply one of enforcing a preferred behavior over another, as is abundantly 
clear from his sharply worded criticisms of the moralism in Gotthelf’s work (to cite just 
one quote in his critical writings), but rather of examining, and dramatizing the examination 
of, the processes of socialization and modes of labor that bind one to something called 
Wirklichkeit in the first place. Keller’s sense of a Lebensart extends well past one’s 
behavior into one’s understanding, into one’s disposition. It is the plurality of these 
Lebensarten, and the conflicts between them to which that plurality gives rise, that provides 
Keller’s work not only with its dramatic thrust, but with its most fundamental formal 
elements. And so while it may credibly be argued, as have a century of Keller scholars, 
that Keller’s work advance a philosophy of skepticism and of liberation, championing the 
individual’s right to fashion an ethics for himself, it must also be said these convictions are 
presented amid considerable skepticism about art’s power, and much hesitation about its 
right, to enjoin to the reader to live his life one way or the other. 
 Far from being hobbled by this skepticism or this indecision, Keller’s work offers 
the contemporary scholar of Realism not only a critique of the poetic Realism of his time, 
but also a powerful concept for considering the relationship between Realism and reality, 
a concept that sidesteps the debates of past decades regarding mimetic and semiotic 
approaches, and turns instead to the relationship between the work’s interior formal 
structure, its verisimilitude, and its approach to the question of how one ought to live. In 
so doing, Keller’s work draws heavily on the literary tradition of the example, which may 
be observed in the form of the anecdote, as well as in the aphorism. These forms have 
always remained at the margins of scholarly debates on Realism, which, at least in the 
German context, focus primarily on the novel, the novella, and, to a lesser extent, on drama; 
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as modes of writing that observe experience and seek to offer counsel to their reader, that 
overlay the oral tradition of storytelling with the written one, and that ask to be judged not 
only by the beauty of their formulation but by their insight and their accuracy, they would 
be indispensable to a study of Realism from an ethical perspective. Seen in this light, 
Keller’s closest literary relations would not be his fellow Realists, nor even progenitors 
like Charles Dickens, but a stranger, more motley assortment of authors and works that 
have always sat strangely in the canon of Realism—Melville’s Confidence-Man, Hebel’s 
Schatzkastlein, or Kleist’s Polizeiberichte, to take just three examples exclusively from the 
nineteenth century.  
 I stress here the flexibility of the concept of ethical Realism because, as I have 
attempted to demonstrate, the treatment of ethics, the ethical, and the representation of 
these two, varies greatly between Der grüne Heinrich, Die Leute von Seldwyla, and Martin 
Salander. The goals of each work, and the formal constraints that result from these goals, 
produce three very literary approaches to the question of how one ought to live. This 
question is most obviously manifest in Der grüne Heinrich, which, in adopting the form of 
the Bildungsroman to track the development of a young man into manhood—however 
jagged and erratic that development may be—loads the description of the world and the 
people in it with existential possibility. Each person, each detail, represents a possible 
Lebensart. That, and not the changed ending, is the crucial difference between the second 
Fassung and the first one: in switching between first and third person perspective, the latter 
divides the labor of describing the world and deciding how to exist in it between the 
narrator and Heinrich, a division that the second Fassung abandons. Keller’s novel offers 
a panorama of the shopkeepers and master craftsmen that made up Switzerland’s petit 
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bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century. But the flatness of each character as perceived by 
Heinrich, the unity between their character, their outward appearance, their work, and the 
manner in which they die is a perspectival effect created by the fact that they are seen with 
Heinrich’s eyes, the sense that he, and the reader, can develop in any number of possibly 
contradictory ways. The novel is as much compendium as it is Bildungsroman: Keller’s 
reluctant to enjoin one way of being over the other is an aesthetic choice as much as it is 
an ethical one, given the novel breadth and dramatic weight. 
 The third person perspective of the Leute von Seldwyla novellas creates a very 
different work from Der grüne Heinrich, despite the thematic continuity between the two. 
The third person perspective of the former subjects the protagonists of each novel to the 
same flattening, the same unity of inward desire and outward appearance that marked the 
supporting characters in Der grüne Heinrich; as a result, none of the novella’s protagonists 
possesses quite the same freedom of self-determination that Heinrich does. Instead the 
central role played here by the setting of the stories, the so-called Kreditparadies of 
Seldwyla, where no one has work and where everyone is always “guter Dinge,” directly 
ties ethics to the production and reproduction of material existence, and places all ethical 
considerations within the parameters of a materialist anthropology. Work, as the means by 
which an individual secures a wage and the means by which he transforms raw materials 
into usable objects, is the key Lebesnart, the key disposition towards reality, in the 
Seldwyla novellas. It is also the key image for the artistic transformation of reality into 
meaning-laden symbols, charged with the pleasure that has been withheld in the workshop. 
This limitation of the scope of Keller’s ethical considerations brings with it, as 
compensation, a broadening of the concept of Verklärung from an artistic process, 
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practiced by artists in preparation for the making of paintings, novels and poems, to a 
faculty inherent in every human being, even those who “produce” nothing. To poeticize is 
to engage in an intimate congress with the material world and to produce meaning, as a 
worker does, free of the constraints of wage-labor, free of the worry of what will sell and 
who will buy. As in Der grüne Heinrich, the pessimism and optimism of Keller’s 
worldview, whether it is regarding the power of the individual to recognize and claim his 
own happiness, or art’s ability to counsel its readers, are impossible to extricate from one 
another.  
 It is the last of these three works, Martin Salander, written with the likely awareness 
that it would be Keller’s last work, that attempts to resolve some of these ambiguities and 
contradictions by bringing them to the fore. For this reason, Martin Salander is both the 
most realistic of Keller’s work, and the most ethical: realistic in the sense of being 
concretely grounded in the historical Switzerland of the 1870s, when Keller began work 
on the novel, with references to industrialization, public schools, banking crises, and 
environmental disaster, and rendered in the pared-down, dialogue-heavy style of Zola; 
ethical, in the sense, that the theme of pedagogy, around which the novel’s political plot is 
threaded, explicitly asks the question of how political and personal character is formed, 
and what role the poetic beautification of reality might play in that formation. And unlike 
the previous two, Martin Salander attempts to envision a resolution to the intractable 
ambivalence animating Keller’s work—in the character of Arnold Salander, the 
abstemious son of the novel’s lofty-minded protagonist who prides himself on the highly 
critical and restrained manner with which he considers not only his father’s ideals, but all 
deviation from the bare facts of material reality, whether by extracting surplus value from 
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the family business, engaging in high-flown material speech, or succumbing to what the 
narrator refers to as the “demonic” power of beauty. The eventual resolution of the conflict 
between father and son, which is revealed to be the story’s primary narrative thread, is the 
more striking for the traditionalism of the conception of ethics on which it draws. For 
Arnold, as for the Stoa, the attentive observation of and reconciliation with reality is a 
practice by means of which desire, the cause of all suffering and error, is curbed. These 
stylistic steps on the part of the late Keller towards realism and towards ethics go hand in 
hand, however, with an openly critical repudiation of poetic Realism, Verklärung, and the 
classical inheritance that Realism took on from Idealism and Romanticism. These are now 
treated as a distortion, a dazzling illusion that blinds its viewers, as well as its authors, to 
material reality, with disastrous consequences. Rejected now as inimical to personal growth 
and political stability, the Verklärung of reality is allowed, particularly in the character of 
Marie Salander, the vastly diminished role of survival mechanism by means of which 
poverty and unwelcome news, are sugar-coated.  
 To say that Keller’s later work takes a more jaundiced view of art and its 
relationship to ethics or to politics than does the writing he undertook in the 1850s would 
not be exactly right, however. In retrospective view, the same skepticism regarding the 
perfectibility of the individual and the republic, and by extension the role that the poetic 
transformation of reality is prevalent in all three works. The ideal of a “natural” art, an art 
that faithfully grasps and represents in clarified form the harmony and balance underlying 
nature, and in so doing imparts something of that harmony and balance to its creator and 
its viewer, leads Heinrich from folly to folly. The enlightening power of Goethe, Schiller 
and Jean Paul are extolled without reservation in Der grüne Heinrich. But the novel is no 
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less reserved in depicting the personal realities that muddy art’s message, not least among 
them the ideal-corroding effects of poverty—that art reaches its audience first and foremost 
as a commodity for purchase, that those most in need of its salubrious, healing effects can 
least afford, is dramatized with equal parts humor and pathos in the scene, to pick just one, 
with the bookseller hawking Goethe’s collected works. Nor does it shy away from the 
central ethical conflict of the Realist period, a conflict that, though handled frequently in 
the criticism and theoretical writing of the period, is rarely tackled in the literature itself: if 
art’s sole value is in its fidelity to reality, then why should art exist at all? Heinrich’s 
experiences with the theater, both in a local production of Faust and in the Tellfest that is 
the centerpiece of the novel’s second volume, offer a possible way out of this quandary by 
imagining art and life becoming one. But, as I have argued, the reverse side of this ideal, 
which recurs again and again in Keller’s work, is a profound skepticism of the artistic 
process. It reveals the worry that, by making his subject beautiful, the artist is not only 
falsifying it, but, what is worse, failing in his duty to show his public things as they actually 
are. Sure enough, Heinrich’s artistic adventure brings out both the best and the worst parts 
of his personality. It deepens his narcissism, his tendency to embellish, and his 
wastefulness; but it also the powerful sense of obligation he feels towards his family to 
unearth and preserve the dignity that he senses in their way of life. And the same uneasiness 
about art is at work in the focus on handicraft and labor in the Leute von Seldwyla cycle, 
which seeks, across all ten novellas, to ground poetic imagination by recovering in it the 
dignity and the closeness to the physical world that comes with labor, while redeeming 
labor by granting it the freedom of a self-directed poetic imagination. Here the guiding 
artistic light is Shakespeare, whom the narrator praises not as the taboo-breaking genius of 
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the Sturm und Drang period, but as an observer of human fates and human characters. 
Shakespeare’s genius is therefore not his own; rather, the genius of his works is the genius 
of life itself, the original storyteller, from whom all other storytellers crib and cite. 
 I have attempted to demonstrate that, from a narrative standpoint, Der grüne 
Heinrich and Die Leute von Seldwyla weave together in myriad ways this skepticism and 
this idealism towards Poesie. By contrast, Martin Salander stands out as that work of 
Keller that gives up exploring the tensions of the poetic Realist project and rejects its 
aesthetics as well as its politics. As I have argued in the third chapter of this dissertation, 
the political plot in Martin Salander is added not simply for verisimilitude, but as an 
explicit confrontation with the liberal, democratic dimension of Realist movement, which 
saw in poetic idealization a tool of civic pedagogy, a bellows for the flames of 
Volksgemeinschaft and national pride. Just as Schmidt, Freytag, Vischer, and Keller 
himself held that Verklärung cleared away the chaff of empirical reality and extracted the 
essences of things, so too would it portray the bonds that tied the German (or the Swiss) 
people together, buried beneath the surface of regional difference and class conflict, and 
offer up a portrait of the national character as it is, and as it might be, and thereby solidify 
them. Such was the hope of the young Keller, the patriotic poet, as well as the mature Keller 
who took the stage at the Schiller’s centenary in Bern in 1859. The late Keller attacks the 
notion that reality as it is somehow insufficient or incomplete, or that beautifying it have 
some instructive purpose. As I argued, Martin Salander draws a critical parallel between 
the high-spun poetic and political aspirations of Keller’s eponymous protagonist; the 
avaricious, social-climbing Weidelich twins; and the novel’s antagonist, the swindler, 
confidence-man, Louis Wohlwend. Through the latter character, who fashions himself as 
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a patriot, a lover of poetry and nature, and the prophet of a religious state, Keller advances 
the notion that poetic Realism is only another confidence scheme whose idealizations are 
no realer than the holdings of the Atlantische Uferbank, of which Wohlwend is chief 
officer—that to pass off what ought to be as though it actually exists is nothing more than 
a swindle on reality itself. Over the course of the novel, Martin Salander is disabused of 
his restless imagination, his poetic visions of the Swiss people and their civic virtue, of the 
money to be in the New World, of the salubrious effects of the political process on the 
character of those who participate in it; before he turns out the light to go to sleep one final 
time, he finds himself content with what is, instead of yearning for what might be.   
 I closed my third chapter by considering Arnold Salander, the counter-model 
offered by Keller to Salander’s tireless idealism. In Salander fils Keller considers that 
theme with which the late Goethe returned again and again—renunciation. Insofar as 
Arnold embodies an ethics, it is a negative one: he refuses to extract surplus value from the 
family business; he resists the charms of Louis Wohlwend’s beautiful but slow-witted 
sister-in-law; and, the greatest rebuff to his father, refuses to participate in politics. His is 
an ethics of continence, of refusal to demand what might be in addition to what is. Perhaps 
most striking about his character, then, is that he dovetails so closely with the literary 
movement that Keller and his fellow poetic Realists might, thirty years previously, have 
rejected as “naturalism”—the writing of Flaubert, Zola, and later Ibsen; declarative in style, 
frank in its portrayal of personal failures and social ills, firm in its refusals to see ideals as 
anything more substantial that wisps of imagination. Keller’s letters and critical writing 
show that he bristled at these authors’ cynicism, and I do not mean to argue here that, had 
Keller lived another decade, he might have written a novel peopled with the courtesans and 
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social strivers he disdained in Zola. Nonetheless, the late Keller is virtually alone among 
the authors of poetic Realism in giving serious consideration to how its aesthetics and its 
politics might be reformed; and his consideration of the French novel at the end of his life 
suggests that, though he rejected its cynicism, he recognized in it an authentic care for the 
material basis of social and individual life. In the last years of his life, Keller toyed with 
the idea of a sequel to Martin Salander following the further adventures of Arnold, in which 
Keller might have continued his attempt to detach that care for man’s material well-being 
from the blasé attitude that the French authors in their turn attempted to pass off as “just 
the way things are,” and to transform it into a livable Lebensart that might be the basis not 
only of a truthful literature for the close of nineteenth century, but also a basis for 
responsible family life, private enterprise and citizenship, as well as a tool for unmasking 
mendacious political ideologies.  
 That this book was never written cannot be attributed exclusively to Keller’s death 
two years later. As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this dissertation, a “critical” 
Realism in which the tensions, contradictions and, most significantly, the aspirations, both 
political and aesthetic, of poetic Realism would have meant the end of Keller’s project. 
Noble though the character of Arnold Salander might be the author’s point of identification 
is unmistakable with the foolish visions and plans of his father. Arnold, I observed, is 
unswerving in his fidelity to reality, he refuses to be taken in, he risks nothing, but for that 
very reason he does not produce anything either. The capacity for poetic imagination in its 
wisdom and its folly is the motive mechanism of Keller’s work; the variety of human 
Lebensarten its substance. A novel in which the precarious balance between reality and 
ideal has been settled for the former, and in which the question, for example, of how much 
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skepticism is liberating and how much corrosive, or of how much pleasure is gluttonous 
and how joyful, affirmative, of whether to mourn the passage of things or cherish them the 
more deeply for their transience, of how to work so that one learns the boons of diligence 
and productivity but not the yoke of a master, has found an answer would no longer be a 
novel by Keller. In the character of Arnold the desire that moves not only the bodies but 
the minds of Keller’s protagonists has been entirely bridled, and their political aspirations 
for a truly representative democracy that challenges its participants to set aside their 
inwardness and their selfishness and participate as members of a community have been 
limited to a mere administration or management. As a student of history, he looks not 
forward, but backward, as so many of Keller’s contemporaries, from Meyer to Stifter to 
Freytag, were inclined to do; in him, there is nothing left to imagine, and therefore nothing 
left to write. Critical though Keller’s novels and novellas were of the poetic Realist project, 
they were nonetheless inextricably woven together with its conceptual language and its 
sense of purpose, its hopes and its disappointments. As those authors aged, and their sense 
of purpose dimmed, so too did Keller’s. By finally rejecting poetic abstraction on ethical 
grounds, and by attempt to answer at last the question of what art could finally do for its 
reader, Keller severed the last links between himself and the movement, and in so doing, 
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